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Abstract 
 
The University of Manchester 
Ahmed Mamdouh Tahoun 
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) 
Essays in Accounting and Finance 
15 September 2010 
 
In this thesis, I examine why there are distortions in investor portfolio selection, and show the 
consequence of these distortions on firms’ investment decisions. The thesis consists of three 
essays.  
 
In the first essay, I examine the economic consequences of the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 
EU countries by showing which types of economies have the largest reduction in investment-
cash flow sensitivity post-IFRS. I also examine whether the reduction in investment-cash flow 
sensitivity depends on firm size as well as economy type. I find that the investment-cash flow 
sensitivity of insider economies is higher than that of outsider economies pre-IFRS and that 
IFRS reduces the investment-cash flow sensitivity of insider economies more than that of 
outsider economies. Also, I find that small firms in insider economies have the highest 
sensitivity of investment to lagged cash flow pre-IFRS, and that they are no longer sensitive to 
lagged cash flow post-IFRS. Overall, my results suggest that IFRS adoption might have 
improved the functioning of capital markets in relation to small firms in insider economies.  
 
In the second essay, I show that the level of conditional accounting conservatism of foreign 
markets significantly influences decisions to diversify portfolios internationally. This could be 
either because conditional conservatism per se is attractive to international investors, or 
because the unmodelled factors that attract foreign investors to a country also cause these 
countries to adopt conditionally conservative accounting practices. We also find that the 
positive association between investor diversification decision and conditional conservatism is 
sensitive to the level of conditional conservatism of investors’ home markets. If conditional 
conservatism serves to alleviate foreign investors’ concerns related to insiders have 
asymmetric access to information then one would expect the chosen mode of entry into a 
foreign market (as foreign portfolio or direct investor) to be sensitive to the level of 
conditional conservatism. I find evidence supportive of this expectation. 
 
In the third and final essay, I document pieces of evidence suggesting that the stock ownership 
of politicians is a mechanism to establish mutual relations with firms. There is a positive 
association between the ownership of politicians and the contribution they receive from firms 
during the elections. This association is a function of how valuable it is to establish a mutual 
relation between politicians and firms. Politicians invest more in firms that favor their party 
and less in firms that oppose their party. The strength of the ownership-based relation with 
contributing firms is positively associated with the amount as well as the number of 
government contracts awarded to firms. When politicians divest the stock, the established 
relation with contributing firms breaks down. Such break-down, however, only exist when 
there are no other mechanisms enforcing politician-firm relation. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction  
 
Despite the elegant mathematical representation offered in the Markowitz model of portfolio 
selection, a growing empirical literature shows that investor preferences cannot simply be 
reduced to a two dimensional risk-return space. Compared to the predictions of this model, 
investors appear to “over” or “underweight” assets; for example, because they are more 
familiar with certain stocks (Merton 1987), have emotional ties or feelings of loyalty to a firm 
(Cohen 2009), or prefer to invest in firms that are located in the same geographical area 
(Coval and Moskowitz 1999). In addition to these investor preferences, market frictions (such 
as governance and information problems) also lead investors to over or underweight assets. 
This is because investors respond to these kinds of problems by readjusting their portfolios in 
the direction of markets where they are more protected, thereby leaving some assets being 
over-weighted while others being under-weighted. The cumulative effect of these distortions 
in individual portfolio selection (either due to market frictions and/or their own preferences) 
can cause capital rationing at an aggregate level, which in turn can affect the investment 
behavior of firms. 
 
My thesis is structured around three essays containing original research in Chapters 2, 3, and 
4, respectively. The essays are self-contained, i.e., they have separate literature reviews, 
exploit different datasets, and answer distinct research questions. Each of the three essays 
addresses an individual aspect of the above-mentioned scenario. While I recommend reading 
each chapter independent of the others, there is a link between the chapters as follows. 
Chapters 2 and 3 focus on the effect of accounting quality (as a mechanism that can alleviate 
market frictions) on investment decisions. Chapters 3 and 4 introduce examples for each of the 
two main reasons (i.e., market frictions and investors preferences) behind investors’ over or 
underweighting of assets. I briefly explain these links below. 
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Chapters 2 and 3 examine the impact of accounting quality improvement on investment 
decisions. The former focuses on the investment decisions of firms, while the latter focuses on 
those of investors. The idea rests on the following. If enhancing accounting quality can 
mitigate information and governance problems that cause investors to misallocate and ration 
their capital, firms will invest more efficiently. In chapter 2, I capture the increase in the 
accounting quality using the event of mandatory adoption of the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) in the European Union. I directly test whether firms have lower 
investment efficiency in the pre-IFRS adoption period (i.e., a time period where funds may 
have been withheld from the market due to severe governance and information problems). I 
use investment-cash flow sensitivities as a proxy for investment efficiency, i.e. lower 
investment-cash flow sensitivity means higher investment efficiency. I indeed find that pre-
IFRS adoption firms (in particular the small firms) in economies with severe information and 
governance problems have higher investment cash flow sensitivity. I then show that when the 
accounting quality is increased exogenously by the adoption of IFRS, the investment 
efficiency of these firms increases (as proxied by lower investment-cash flow sensitivity in the 
post-IFRS period).  
 
The findings of chapter 2 suggest that when investors perceive severe information and 
governance problems (i.e., when accounting quality is low), firms under-invest; and when 
investors start to feel protected (i.e., when accounting quality improves), firms invest 
efficiently. Thus, chapter 2 predicts that accounting quality should play a role with regard to 
investors’ decisions to allocate their funds. Therefore, I directly examine, in chapter 3, 
whether accounting quality indeed plays such a role. Specifically, I test whether the quality of 
accounting information (as a proxy for governance and information problems) in both 
domestic and international markets matters in explaining investors’ portfolio allocation 
decisions. In this chapter, I use the degree of conditional accounting conservatism, measured 
using the Basu (1997) model, in the market to capture the quality of accounting information in 
that market. A low degree of accounting conservatism in a market can leave investor wealth 
exposed to expropriation risk (Ball 2001). Investors, accordingly, respond to these kinds of 
problems in two ways. They will either (1) not invest in countries where these problems are 
severe or (2) conditional upon investing, choose a type of investment that mitigates the 
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severity of these countries’ problems. Consistent with this, I show that the degree of domestic 
and international portfolio allocation and the forms of international allocation (portfolio versus 
direct investment) are strongly influenced by the degree of conditional accounting 
conservatism.  
 
The findings of chapter 3 suggest that information and governance problems (as examples of 
market frictions) can explain why investors appear to over or underweight assets. Market 
frictions, such as governance and information problems, cause investors to misallocate their 
funds. Prior studies, however, suggest that market frictions is not the full story behind the 
misallocation of investors’ funds, and investors are not always compelled to misallocate their 
funds (Merton 1987, Coval and Moskowitz 1999, Cohen 2009). These studies suggest that 
investors could have preferences to overweight certain assets due to, for example, 
geographical proximity, familiarity, or loyalty. That is investors could choose to misallocate 
their funds without being compelled to do so. Therefore, chapter 4 offers a novel example of 
investor preferences that could explain why some investors under or overweight certain assets. 
Specifically, I examine a setting in which investor preferences for stocks are determined by 
“personal ties” with the firm. In this chapter, I focus on politicians because they represent a 
class of investors who could have a personal relation with firms during election times. Thus, 
the relation between politicians and firms during the election period provide an a priori 
promising setting to test the “personal ties” hypothesis. I show that politicians tend to invest 
their personal wealth in companies that support them during elections. Further, I find that 
politicians overweight (underweight) the stocks of firms that favor (oppose) their party. I 
discriminate between “personal ties” as a determinant for investment behavior and closely 
related determinants, such as investor recognition and proximity. While politicians comprise a 
relatively small class of investors, their dealings have a significant impact on society. Indeed, I 
document that the investment behavior of politicians is associated with government 
redistributive actions via the award of federal contracts to firms with personal ties to these 
politicians. 
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Chapter 2 
IFRS Adoption in Europe and Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity:  
Outsider versus Insider Economies∗ 
 
2.1. Introduction  
 
Starting from 2005 listed firms in the European Union (EU) countries were required to prepare 
their consolidated financial statements according to the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS). Several studies document anticipated as well as actual economic 
consequences of IFRS adoption.1 None of these studies, however, focus on investment 
efficiency, defined as the extent to which managers  under- or over-invest and proxied by the 
absence of sensitivity of investment to cash flows (see e.g. Hubbard 1998). Thus, we ask, with 
regard to investment efficiency, which types of economies benefited most from IFRS 
adoption? Also we examine if the benefits of IFRS adoption applied equally to small and large 
firms.  
 
Several studies examine the association between information quality and investment 
efficiency. The results of these studies show that investment efficiency is positively associated 
with accounting quality (Biddle and Hilary 2006; Biddle et al. 2009), disclosure level 
(Khurana et al. 2006), and stock price efficiency (Durnev et al. 2004). When combined with 
the evidence that IFRS adoption is associated with higher quality accounting (Barth et al. 
                                               
∗
 This chapter is published at the International Journal of Accounting, and co-authored with my supervisors 
Thomas Schleicher and Martin Walker, who are from the Manchester Accounting and Finance Group, 
Manchester Business School, UK. We wish to thank Ahmed Rashad Abdel-Khalik, two anonymous referees, 
Jenice Prather-Kinsey (Discussant), Hans Bonde Christensen, Begona Giner, María Gutiérrez, Gilles Hilary, 
Thomas Jeanjean, Edward Lee, Cedric Lesage, Peter Pope, Phillip Stocken, Herve Stolowy, Peter Wysocki, Steve 
Young, workshop participants at the 2008 INTACCT Colloquium (Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University 
Frankfurt), the 2008 VI Workshop on Empirical Research in Financial Accounting (Universidad Carlos III de 
Madrid), the 2008 ESRC/MAFG Conference and Doctoral Colloquium (Manchester), the 2008 
International Journal of Accounting and Illinois International Accounting Symposium (Warsaw), and 
the 2008 EIASM Workshop on Accounting and Economics (Universita Bocconi) for helpful comments 
and suggestions. Ahmed Tahoun gratefully acknowledges the financial contribution of the European 
Commission Research Training Network INTACCT (MRTN-CT-2006-035850).  
1
 Armstrong et al. (2010); Comprix et al. (2003); Daske et al. (2007a); Pae et al. (2006): Prather-Kinsey et al. 
(2008). 
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2008) and with the evidence that mandatory disclosure improves stock price efficiency 
(Ferrell 2007) these results suggest that the mandatory adoption of IFRS should improve 
investment efficiency in the EU countries.  
 
Furthermore, the effects of IFRS adoption are likely to vary across economies and firms. For 
example, firms operating in countries with higher quality accounting systems (i.e. accounting 
systems characterized by high quality domestic accounting standards and which promote 
extensive disclosure) prior to the adoption of IFRS should have less to gain from IFRS 
implementation. This line of thinking leads us to consider the following two research 
questions: 
 
(1) Does IFRS adoption improve the investment efficiency of some types of economy more 
than other types?  
 
(2) Controlling for economy type, does IFRS adoption improve the investment efficiency of 
certain types of firms more than other types of firms? 
 
In order to answer these questions we follow Leuz et al. (2003) who classify economies, based 
upon several institutional features, into two types as follows. Outsider economies, which are 
economies with large stock markets, dispersed ownership, strong outside investor rights, high 
disclosure levels and strong legal enforcement. Insider economies, which are economies with 
small stock markets, highly concentrated ownership, weak outside investor rights, poor 
disclosure levels and weak legal enforcement.2 Insider economies provide less protection for 
ordinary external investors giving rise to significant costs due to moral hazard and adverse 
selection (see e.g. Dyck and Zingales 2004). Furthermore, Leuz et al. (2003) show that the 
accounting and disclosure quality of insider economies is lower than that of outsider 
economies. Thus, investors in insider economies lack the information they need to mitigate 
any agency and adverse selection problems that arise in such economies as a result of their 
weak institutional features.  
                                               
2
 In fact, Leuz et al. (2003) classify economies into three groups. The third one is insider economies with medium 
stock markets, concentrated ownership, weak outside investor rights, average disclosure level but with strong 
legal enforcement. We exclude this group for reasons explained in footnote no. 7. 
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If it is true that insider economies suffer from greater costs of moral hazard and adverse 
selection (Leuz et al. 2003), then it seems reasonable to predict that a major change in 
accounting and disclosure, such as the implementation of IFRS throughout the EU, might 
affect outsider EU economies differently from insider EU economies. For this reason we test 
to see whether the implementation of IFRS has a differential impact on our measure of 
investment efficiency, as proxied by investment-cash flow sensitivity, for insider and outsider 
EU economies. 
 
Firstly, we compare the pre-IFRS investment-cash flow sensitivity of insider and outsider 
economies. The literature on investment cash-flow sensitivity predicts and finds that firms for 
which the perceived adverse selection and agency problems are severe face tighter financing 
constraints, i.e. a larger cost differential between internal and external funds (e.g. Fazzari et al. 
1988).3 Consequently, such firms have to rely more on internally generated cash flows to 
finance their investment due to their cost advantage over external funds. Moreover any 
shortage in such firms’ internal cash flows leads to an underinvestment problem, i.e. lower 
investment efficiency.4  
 
Combining the insight that investment-cash flow sensitivity is greater for firms with severe 
adverse selection and agency problems with the insight that insider economies exhibit 
generally higher levels of adverse selection and moral hazard than outsider economies leads us 
to predict that insider economies should have higher investment-cash flow sensitivity than 
outsider economies before the mandatory adoption of IFRS. Our results are consistent with 
this prediction. 
  
Secondly, we compare the post-IFRS investment-cash flow sensitivities of insider and outsider 
economies. The results of prior studies show that higher quality accounting enhances 
investment efficiency by mitigating agency problems and adverse selection (Biddle and Hilary 
                                               
3
 See Hubbard (1998) for a comprehensive review of this literature. 
4
 In fact, investment can be sensitive to internally generated cash flows not only because firms are financially 
constrained but also because firms might have excess cash that managers do not want to distribute to investors, 
thereby leading to an overinvestment problem, i.e. lower investment efficiency. This is explained in Section 3.2. 
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2006, Biddle et al. 2009). When combined with the empirical evidence that IFRS is associated 
with higher quality accounting (Barth et al. 2008), these results suggest that the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS might play a role in enhancing investment efficiency by improving 
accounting quality that, in turn, mitigates agency problems and adverse selection. This role is 
expected to be more important in settings where there is a higher likelihood of agency 
problems and adverse selection and where there are lower quality accounting and poor 
disclosure levels before the mandatory adoption of IFRS. Since this is the case with insider 
economies, we expect a stronger effect of IFRS on reducing investment-cash flow sensitivity 
for those economies. Thus, we predict that IFRS reduces investment-cash flow sensitivity 
more in insider than in outsider economies. Our results support this prediction. 
 
Subsequently, we extend our analysis by considering whether our results are sensitive to firm 
size (in addition to economy type). Firstly, combining our prediction that insider economies 
have the highest investment-cash flow sensitivity pre-IFRS with the evidence that small firms 
face liquidity constraints and have higher investment-cash flow sensitivity (Gilchrist and 
Himmelberg 1995; Himmelberg and Petersen 1994) leads us to predict that the small firms in 
insider economies should have the highest investment-cash flow sensitivity pre-IFRS 
adoption. Secondly, we predict that IFRS adoption will have a stronger effect on reducing the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity of small firms operating within insider economies than the 
large firms operating in such economies. Consistent with these predictions, we find that (1) the 
small firms have the highest sensitivity of investment to lagged cash flow pre-IFRS adoption, 
and (2) they have the largest reduction in the sensitivity to lagged cash flow post-IFRS 
adoption. 
 
Our results suggest that IFRS adoption might have relaxed financing constraints and that IFRS 
standards help to take us back to a neoclassical setting in which Tobin’s Q, as a proxy for 
investment opportunities, is the only determinant of investment (Tobin 1969; Hayashi 1982, 
Bond et al. 2003; Hovakimian and Hovakimian 2009). Thus, our results suggest that 
accounting standard setters can contribute to efficient corporate investment activity by 
improving the quality of countries’ accounting systems and this applies especially to countries 
with poor prior accounting. 
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explains how our study relates to 
prior literature. Section 3 develops the hypotheses. Section 4 presents the empirical models 
and describes the sample and the data. Section 5 provides the empirical results and robustness 
tests. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2.2. Related Research 
 
Our paper relates to three streams of prior research, namely the literature on economic 
consequences of the mandatory adoption of IFRS, the literature on finance and economic 
growth, and the literature on financing constraints and investment-cash flow sensitivity. The 
paragraphs below briefly review these three streams and clarify our contribution. 
 
2.2.1. Economic consequences of the mandatory adoption of IFRS 
 
Our research is related to the literature on the economic consequences of mandated changes of 
accounting standards generally, and in particular to the stream of research that examines the 
economic consequences of the mandatory adoption of IFRS.5 For example, Armstrong et al. 
(2010); Comprix et al. (2003); Pae et al. (2006) attempt to model the anticipated economic 
consequences of IFRS adoption prior to their actual adoption. Their results suggest that capital 
markets expected net benefits to flow from IFRS adoption. The evidence in Christensen et al. 
(2007) suggests, however, that not all firms expect the same benefits from mandatory IFRS 
adoption. Unlike these studies, other studies examine the economic consequences of 
mandatory IFRS after its actual adoption. For example, Daske et al. (2008) examine the 
impact of IFRS adoption in 26 countries on market liquidity, equity valuations, and cost of 
equity capital. They find an increase in market liquidity, an increase in equity valuations, and 
a decrease in cost of capital around the mandatory adoption of IFRS. They find that these 
capital market effects (1) are stronger in countries that have larger differences between local 
GAAP and IFRS and (2) exist only in countries with strong legal enforcement and reporting 
incentives. Prather-Kinsey et al. (2008) also document that European firms have lower cost of 
                                               
5
 See Leuz and Wysocki (2007) for a review of this literature. 
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equity capital post-IFRS adoption. We complement this stream of the literature by focusing on 
investment efficiency, thereby demonstrating another benefit that is likely to flow from the 
adoption of IFRS standards. 
 
2.2.2. Finance and economic growth 
 
Our study is also related to the stream of research that examines the association between 
financial market development (and the associated institutions) and economic growth. Several 
studies, for example King and Levine (1993) and Levine and Zervos (1998), show that 
developed financial markets facilitate economic growth. Subsequent studies attempt to 
examine the rationale behind such a relationship. For example, Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
show that industries that rely more on external financing grow faster in countries with more 
developed financial markets (as measured by the quality of accounting standards). Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) find that the proportion of firms growing at rates exceeding the 
maximum growth rate that can be attained using only internal finance is higher in countries 
with strong legal enforcement and more developed financial markets. Both Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Maksimovic and Rajan and Zingales (1998) interpret their results as financial 
development reduces the cost of external finance to firms, and accordingly it is predicted that, 
as Rajan and Zingales (1998, 561) put it, “financial development liberates firms from the 
drudgery of generating funds internally” and, as Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998, 
2108) put it, “as financial markets develop, the role of established firms’ internal capital 
diminishes.” Our results that outsider economies have lower investment-cash flow sensitivity 
than insider economies provide empirical support for this prediction, since outsider (insider) 
economies are the economies with more (less) developed financial markets, strong (weak) 
legal enforcement and higher (lower) quality accounting.     
 
2.2.3. Financing constraints and investment-cash flow sensitivity 
 
Finally, our study is related to the stream of research that examines the relation between 
financing constraints and investment-cash flow sensitivity. In their seminal paper, Fazzari et 
al. (1988) find that firms facing tighter financing constraints, i.e. a larger cost differential 
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between internal and external financing as proxied by dividend payout ratio, have higher 
investment–cash flow sensitivities after controlling for their growth opportunities. A large 
body of subsequent empirical studies finds results consistent with those of Fazzari et al. (1988) 
using other proxies for being financially constrained, such as the existence of bond or 
commercial paper ratings and access to public debt markets (Calomiris et al. 1995; Gilchrist 
and Himmelberg 1995), membership in industrial groups (Hoshi et al. 1991), banking 
relationships (Houston and James 2001), firm size (Gilchrist and Himmelberg 1995), and firm 
age and ownership dispersion (Schaller 1993).6 We complement those studies in two ways. 
Firstly, unlike prior studies that allow the specification of their models to vary among firms 
within the same economy, we show a role for liquidity, as measured by internally generated 
cash flows, to influence investment by allowing the specification of the model to vary among 
economies. Secondly, we suggest a new proxy for financing constraints which is the type of 
the economy to which a firm belongs, i.e. insider versus outsider economies. Consistent with 
the validity of this proxy our results indicate that pre-IFRS adoption insider economies have 
higher investment-cash flow sensitivity than outsider economies. 
 
2.3. Hypothesis Development 
 
2.3.1. Investment-cash flow sensitivity of insider versus outsider economies: Pre-IFRS 
 
Leuz et al. (2003) group 31 countries into three groups according to institutional 
characteristics drawn from La Porta et al. (1997, 1998). Those groups and their related 
features are as follows: (1) outsider economies with large stock markets, dispersed ownership, 
strong outside investor rights, high disclosure level and strong legal enforcement; (2) insider 
economies with medium stock markets, concentrated ownership, weak outside investor rights, 
average disclosure level but with strong legal enforcement;7 and, (3) insider economies with 
                                               
6
 See Hubbard (1998) for a review of this literature. 
7
 We exclude the insider economies with strong legal enforcement for three reasons as follows. First, it includes 
two countries that might lead to misleading inferences which are Germany, in which several companies have 
already adopted IFRS voluntarily before the mandatory adoption of IFRS, and Switzerland, which is not 
committed to follow the EU Directives (Armstrong et al. 2010). Second, it includes three countries (which are 
Belgium, France, and Germany) that have been shown by Bond et al. (2003) to have lower sensitivity of 
investment to internal liquidity than the UK (one of our two outsider economies) since these three countries have 
more bank-oriented financial systems whereas the UK has a more market-oriented financial system. Third, this 
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small stock markets, highly concentrated ownership, weak outside investor rights, poor 
disclosure level and weak legal enforcement.8  
 
Since Dyck and Zingales (2004) find that private benefits of control – i.e., benefits that can be 
extracted by corporate insiders – are negatively associated with investor protection and legal 
enforcement and they are observed in countries with small capital markets and concentrated 
ownership, one would expect that there are greater private control benefits acquired by 
managers (or controlling owners) in insider economies (in particular the last group with weak 
legal enforcement), as opposed to outsider economies. Accordingly, there is a higher 
likelihood of the funds of non-controlling investors being expropriated in insider economies. 
In addition, as a consequence of the poor disclosure level in insider economies, there is also a 
higher likelihood that corporate insiders have more information about the value of the firm 
and its investment opportunities than outside investors.  
 
Moreover, the finding of Leuz et al. (2003) that outsider economies have the lowest level of 
earnings management and insider economies with weak enforcement, on the other hand, have 
the highest level of earnings management, suggests that the accounting quality of insider 
economies is lower than that of outsider economies. In addition, they also show that the 
disclosure level of insider economies is lower than that of outsider economies. Taken together, 
investors in insider economies lack the mechanisms (i.e. accounting and disclosure) for 
monitoring managers and reducing information asymmetry problems that might arise in those 
economies as a result of their weak institutional features.9  
                                                                                                                                                   
group can be considered as a semi-insider (or a semi-outsider) economy. Thus, we can achieve a better 
comparison between pure insider economies and pure outsider economies by excluding this middle group.  
8
 The present paper has made no attempt at identifying which of these underlying factors is the main driver of our 
results. We believe this is an interesting line for further research. In particular, it would be interesting to know 
which underlying characteristic has lead to the higher investment-cash flow sensitivity in the pre-IFRS period and 
whose influence on investment-cash flow sensitivities has subsequently been mitigated by the introduction of 
IFRS. 
9
 Prior literature shows how disclosure and accounting are important tools for mitigating information asymmetry 
and monitoring managers. One stream of research suggests that commitments to higher disclosure level mitigate 
adverse selection costs by reducing information asymmetry between managers and investors and between 
informed and uninformed investors (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991). Several studies support this empirically. For 
instance, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) show that a commitment to increased levels of disclosure reduces 
information asymmetry. See Healy and Palepu (2001) for a review of this literature. Another stream of research 
suggests that financial accounting information can mitigate agency problems since it can be used as a direct input 
into compensation contracts and can be used by investors as a monitoring mechanism (Lambert 2001; Bushman 
 22 
 
Thus, rational investors in insider economies are expected to withhold their capital or increase 
their required rate of return (i.e. the cost of external finance) as a result of (1) the greater 
likelihood of facing severe information asymmetry problems arising from the weak 
institutional features of insider economies; and (2) the lack of effective tools to mitigate those 
information asymmetry problems.  
 
Theoretical models explain how information asymmetry problems might lead to capital 
rationing or higher cost of external finance. For example, as far as adverse selection is 
concerned, Myers and Majluf (1984) demonstrate a case in which a company has a new 
investment opportunity with a positive NPV for which it is seeking external finance. The 
managers of the firm have access to information about the profitability of existing projects that 
is not available to potential equity investors. The insider information about the existing 
projects is either Good or Bad. If the managers could pre-commit not to exploit their 
information advantage then the new equity would be fairly priced on the basis of the market’s 
more limited information set. However if the price is set at this level, managers will have a 
strong incentive to issue equity when the news they have about existing assets is Bad, and to 
fall back on other forms of finance when the news they have is Good.  Thus the pricing of the 
equity on the basis of the market’s information set would only be an equilibrium if managers 
could pre-commit not to exploit potential investors. Myers and Majluf show that if the 
probability of the managers having Bad news is sufficiently high, the only possible 
equilibrium is one in which the firm issues equity in the Bad news state (priced as if the news 
is Bad), whilst the firm finances the project from retained earnings or new debt issues in the 
good news state. Thus adverse selection problems potentially reduce the ability of firms to 
finance new projects by issuing new equity. 
 
Regarding agency problems, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that external financing 
reduces the amount of equity held by managers, and accordingly, those managers have more 
incentives to reallocate wealth from outside investors to themselves. “This ex post incentive 
                                                                                                                                                   
and Smith 2001). Recently, both Bens and Monahan (2004) and Hope and Thomas (2008) show empirically that 
disclosure plays a crucial role in monitoring managers. 
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problem reduces the amount of capital supplied ex ante” (Biddle and Hilary 2006, 967). Stated 
differently, investors require a higher return by adjusting the risk premium upward to 
compensate them for the costly monitoring of managerial actions.  
 
Therefore, in both cases there will be a gap between the cost of external financing – which 
contains a premium for either adverse selection or agency problems – and internally generated 
funds. In an extreme case there is even the possibility that external funds are withheld.10 
Accordingly, managers find it more attractive to finance their investment with their internally 
generated cash flows due to their cost advantage over external financing, and any shortage in 
internal funds will, consequently, lead to an underinvestment problem (Hubbard 1998).  
 
Hence, it is predicted that if the cost differential between internal and external funds is 
significant, capital investment will be highly correlated with internally generated cash flows 
(Hubbard 1998). In an attempt to investigate this hypothesis, Fazzari et al (1988) test whether 
the determinants of investment differ between firms for which the gap between the cost of 
internal financing and external financing differ, i.e. is there a difference in the investment 
behaviors of firms that are not financially constrained, and firms for which the cost of external 
financing exceeds the cost of internal financing, i.e. firms that are financially constrained. 
They show that the capital investment of the most constrained firms is more sensitive to their 
internally generated cash flows than that of the least constrained firms. A subsequent stream of 
studies provides results consistent with Fazzari et al (1988).11 However, both Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997) and Cleary (1999) provide opposing evidence showing that the least 
constrained firms have the highest investment-cash flow sensitivity. That led to an ongoing 
debate as to whether investment-cash flow sensitivity provides useful evidence about the 
presence of financing constraints (Fazzari et al. 2000; Kaplan and Zingales 2000). 
 
                                               
10
 In his analysis to show the link between internally generated cash flows and capital investment, Hubbard 
(1998) illustrates that the firm perceives the opportunity cost of internal funds to be the market interest rate, and 
the firm can borrow and lend at that interest rate in the capital market. Thus, without the lemons premium, the 
cost of both internal and external financing will be the same. In other words, internal and external funds are 
perfect substitutes in prefect capital markets. 
11
 See Hubbard (1998) for a review of this literature.  
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To provide an explanation for this puzzle, Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) show that the 
findings of both Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Cleary (1999) are driven by the impact of 
including negative cash flow observations (as a proxy for financially distressed firms) in their 
samples.12 They show that the inclusion of negative cash flow observations biases the results 
of both Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Cleary (1999) due to the fact that when a firm is in a 
financially distressed situation, investment cannot respond to cash flow. They explain this 
result as follows: When firms’ cash shortfall is severe, they are pushed into financial distress. 
Accordingly, they are able to make only the minimum essential investments. Any further 
reduction in their investments in response to further declines in their internally generated cash 
flows is no longer possible. Therefore, such firms’ investment–cash flow sensitivities are very 
low. Since the incidence of the negative cash flow observations is higher in the most 
financially constrained firms than in the least financially constrained firms, the estimated 
investment-cash flow sensitivity is lower for the most constrained firms as documented by 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Cleary (1999).  
 
Indeed, when Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) exclude the negative cash flows observations 
from the sample of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Cleary (1999), they find that the estimated 
investment-cash flow sensitivities for the most financially constrained firms are much higher, 
and the results are much closer to those in Fazzari et al (1988) and other subsequent studies 
that document a higher investment cash flow sensitivity for the most financially constrained 
firms. A similar point to that of Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) has been made by Fazzari et 
al (2000) who argue that the financially constrained firms in the sample of Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997) include some years of financial distress. Thus, ignoring these causes a 
downward bias in the cash flow coefficient.  
 
In summary, the likely private control benefits enjoyed by managers in insider economies 
coupled with the lack of adequate mechanisms for monitoring those managers and mitigating 
information asymmetry by investors increase the likelihood of having severe adverse selection 
and agency problems in those economies. Consequently, managers in insider economies will 
                                               
12
 Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) present evidence on firm characteristics such as growth rates, debt ratings, 
debt ratios and dividend changes that confirm the validity of negative cash flow observations as a proxy for weak 
financial health.     
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face a high cost of external finance or perhaps even capital rationing, and in turn they will find 
it more attractive to finance their investment with their internally generated cash flow due to 
its cost advantage over external financing. This leads to our first hypothesis:   
 
H1: Before the mandatory adoption of IFRS, firms in insider economies have higher 
investment cash flow-sensitivity than firms in outsider economies.  
 
2.3.2. Investment-cash flow sensitivity of insider versus outsider economies: Post-IFRS 
 
Biddle and Hilary (2006) examine the association between accounting quality and investment 
efficiency as proxied by investment-cash flow sensitivity. They argue that if managers could 
commit to reveal all of their private information, investors would not ration capital for fear of 
purchasing overpriced securities and if higher accounting quality permitted perfect monitoring 
by outsider investors, there would be no agency problem. Their arguments suggest that higher 
accounting quality overcomes the capital rationing or the high cost of external finance 
problem by mitigating either the adverse selection or the moral hazard problem, and 
accordingly, higher accounting quality may serve to reduce investment-cash flow sensitivity. 
Consistent with this, Biddle and Hilary (2006) find that higher accounting quality reduces the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity both across and within countries.  
 
However, Biddle and Hilary (2006) do not address whether high quality accounting mitigates 
the under-investment or over-investment problem. In fact, investment can be associated with 
internally generated cash flows not only because firms are financially constrained but also 
because firms might have excess cash that managers do not want to distribute to investors.13 
                                               
13
 Jensen (1986) presents a free cash flow theory that suggests an explanation behind such overinvestment as 
follows. His theory suggests that managers ‘with free cash flow’ grow their firms beyond their optimal size since 
returning such excess cash to investors reduces the resources under managers’ control, thereby reducing their 
power. In addition, reducing the available internal cash exposes managers to several problems, such as the 
monitoring of outside capital suppliers that occurs when managers must raise new capital; the probability that 
external capital will be unavailable; or available only at a high cost. By growing the firm using internal funds 
rather than external financing, managers can avoid all of these problems. Consistent with Jensen’s (1986) theory, 
Blanchard et al. (1994) show empirically that managers, who receive a cash windfall that does not change the 
investment opportunity set, choose to keep such cash windfall inside the firm rather than return it to investors, 
and more surprisingly, they then use it to acquire other firms in unrelated lines of business that often fail. They 
point out that their evidence is inconsistent with the ‘perfect capital market model’, which predicts that the cash 
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Unlike Biddle and Hilary (2006), Biddle et al. (2009) address the under-investment or over-
investment problem, and find that accounting quality is negatively associated with both 
underinvestment and overinvestment.  
 
Taken together the results of Biddle and Hilary (2006) and Biddle et al. (2009) provide strong 
evidence that accounting quality plays a crucial role in enhancing investment efficiency by 
mitigating adverse selection and agency problems. In addition, other studies show that 
disclosure level (Khurana et al. 2006) and stock price efficiency (Durnev et al. 2004) also 
enhance investment efficiency.14 Combining the results of these studies with both the evidence 
that IFRS adoption appears to improve accounting quality (Barth et al. 2008) and the evidence 
that mandatory disclosure improves stock price efficiency (Ferrell 2007) suggests an important 
role for IFRS adoption in enhancing investment efficiency. This role should be more 
important in economies where there is a higher likelihood of adverse selection and agency 
problems. Since there is higher likelihood of adverse selection and agency problems in insider 
economies compared to outsider economies as explained in section 3.1, we expect a stronger 
effect of IFRS adoption on investment-cash flow sensitivity in insider economies. Thus, we 
hypothesise: 
 
H2: IFRS adoption reduces the investment-cash flow sensitivity more for firms in insider 
economies than for firms in outsider economies. 
 
2.3.3. Investment-cash flow sensitivity of small firms in insider economies: pre-IFRS versus 
post-IFRS evidence 
 
We extend our set of hypotheses to consider the differential impact of IFRS on small versus 
large firms. Firstly, since small firms are more likely to be young firms, less well-known, less 
followed by financial analysts, with more concentrated ownership, with lower quality 
                                                                                                                                                   
windfalls should be returned to investors when investment opportunities inside the firm are not attractive. There 
are other models that provide other explanations behind such overinvestment behavior, for a review of those 
models see Hope and Thomas (2008). 
14
 Durnev et al. (2004) show that investment efficiency, as measured by the deviation in Tobin’s marginal q, is 
positively associated with the informativeness of stock prices, as measured by the magnitude of firm specific 
variation in stock returns. Khurana et al. (2006) find that a firm's externally financed growth rate is positively 
associated with AIMR disclosure scores, suggesting that disclosure improves investment efficiency. 
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accounting and disclosure levels and hence more vulnerable to capital market imperfections 
induced by adverse selection and moral hazard problems, they are more likely to be financially 
constrained.15 Consistent with this expectation, a vast number of studies find that small firms 
face liquidity constraints and have higher investment-cash flow sensitivity (Gilchrist and 
Himmelberg 1995; Himmelberg and Petersen 1994). Combining this with our prediction that 
insider economies have a higher investment-cash flow sensitivity pre-IFRS adoption leads to 
the following hypothesis:  
 
H3: Prior to the introduction of IFRS small firms in insider economies have a higher 
investment-cash flow sensitivity than firms in outsider economies. 
 
Secondly, we predict that the mandatory adoption of IFRS plays a crucial role in reducing 
investment-cash flow sensitivity by improving accounting quality which, in turn, mitigates 
agency problems and adverse selection. This role is expected to be more important in settings 
where there is a higher likelihood of agency problems and adverse selection. Since this is the 
case with insider economies and in particular with the small firms which are more likely to 
benefit from the ease of benchmarking themselves against firms in other countries as a result 
of IFRS, we expect a stronger effect of IFRS on reducing investment-cash flow sensitivity of 
these firms. Thus, it can be hypothesised that: 
 
H4: IFRS adoption reduces the investment-cash flow sensitivity more for small firms in insider 
economies than for firms in outsider economies. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
15
 In the present paper we split the sample along size and not along firm age because the data source we use 
includes variables that allow us to proxy for size, but does not include a variable that would allow us to proxy for 
age. It is very likely that size and age are highly correlated and thus it is quite possible that any splits along age 
are likely to produce results that are not too different from those presented below. However, future research 
would clearly benefit from splitting the samples along other dimension such as firm age. 
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2.4. Empirical Setting 
2.4.1. Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity Model 
 
Following Fazzari et al. (1988) and Hovakimian and Hovakimian (2009), we estimate the 
following investment-cash flow sensitivity model using firm-fixed effects to test our 
hypotheses:16  
 
1
1 2 3
1 1 1
(1)iit it ito it it
it it it
I CF CF MTB
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β β β β ε−
− − −
= + + + +  
 
where, itI  is the gross capital expenditures for firm i in year t, 1−itTA  is the total assets for firm 
i in year t–1, itCF  and 1−itCF  represent cash flow to firm i in years t and t–1, respectively, and 
are measured by the sum of income before extraordinary items and before depreciation and 
amortization, itMTB  is the market-to-book ratio of assets for firm i at the beginning of period t 
as a proxy for Tobin’s Q and equals [(total assets in year t–1 minus book value of equity in 
year t–1 minus deferred taxes in year t–1 plus market value of equity in year t–1) divided by 
total assets in year t–1]. We follow the prior literature on investment-cash flow sensitivity in 
defining the above variables (e.g. Hovakimian and Hovakimian 2009).  
 
In testing our hypotheses we focus on the one-year lagged cash flow term, 11 −− itit TACF , since 
we believe that the use of a one-year lagged cash flow term is more appropriate than the use of 
current cash flow. The argument behind this is as follows: Investment is added to the balance 
sheet in the period it is completed. However, investment models are trying to model 
investment decisions, not additions to the balance sheet which are used only because they are 
observable, while investment decisions are unobservable. Empirical evidence suggests that the 
average time between the investment decision and the completion of the investment project is 
around one year (Mayer 1958). Thus, a one-year lagged cash flow term seems the most 
appropriate specification and any changes in completed investments are expected to be more 
                                               
16
 We deflate all the variables with Total Assets, which is the same scalar used for computing the MTB because 
estimating a model with variables deflated by different scalars might cause spurious significance. We thank the 
editor and one of the referees for pointing this out to us. We do not deflate the intercept as the fixed effect model 
effectively removes the intercept. 
 29 
correlated with changes in lagged rather than current cash flow.17 Fazzari et al. (1988) also 
argue that a lagged cash flow term is likely to have explanatory power for investment in a 
time-to-build context. 
 
In order to test H1 and H2 we estimate regression model (2) below, and we do this separately 
for pre- and post-IFRS periods.18  
 
1 1
1 2 3 4
1 1 1 1 1
5 6
* *
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iit it it it it
o
it it it it it
it it it
I CF CF CF CFINSIDERS INSIDERS
TA TA TA TA TA
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β β ε
− −
− − − − −
= + + + + +
+ +
  (2) 
 
Note that in model (2) every regressor from (1) is included twice, once on its own and once 
interacted with an INSIDERS dummy variable which takes on the value of 1 if the observation 
belongs to an insider economy and zero otherwise. We control for year effects by including a 
full set of YEAR dummies.19  
 
In order to test the third and fourth hypotheses, we re-estimate the above model pre-and post-
IFRS after partitioning the INSIDER sample by firm size. Specifically, instead of interacting 
each of the main variables with an INSIDER dummy, we interact them with (1) a 
LARGEINSIDERS dummy that takes the value 1 if the observation belongs to an insider 
country and is greater than (or equal to) the median value of the market capitalization and zero 
otherwise; and (2) a SMALLINSIDERS dummy that takes the value 1 if the observation 
belongs to an insider country and is less than the median value of the market capitalization and 
zero otherwise.  
 
                                               
17
 For example, if a company reported a new fixed asset in the balance sheet at Year 2006, this fixed asset is more 
likely to be the outcome of an investment decision that has been taken in Year 2005 based upon the availability 
of the cash flow that was internally generated during 2005. Thus, this new fixed asset (which is a 2006 figure) is 
correlated with the cash flow generated during Year 2005 (i.e. the one year lagged cash flow for Year 2006). 
18
 Since our models are estimated with firm-fixed effect; and the economy type to which a firm belongs does not 
change over time, we can not include an insider dummy in our models. 
19
 Since our models are estimated with firm-fixed effect; and the industry to which a firm belongs to do not 
change over time, we can not include industry dummies in our models. Industry dummies drop from the model 
and, accordingly, their effect can not be estimated. However, estimating a firm-fixed effect model likely to 
effectively control for industry effect as well since the firm effect is determined jointly by firm-specific effects as 
well as industry effects. 
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2.4.2. Sample and Data 
 
Since our objective is to assess the economic consequences of the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS in Europe, we focus on those European countries which are classified by Leuz et al. 
(2003) as outsider economies and insider economies with weak legal enforcement. Thus, our 
sample includes ‘United Kingdom’ and ‘Norway’ as outsider economies and ‘Italy’, ‘Greece’, 
‘Portugal’ and ‘Spain’ as insider economies.  
 
Our data are obtained from Thomson ONE Banker and are from the years 2000 to 2007. 
Following prior studies, we focus on publicly traded non-financial firms and we exclude those 
firms issuing American Depository Receipts. We also exclude all cross-listed firms, regardless 
of whether they are cross-listed in the U.S. or in another country. Thus, our sample includes 
only domestically listed firms. We define the pre-IFRS period as the years 2000 to 2004, while 
the post-IFRS period comprises the years 2005 to 2007. Following Daske et al. (2007), we 
define firm-years as post-IFRS if they report that they are applying (a) International standards 
(Code 02), (b) International standards and some EU guidelines (Code 06), (c) Local standards 
with EU and IASC guidelines (Code 08), (d) International standards – inconsistency problems 
(Code 12), (e) International standards and some EU guidelines – inconsistency problems 
(Code 16), (f) Local standards with some IASC guidelines (Code 18), (g) Local standards with 
OECD and IASC guidelines (Code 19), and (h) IFRS (Code 23). 
 
Following Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004), we exclude negative cash flow observations. 
This is an attempt to minimise any possible bias in the cash flow coefficient as a result of 
financial distress. Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) do not exclude observations for all years 
for a firm with negative cash flows in some years, but instead they exclude only those firm-
years with negative cash flows. We follow the same approach here. This gives us a sample of 
5655 observations. Table 1 shows the distribution of those observations pre- and post-IFRS 
among economies (Panel A), countries (Panel B), and industries (Panel C). Our industry 
classifications follow the industry classification of Campbell (1996). As shown in Panel C-
Table 1, the observations are well distributed across industries in the pre- and post-IFRS 
periods. 
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<INSERT TABLE 1 HERE> 
 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the main variables used in our econometric 
analysis. The descriptive statistics show that the pre- and the post-IFRS median values for 
insiders are relatively close. This suggests that any differences in the investment-cash flow 
sensitivities between pre- and post-IFRS periods are unlikely to be explained simply by 
changes in the distribution of the underlying regression variables over time. The heterogeneity 
of our cross-country sample might induce non-linear relations. Thus, in order to mitigate this 
problem we take the log of all the variables in the model following Biddle and Hilary (2006). 
In order to mitigate the influence of outliers we winsorize all variables at the 1% and 99% 
levels.  
 
<INSERT TABLE 2 HERE> 
 
Table 3 provides the correlations among the independent variables. The correlation between 
the current and lagged cash flow variables is quite high, although less than 50% of the 
variation in one of theses variables is explained by the other. Similarly less than 10% of the 
variation in MTB is explained by each of the cash flow variables. Thus there is no serious 
multicollinearity problem with the data. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 3 HERE> 
 
2.5. Empirical Results 
 
The regression results of the first and second hypotheses are presented in Tables 4 and 5, 
respectively, while the regression results for the third and fourth hypotheses are presented in 
Tables 6 and 7, respectively. Recall that in testing our hypotheses we focus on the coefficients 
on the one-year lagged cash flow term. 
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2.5.1. Hypothesis One 
 
Table 4 reports regression results for outsider and insider economies pre-IFRS. We report p-
values in brackets. These p-values are computed from two-tailed t-test and use standard errors 
corrected for heteroskedasticity.  
 
<INSERT TABLE 4 HERE> 
 
The regression results in Table 4 show that the coefficient on the one-year lagged cash flow, 
11 −− itit TACF , of 0.043 is statistically insignificant, suggesting that the investment of firms in 
outsider economies is not sensitive to lagged cash flow before the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS. However, the coefficient of 0.204 on the interaction term, INSIDERSTACF itit *)( 11 −− , is 
statistically significant at the 5% level, suggesting that before the adoption of IFRS the 
investment of firms in insider economies is more sensitive to lagged cash flow than those in 
outsider economies.  
 
As an additional test we assess the significance level of the overall sensitivity of investments 
by firms operating in insider economies to lagged cash flow, i.e. the sum of the coefficients on 
11 −− itit TACF and INSIDERSTACF itit *)( 11 −− . We find that the sum is statistically significant at the 
1% level, suggesting that the investment of firms in insider economies is highly sensitive to 
lagged cash flow before the mandatory adoption of IFRS. Overall, the results in Table 4 
support our first hypothesis that, before the mandatory adoption of IFRS, firms in insider 
economies have a higher investment-cash flow sensitivity than firms in outsider economies.  
 
2.5.2. Hypothesis Two 
 
The regression results in Table 5 report the investment-cash flow sensitivity for outsider and 
insider economies post-IFRS.  
 
<INSERT TABLE 5 HERE> 
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For firms in outsider economies the results show that investment is still not sensitive to lagged 
cash flow: the coefficient of 0.069 on the one-year lagged cash flow term, 11 −− itit TACF , is still 
insignificant. This suggests that IFRS adoption has little impact on the cash flow sensitivity of 
firms operating in outsider economies. In addition, Table 5 shows that the coefficient on the 
interaction term, INSIDERSTACF itit *)( 11 −− , of 0.124 is no longer significant. This suggests that 
in post-IFRS periods insider firms no longer have higher investment-cash flow sensitivities.  
 
Once again we assess the significance level of the overall sensitivity of investments by firms 
operating in insider economies to lagged cash flow. We find that the sum of the coefficients on 
11 −− itit TACF  and INSIDERSTACF itit *)( 11 −−  is marginally significant at the 10% level, suggesting 
that post-IFRS the investment of firms operating in insider economies is not  highly sensitive 
to lagged cash flow. Overall, the results in Table 5 support our second hypothesis that IFRS 
adoption reduces the investment-cash flow sensitivity more for firms in insider economies 
than for firms in outsider economies. 
 
 
2.5.3. Hypothesis Three 
 
We also examine the differential investment-cash flow sensitivity of small and large firms. 
Table 6 reports the pre-IFRS results.  
 
<INSERT TABLE 6 HERE> 
 
We make the following observations in Table 6. First, the investment of firms in outsider 
economies continues not to be sensitive to lagged cash flow before the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS: the coefficient of 0.041 on the one-year lagged cash flow term, 11 −− itit TACF , is 
statistically insignificant. Second, the sensitivity of investment of large insider firms to lagged 
cash flow is not statistically different from that of outsider firms: the coefficient of 0.165 on 
ERSLARGEINSIDTACF itit *)( 11 −−  is statistically insignificant. Third, the investment of small firms in 
insider economies is more sensitive to lagged cash flow than the investment of outsider firms: 
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the coefficient of 0.236 on ERSSMALLINSIDTACF itit *)( 11 −−  is statistically significant at the 5% 
level.  
 
As before we compute the significance level of the overall sensitivity of investments by small 
firms in insider economies to lagged cash flow, i.e. the sum of the coefficients on 
11 −− itit TACF and ERSSMALLINSIDTACF itit *)( 11 −− . We find that the sum of 0.041 and 0.236 is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. This suggests that the investment of small firms in 
insider economies is sensitive to lagged cash flow before the mandatory adoption of IFRS. 
Taken together, the results in Table 6 support our third hypothesis that small firms in insider 
economies have the highest investment-cash flow sensitivity pre-IFRS. 
 
2.5.4. Hypothesis Four 
 
This section examines the differential impact of IFRS adoption on small versus large insider 
firms. The associated results are reported in Table 7. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 7 HERE> 
 
We make the following observations with respect to Table 7. First, similar to the pre-IFRS 
period the investment of firms in outsider economies is not sensitive to lagged cash flow: the 
coefficient of 0.069 on the one-year lagged cash flow term, 11 −− itit TACF , is statistically 
insignificant. Second, similar to the pre-IFRS period the sensitivity of large insider firms’ 
investment to lagged cash flow is still not statistically different from that of outsider firms: the 
coefficient of 0.169 on ERSLARGEINSIDTACF itit *)( 11 −−  is statistically insignificant. Third, the 
sensitivity of small insider firms’ investment to lagged cash flow is no longer significantly 
different from that of outsider firms since the coefficient of 0.043 on 
ERSSMALLINSIDTACF itit *)( 11 −−  is statistically insignificant. 
 
In addition, in Table 7 we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients of 
0.069 on 11 −− itit TACF and 0.043 on ERSSMALLINSIDTACF itit *)( 11 −−  is equal to zero.  This 
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suggests that post-IFRS the investment of small firms in insider economies is no longer 
sensitive to lagged cash flow. Thus, the results in Table 7 support our fourth hypothesis that 
IFRS adoption reduces the investment-cash flow sensitivity of small firms in insider 
economies more than for other groups in the sample. 
 
2.5.5. Robustness Tests 
 
We perform some robustness and sensitivity tests as follows. First, we considered the use of 
the governance indicators constructed by Kaufmann et al. (2008) to define an alternative 
classification of economies, namely high versus poor governance economies. Kaufmann et al 
(2008) provide an assessment of each country’s governance level based upon six dimensions 
of governance (voice & accountability, political stability & absence of violence/terrorism, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption). We 
identify the Kaufmann et al.’s governance indicators for the 16 European Countries that have 
an insider or outsider classification. We rank each of their governance indicators at the 
beginning of our sample period. Then, we compute the average of these ranks to construct an 
average governance level for each country. We estimate a logistic regression, with a 
dependent variable that is a binary indicator that takes the value 1 if the country is a pure 
insider economy and zero otherwise, and its independent variable is the computed average 
governance level based upon the Kaufmann et al.’s indicators. The result of this regression 
(not tabulated) shows that if a country has a higher average governance level, then it is less 
likely to be a pure insider economy and the coefficient on the average governance level was 
negative and significant at the 1% level. We also examine whether the model correctly 
predicts whether the country is an insider or outsider economy. We find that the percentage of 
the correctly predicted countries’ classification is 93.75%. In addition, the results (not 
tabulated) show that the two outsider economies in our sample, Norway and the UK, have 
much higher average governance ranks relative to the four pure insider economies in our 
sample, Spain, Greece, Portugal, and Italy. Thus, classifying our sample into high versus poor 
governance economies using the Kaufmann et al.’s indicators will be similar to classifying it 
using the outsider versus pure insider economies classification of Leuz et al (2003). Therefore, 
we continue using the Leuz et al.’s classification of economies in conducting our tests. 
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Second, we perform some robustness tests to examine whether the reduction in investment-
cash flow sensitivity was due not to IFRS adoption, but to the availability of more external 
capital. The motivation for this test is as follows: For a sample of manufacturing firms, 
Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) find that the investment-cash flow sensitivities are lower for 
all firms in 1987-1996, compared to 1977-1986, and the decline in sensitivities is the strongest 
for the most financially constrained firms. They argue that this might be due to either an 
improved informational efficiency of capital markets or an increased supply of funds to capital 
markets resulting in easier access to external capital. 
 
Thus, in order to enhance the confidence in our results, we perform additional tests that 
control for the availability of external capital. Specifically, we re-estimate our models after 
including an additional variable that captures the availability of external capital, which is the 
ratio of the stock market capitalization held by minorities to gross national product. This 
variable is introduced by La Porta et al. (1997) as the main determinant of firms’ ability to 
raise external finance. The stock market capitalization held by minorities is the product of the 
aggregate stock market capitalization and the average percentage of common shares not 
owned by the top three shareholders in the ten largest non-financial, privately-owned domestic 
firms in a given country. We collect the data required for computing this variable from 
Thomson ONE Banker and the Global Market Information Database (Euromonitor). We 
compute this variable per year for each country in the sample. 
 
We include the ratio of the stock market capitalization held by minorities to gross national 
product as an additional regressor in our regression models, and we include this ratio both on 
its own and interacted with 1−itit TACF  and  INSIDERSTACF itit *)( 1− . We also interact this ratio 
with ERSLARGEINSIDTACF itit *)( 1−  and ERSSMALLINSIDTACF itit *)( 1−  when partitioning our insider 
economy sample in Tables 6 and 7.  
 
By including the ratio of the stock market capitalization held by minorities to GNP in our 
model we assume that that there is no change in the supply of funds to capital markets post-
IFRS that is a consequence of the IFRS adoption. We note that including this variable in our 
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model might underestimate the effect of IFRS adoption given that IFRS adoption might induce 
some investors, who withhold their capital pre-IFRS, to provide their capital to the market 
post-IFRS, since they perceive IFRS as a protection device for them. Regardless of this logical 
possibility, the results (not tabulated) of these tests still support our predictions and our 
inferences remain unchanged.  
 
The third set of robustness tests examines whether our results are sensitive to the elimination 
of one of the two countries from the sample of outsider economies. First, we re-estimate our 
models after dropping Norway and the results (not tabulated) are similar to those reported in 
the paper. Dropping Norway, for example, shows that in the pre-IFRS period the small insider 
firms’ sensitivity to lagged cash flow is 0.29, and this is statistically different from zero, with a 
p-value of 0.011. At the same time the sensitivity of investment to lagged cash flow is much 
lower at 0.102 in the post-IFRS period, and with a p-value of 0.294 it is no longer statistically 
significant. Similarly, dropping UK observations shows that the sensitivity of the investment 
of small insider firms to lagged cash flow is 0.26 with a p-value of 0.028 in the pre-IFRS 
period and 0.13 with  a p-value of 0.1604 in the post-IFRS period.  
 
The fourth set of robustness tests examines whether the results are sensitive to dropping any 
one country from the sample of insider economies. The results of these tests (not tabulated) 
are similar to those reported in the paper. Dropping Spain, for example, shows that pre-IFRS 
the investment of small insider firms is highly sensitive to lagged cash flow as the sum of the 
coefficients on 11 −− itit TACF and ERSSMALLINSIDTACF itit *)( 11 −−  is 0.294 with a p-value of 0.015, 
while post-IFRS the sensitivity of their investment to lagged cash flow is lower and no longer 
statistically significant as the sum of the coefficients on 11 −− itit TACF and 
ERSSMALLINSIDTACF itit *)( 11 −− is 0.118 with a p-value of 0.227.  
 
The final set of robustness tests examines whether the results are sensitive to the exclusion of 
individual years. For example, the year 2001 was bad in terms of capital market performance, 
so its inclusion in the pre-IFRS period might unduly influence the results.20 Thus, we re-
estimate our model without this year. The results of this test (not tabulated) continue to show 
                                               
20
 We thank one of the referees for pointing this out to us.  
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that small insider firms have the highest sensitivity to lagged cash flow before the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS. We also check whether any of the other pre-IFRS years has an undue 
influence on our findings. The overall picture that emerges from these additional tests is 
generally quite consistent with our above findings and thus our inferences remain generally 
unchanged.  
 
2.6. Conclusion 
 
This study examines the economic consequences of the mandatory adoption of IFRS in the 
EU. Specifically, it examines whether the mandatory adoption of IFRS enhances the 
investment efficiency more for insider firms than for outsider firms and more for small firms 
than for large firms.  
 
In order to examine the differential effect of IFRS adoption across economy type we follow 
Leuz et al. (2003) and classify economies according to their institutional features into insider 
and outsider economies. We then use investment-cash flow sensitivities as a proxy for 
investment efficiency, i.e. lower investment-cash flow sensitivity means higher investment 
efficiency.  
 
Following prior studies, we estimate our investment-cash flow sensitivity model using firm 
fixed effects. Pre-IFRS adoption, we find that (1) the investment of firms operating in insider 
economies is highly sensitive to lagged cash flow, whereas the investment of those operating 
in outsider economies is insensitive to lagged cash flow. Post-IFRS adoption, we find that the 
investment of insider firms is no longer sensitive to lagged cash flow. These results support 
our prediction that IFRS adoption reduces investment-cash flow sensitivity more for insider 
economies.  
 
Furthermore, when we partition the insider economies sample by firm size, the results show 
that (1) the small firms operating in insider economies have the highest sensitivity of 
investment to lagged cash flow pre-IFRS adoption; and (2) their investment is no longer 
sensitive to lagged cash flow post-IFRS adoption. These results support our prediction that 
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IFRS adoption reduces investment-cash flow sensitivity most for small firms operating in 
insider economies. 
  
It may seem surprising that the investment efficiency benefits of IFRS show up so quickly in 
the data. One might have expected the market to take several years to adjust to the new 
accounting and disclosure standards. Whilst we are inclined to agree that the full 
consequences of IFRS adoption may take several years to emerge, we note that the prolonged 
prior notice given to IFRS adoption, along with the level of pre-commitment it entailed may 
explain why observable benefits may have followed so soon after the actual implementation. 
In particular an important feature of the adoption of IFRS is that it pre-committed firms to 
improving their accounting and disclosure quality through IFRS several years prior to the 
actual implementation of the standards. Specifically, even though EU firms were not required 
to implement IFRS until 2005, the commitment to implement by 2005 was actually confirmed 
by the EU in late 2001. Thus by 2002 all firms and investors would have known that all listed 
EU firms were committed to IFRS from 2005 onwards.    
 
In order to reduce the doubt that the observed reduction in sensitivities is not due to IFRS 
adoption but due to the availability of external capital post-IFRS, we perform robustness tests 
that controls for the availability of external capital. Conducting these robustness tests (and 
some other sensitivity tests) provides results similar to those reported in the paper.  
 
A number of caveats apply to our study. First, the reduction in sensitivity might not be 
attributed solely to IFRS adoption as there were simultaneous institutional and enforcement 
improvements in the EU suggesting that the reductions observed might be the outcome of 
IFRS or these improvements or the joint effects of both sets of changes working together. 
Second, our proxy for investment opportunities, i.e. the market-to-book ratio, might be 
affected by differences in accounting standards among insider and outsider economies that 
existed before the IFRS adoption. Third, the short time periods that we study and the small 
sample sizes in some of our insider economies limit our ability to draw stronger conclusions.  
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The documented reduction in sensitivity might also not be the direct outcome of IFRS but 
rather an indirect outcome. For example, IFRS adoption might have changed the proportion of 
firms being audited by the Big 4 auditors. Observing big auditing firms in the market might 
have subsequently affected the trust of both current and potential investors in the stock market. 
Any increase in investors’ trust in the stock market is likely to imply higher flow of external 
capital to firms, and, accordingly, lower investment-cash flow sensitivity. Examining this line 
of argument empirically is an important topic for future research. 
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Table 1: Distribution of Sample Observations 
 
This table provides distribution of sample observations for the pre-IFRS (2000-2004) and post-IFRS (2005-2007) 
periods. The table shows the distribution by economy, country, and industry groups (based on the industry classification 
of Campbell (1996)). The sample includes only domestically listed firms. 
 
 
 
Pre-IFRS 
(2000-2004) 
Post-IFRS 
(2005-2007) Total  
Panel A: 
Economies    
 
Outsider Economies 
 
2351 1289 
 
3640 
 
Insider Economies 1036 979 2015 
Total 3387 2268 5655 
 
Panel B: 
Countries  
   
UK 2115  1057 3172 
NORWAY 236   232 468 
SPAIN 293 184 477 
GREECE 236 445 681 
PORTUGAL 115 61 176 
ITALY 392 289 681 
Total 3387 2268 5655 
 
Panel C: 
Industries 
 
   
Petroleum  83 71 154 
Consumer Durables 514 329 843 
Construction  327 205 532 
Real Estate 36 24 60 
Basic  296 216 512 
Food/Tobacco 178 139 317 
Capital Goods 292 185 477 
Transportation  209 137 346 
Utilities  183 155 338 
Textiles/Trade 313 187 500 
Services  389 293 682 
Leisure  313 179 492 
Others  254 148 402 
Total 3387 2268 5655 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table provides summary statistics for the full sample in Panel A, the Outsider Economies sample in Panel B, and the Insider Economies sample in Panel C. itI  is the 
capital expenditures for firm i in year t. 1−itTA  is the total assets for firm i in year t-1. itCF represents cash flow to firm i in year t as measured by the sum of income before extraordinary 
items and depreciation and amortization expense. 1−itCF  is the cash flow for firm i in year t-1. itMTB  is the log of the market to book ratio of assets for firm i at the beginning of year t as 
a proxy for its Tobin’s Q, and equals to [ (total assets – book value of equity – deferred taxes + market value of equity) / total assets]. 
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itMTB  
  
 
Mean P25  Median P75 Std. Dev. Mean P25 Median P75 
Std. 
Dev. Mean P25 Median P75 
Std. 
Dev. Mean P25 Median P75 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
Panel A:  
Full Sample 
 
                    
 
 
Pre-IFRS:  
(2000-2004) 
N= 3387 
.069 .023 .044 .081 .087 .116 .063 .100 .148 .076 .103 .059 .092 .133 .062 2.84 .324 3.72 4.58 2.12 
 
 
Post-IFRS:  
(2005-2007) 
N= 2268 
.068 .020 .043 .079 .094 .117 .060 .097 .148 .087 .099 .054 .083 .127 .064 2.34 .239 1.07 4.54 2.21 
 
                    
 
                    
 
Panel B: 
Outsider 
Economies 
 
                    
 
 
Pre-IFRS:  
(2000-2004) 
N=2351 
.071 .025 .045 .083 .091 .126 .072 .110 .162 .079 .111 .065 .101 .143 .065 3.99 3.62 4.28 4.83 1.46 
 
 
.074 .020 .044 .084 .104 .139 .079 .119 .172 .089 .115 .067 .101 .147 .067 3.89 3.68 4.41 4.96 1.71 
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Post-IFRS:  
(2005-2007) 
N=1289 
 
                    
 
                    
 
Panel C: 
Insider 
Economies 
 
                    
 
 
Pre-IFRS:  
(2000-2004) 
N= 1036 
.064 .020 .043 .077 .079 .093 .054 .078 .116 .063 .085 .051 .073 .107 .051 .246 .020 .162 .438 .458 
 
 
Post-IFRS:  
(2005-2007) 
N=979 
.06 .020 .040 .075 .078 .089 .045 .073 .109 .074 .078 .045 .066 .095 .053 .297 .014 .232 .462 .457 
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Table 3: Correlation among Independent Variables 
 
This table provides the correlation among the independent variables for the whole sample period (2000-2007). itCF  represents 
cash flow to firm i in year t as measured by the sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation and amortization 
expense. 1−itCF  is the cash flow for firm i in year t-1. 1−itTA  is the net property, plant, and equipment for firm i in year t-
1. itMTB  is the log of the market to book ratio of assets for firm i at the beginning pf year t as a proxy for its Tobin’s Q, and 
equals to [(total assets – book value of equity – deferred taxes + market value of equity) / total assets]. The p-values are reported 
in brackets. 
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itMTB  
 
itMTB  
 
0.32  
[0.000] 
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0.66  
[0.000] 
 
0.31  
[0.000] 
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Table 4: Regression Results for the First Hypothesis (Pre-IFRS: 2000-2004) 
 
This table reports the results of the following firm-fixed effect model: 
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itI is the capital expenditures for firm i in year t. 1−itTA  is the total assets for firm i in year t-1. itCF represents cash flow to 
firm i in year t as measured by the sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation and amortization 
expense. 1−itCF  is the cash flow for firm i in year t-1. itMTB is the market to book ratio of assets for firm i at the beginning of 
year t as a proxy for its Tobin’s Q, and equals to [(total assets – book value of equity – deferred taxes + market value of 
equity) / total assets]. The above regression is estimated after taking the log of all the variables. INSIDERS is a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if the observation belongs to an insider economy and zero otherwise. The model includes a full 
set of YEAR dummies. The p-values (computed using two-tailed t-test and using standard errors corrected for 
heteroskedasticity) are reported in brackets. 
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Table 5: Regression Results for the Second Hypothesis (Post-IFRS: 2005-2007) 
 
This table reports the results of the following firm-fixed effect model: 
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itI is the capital expenditures for firm i in year t. 1−itTA  is the total assets for firm i in year t-1. itCF represents cash flow to 
firm i in year t as measured by the sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation and amortization 
expense. 1−itCF  is the cash flow for firm i in year t-1. itMTB is the market to book ratio of assets for firm i at the beginning of 
year t as a proxy for its Tobin’s Q, and equals to [(total assets – book value of equity – deferred taxes + market value of 
equity) / total assets]. The above regression is estimated after taking the log of all the variables. INSIDERS is a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if the observation belongs to an insider economy and zero otherwise. The model includes a full 
set of YEAR dummies. The p-values (computed using two-tailed t-test and using standard errors corrected for 
heteroskedasticity) are reported in brackets. 
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Table 6: Regression Results for the Third Hypothesis (Pre-IFRS: 2000-2004) 
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This table reports the results of the following firm-fixed effect model: 
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itI is the capital expenditures for firm i in year t. 1−itTA  is the total assets for firm i in year t-1. itCF represents cash flow to 
firm i in year t as measured by the sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation and amortization expense. 
1−itCF  is the cash flow for firm i in year t-1. itMTB is the market to book ratio of assets for firm i at the beginning of year t as 
a proxy for its Tobin’s Q, and equals to [(total assets – book value of equity – deferred taxes + market value of equity) / total 
assets]. The above regression is estimated after taking the log of all the variables. LARGEINSIDERS is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 if the observation belongs to an insider country and is greater than (or equal to) the median value of the 
market capitalization and zero otherwise. SMALLINSIDERS is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation 
belongs to an insider country and is less than the median value of the market capitalization and zero otherwise. The model 
includes a full set of YEAR dummies. The p-values (computed using two-tailed t-test and using standard errors corrected for 
heteroskedasticity) are reported in brackets. 
  
Table 7: Regression Results for the Fourth Hypothesis (Post-IFRS: 2005-2007) 
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This table reports the results of the following firm-fixed effect model: 
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itI is the capital expenditures for firm i in year t. 1−itTA  is the total assets for firm i in year t-1. itCF represents cash flow to 
firm i in year t as measured by the sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation and amortization expense. 
1−itCF  is the cash flow for firm i in year t-1. itMTB is the market to book ratio of assets for firm i at the beginning of year t as 
a proxy for its Tobin’s Q, and equals to [(total assets – book value of equity – deferred taxes + market value of equity) / total 
assets]. The above regression is estimated after taking the log of all the variables. LARGEINSIDERS is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 if the observation belongs to an insider country and is greater than (or equal to) the median value of the 
market capitalization and zero otherwise. SMALLINSIDERS is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation 
belongs to an insider country and is less than the median value of the market capitalization and zero otherwise. The model 
includes a full set of YEAR dummies. The p-values (computed using two-tailed t-test and using standard errors corrected for 
heteroskedasticity) are reported in brackets 
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Chapter 3 
Do Cross-Country Differences in Accounting Conservatism Explain 
Variations in the Degree of Investor Diversification?∗ 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
In view of the mounting evidence on the pivotal role of a country’s institutions for the orderly 
functioning of securities markets, it is not surprising that several recent studies document that 
country-level characteristics explain a significant proportion of the variation in the behavior of 
market participants.21  
 
Somewhat more surprising is that cross country differences in accounting systems, while a 
major part of the infrastructure needed for well functioning security markets (Ball 2001; Black 
2001), have been largely overlooked as an explanation for the portfolio choices of investors. 
Our investigation highlights the role of accounting systems as part of the institutions that 
shape security markets at the country level (Ball 2001; Black 2001, and Leuz 2001). This level 
of analysis is motivated by the fact that investors diversify internationally primarily to mitigate 
country-specific risks holding expected return constant. 
 
Under-diversification is a possible equilibrium outcome when investors are faced with severe 
governance and informational problems.  Such problems expose investors to the risk of being 
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 For example, Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) suggest that country-level institutions shape firm-reporting 
choices. Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007) document that country-level characteristics explain most of the 
variations in firm-level governance scores. 
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expropriated or to unfair trades with better-informed counterparties. The accounting system of 
a country forms part of the institutional responses that develop to reduce these problems 
(Black 2001). Strong institutions allow investors to take advantage of the risk sharing potential 
offered by a foreign market without exposure to undue threat of being cheated out of their 
money (Black 2001; Bushman and Smith 2001; 2003). 
 
Although financial reporting characteristics such as extensive disclosures, a high quality audit 
profession, and robust standards all shape the effectiveness of a country’s accounting system 
in supporting security markets, prior literature has identified the verification standards used for 
recognizing news in earnings as a central feature of an accounting system with respect to its 
suitability for addressing information and governance problems (Ball 2001). In particular, the 
timeliness of economic loss recognition relative to economic gain recognition (i.e., the 
conditional conservatism of the accounting system), is argued to be a measure both of the 
constraints put on managers not to transfer wealth from outside investors to themselves and of 
information differences among investors (Ball 2001; Watts 2003; LaFond and Watts 2008).  
 
We document that variations in conditional accounting conservatism across countries explain 
the diversification choices of foreign investors. The precise reasons for this finding are not 
resolved in this paper. This could be either because conditional conservatism per se is 
attractive to international investors, or because the unmodelled factors that attract foreign 
investors to a country also cause these countries to adopt conditionally conservative 
accounting practices. Either way, however, our results indicate that conditional conservatism 
seems to be one of the conditions that make investors more willing to hold non-block 
shareholdings in foreign countries.  
 
We obtain data on the average mutual fund equity allocations of a sample of 26 countries 
across 48 countries between 1999 and 2000. We expect that these average mutual fund 
allocations reflect both the desire of investors to diversify country-risks and to avoid 
governance and information problems.22 Nevertheless, the same countries that offer 
                                               
22
 It is plausible that mutual fund managers’ incentives are not aligned with their investors’ interests. For 
example, mutual funds managers may choose to invest in some countries and not in others because they 
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diversification opportunities are those that are also likely to suffer severely from exactly these 
problems (Harvey 1995; Bekaert and Urias 1996; Bekaert and Harvey 1997). Accordingly, 
international investors will forego the diversification opportunities offered by these markets 
unless institutions are present that mitigate the expropriation and information risks foreign 
investors face. Our first test, therefore, addresses whether there is an association between 
accounting conservatism in foreign markets and investors’ decisions to invest in these 
markets.  
 
Investors do not necessarily withdraw from a market if governance and information problems 
are excessive. Indeed, one alternative is to use a mode of entry to a market that provides better 
possibilities for safeguarding against opportunistic behavior. We use the choice between 
entering a market as foreign portfolio investor or as foreign direct investor (i.e., blockholder) 
to explore further the tradeoff investors make between having greater diversification benefits 
(as portfolio investors) and less exposure to information and governance problems (as 
blockholders) (see, Kho, Stulz and Warnock 2008). As before, we expect that the accounting 
system affects this entry choice because it can reduce some of the problems that cause 
investors to forego the benefits of entering as portfolio investors. We use a sample of foreign 
security ownership by U.S. residents collected from surveys conducted under the aegis of the 
U.S. Treasury Department and of U.S. foreign direct investments available from the 
Department of Commerce to test whether, conditional upon entry, there is an association 
between the accounting conservatism in foreign markets and the chosen mode of entering a 
foreign market. 
 
We complete the description of the role of conservative accounting systems by exploring how 
the degree of domestic ownership concentration varies with both the available domestic 
diversification opportunities (as measured by the extent to which domestic stocks move 
together) and the conditional conservatism of home markets. We expect that even if domestic 
diversification opportunities are high, investors may still choose not to diversify if they reside 
in countries where there are severe information asymmetry problems. To the extent that the 
                                                                                                                                                   
personally like the former but not the latter independent of the risk-return considerations. It is hard to argue, 
however, that unlike their investors, mutual fund managers would prefer to invest more in markets with high 
information and governance problems. 
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domestic accounting system can mitigate these problems, however, ownership in these 
countries should be more dispersed. We use a sample of the ownership concentration in 34 
countries constructed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) to conduct 
our test.  
 
The evidence in this paper is consistent with the proposed role of (conservative) country-level 
accounting systems in mitigating governance and information problems. We document that 
accounting systems of foreign markets matter in the portfolio allocation decisions of mutual 
funds and we show that the accounting system of the mutual fund home market can reduce or 
enhance the role of foreign market accounting systems. What’s more, we find that the mode of 
entry into a foreign market (as portfolio or foreign direct investor) is a function of this 
market’s accounting system. Finally, we provide direct evidence that ownership is more 
dispersed in those countries that have more conservative accounting systems holding constant 
the domestic diversification opportunities.  
 
Our study is related, in general, to the substantial stream of research examining the impact of 
information-asymmetry problems on holdings by foreign investors23, and in particular to the 
subset of this stream that examines the impact of accounting quality on foreign investment. 
For example, Bradshaw, Bushee, and Miller (2004) find increased levels of U.S. institutional 
ownership in non-U.S. firms that use a greater number of accounting methods conforming to 
U.S. GAAP. Aggarwal, Klapper, and Wysocki (2005) find that U.S. mutual funds invest more 
in markets that have higher proportion of firms using either US GAAP or IAS. Covrig, 
Defond, and Hung (2007) find that firms using IAS have higher foreign ownership than those 
using local standards. Unlike these studies, that link accounting standards to foreign 
investment, we use country-level accounting conservatism measures. Since these conservatism 
measures are estimated using observable accounting realizations, they are likely to reflect, as 
Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2011, 14) put it, “…realized accounting practices in a 
country, not strictly the effect of accounting standards per se.” In addition, none of these 
                                               
23
 For example, Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005); Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2003); Edison and 
Warnock (2004); Kang and Stulz (1997) and Kho, Stulz, and Warnock (2008); Leuz, Lins, and Warnock (2009). 
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studies examines the effect of accounting quality on the mode of entering foreign markets. 
Finally, these studies also do not take diversification opportunities into account. 
 
We now turn to the development of our hypotheses and the empirical setting. 
3.2. Prior Literature and Hypothesis Development 
 
While conventional portfolio theory recommends investors to diversify their portfolios, some 
empirical studies suggest that investors choose to forego diversification opportunities (e.g. 
French and Poterba 1991). In relation to investment in corporate securities, two main 
explanations are offered for under-diversification; governance and information problems. 
First, agency theory predicts that one way to alleviate governance problems is to concentrate 
ownership. By holding a block of shares, investors can exercise control over the firm to 
protect their interests against expropriation by managers. This benefit occurs mainly because 
ownership concentration reduces the costs of monitoring managers.24 As a consequence, not 
only are these blockholders less than fully diversified, but because they hold a 
disproportionate stake in the company, other investors are likely to be under-diversified as 
well (Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson 2003; Kho, Stulz, and Warnock 2008).  
 
Second, when informational asymmetry between informed and uninformed equity investors is 
severe, corporate securities can become highly illiquid. For the uninformed investor the 
rational response to high levels of information asymmetry is either to avoid investing in such 
companies altogether, or to buy and hold securities for the long term in order to avoid trading 
with informed investors. Either way the outcome is reduced liquidity for the securities in 
question and a reduction in the average level of diversification into such securities. 
 
In the absence of effective institutional factors that mitigate informational disadvantages 
and/or minimize the risk of expropriation, investors are likely to be under-diversified. On the 
other hand, if these problems can be reduced via some mechanism, one would expect 
investors’ degree of diversification to be higher. Prior studies have argued that the accounting 
system can play a role to alleviate both governance and information problems (e.g. Bushman 
                                               
24
 See Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for a review of this literature.  
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and Smith 2001; 2003). The main arguments of these studies focus on one particular 
accounting property: conditional conservatism.  
 
First, Ball (2001) and Watts (2003) argue that conditional conservatism reduces the likelihood 
that managers (a) pursue negative NPV projects, (b) continue operating loss making 
investments, and (c) forego positive NPV projects. All of these activities are likely to arise 
when governance is weak and the incentives of managers and investors are not well aligned. 
Conditional conservatism provides early warning signals about potential problems to boards of 
directors, shareholders, security analysts, and other stakeholders, who can in turn investigate 
these problems in a timely manner and thereby minimize any potential losses due to 
opportunistic managerial decisions. In sum, conditional conservatism can reduce governance 
problems. 
 
Second, LaFond and Watts (2008) highlight the informational role of conditional 
conservatism. Their argument rests on the idea that managers have incentives to use their 
information advantage over investors to buttress their own position by overstating the 
financial performance of the firm. Conditional conservatism is a mechanism that restrains 
managers from using their private information against investors. Indeed, conditional 
conservatism requires managers to recognize economic losses as they occur. Since managers 
generally derive no benefits from timely loss recognition and will not do so unless compelled, 
the (private) information revealed in this way is credible to investors and information 
asymmetry between equity investors is reduced.25 
 
At the same time, conservative accounting systems only allow managers to recognize 
economic gains in earnings when they become verifiable. While this practice ensures that 
investors receive only credible information, it also means that the accounting system is a poor 
source for softer news about hard-to-verify gains. This deficit, in turn, creates a demand for 
alternative sources of information whether provided by the firm or by outsiders (e.g., analysts 
or the financial press). These alternative sources yield potentially helpful information to 
                                               
25
 Instead of being compelled to provide conservatism, managers, however, could also choose to commit 
themselves to do so, i.e., they use conditional conservatism as a bonding device (Basu 1997). 
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investors but need to build credibility and reputation. Here again, conservative accounting 
information is useful. Accounting earnings function as a yardstick against which to compare 
information provided by alternative sources (Ball and Shivakumar 2008). Conditionally 
conservative accounting disciplines these alternative sources not to manipulate or overstate 
predictions of financial performance by enabling investors to compare these predictions 
against accounting numbers as they are eventually realized. The more conservative the “hard” 
information provided by the accounting system is, the higher the demand for other information 
sources is expected to be. In sum, increased conditional conservatism improves the 
information environment and mitigates the informational disadvantages of uninformed 
investors.  
 
Empirical studies provide evidence that support both the governance and informational roles 
of conditional conservatism. At least two studies document how conditional conservatism 
addresses governance problems. Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2011) find that managers in 
countries with high conditional conservatism reduce investment spending more in response to 
a decline in investment opportunities than managers in countries with low conditional 
conservatism. Overspending on investments is usually interpreted as opportunistic behavior of 
management with potentially value-reducing consequences for investors. This evidence 
suggests that conditional conservatism can mitigate these governance problems. LaFond and 
Roychowdhury (2008) show a negative association between managerial ownership and 
conditional conservatism. Since prior studies suggest that managerial ownership is an effective 
way to alleviate governance problems (Shleifer and Vishny 1997), the substitution effect 
documented by LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) supports the governance role of 
conditional conservatism.  
 
Empirical evidence supporting the informational role of conservatism is found in LaFond and 
Watts (2008) who suggest that equity investors demand conditional conservatism to mitigate 
information asymmetry. In addition, García Lara, Garcia Osma, and Penalva (2010) document 
a negative association between conditional conservatism and the cost of equity capital, which 
is likely to occur through a reduction of information asymmetry among investors (Diamond 
and Verrecchia 1991; O’Hara 2003).  
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In summary, theory as well as prior evidence justifies the use of conditional conservatism as a 
proxy for the extent to which the accounting system of a country is likely to mitigate 
governance and informational problems. We expect differences in conditional conservatism 
across countries to explain variations in the degree of investor diversification. In testing this 
hypothesis, we take into account international as well as domestic diversification. We now 
turn to a detailed development of this hypothesis. 
 
 
3.2.1. Conservative Accounting Systems and International Diversification 
 
Local investors are known to have better information than foreign investors, which creates an 
information asymmetry problem between locals and foreigners26.  As a result of such 
informational disadvantages, foreign investors are more likely than locals both to purchase 
‘lemons’, and to incur greater monitoring costs (to mitigate any potential governance 
problems). Thus, foreign investors face the information and governance problems described 
earlier. As a response to these problems, foreign investors are more likely to take one of two 
decisions. They will either (1) not invest in countries where these problems are severe or (2) 
conditional upon entry choose a type of investment that mitigates the severity of these 
countries’ problems. We next consider each of these decisions. 
 
3.2.1.1. Entering Foreign Markets for Diversification Purposes 
 
Portfolio investors diversify internationally primarily to reduce country-specific risks. The 
countries where they can effectively do so are likely to be those that are less correlated with 
the rest of the world (Chan, Covrig and Ng 2005; Karolyi and Stulz 1996). Despite the 
potential diversification benefits of foreign markets, which are not highly correlated with the 
rest of the world, investors will only choose to use these opportunities if (1) they can enter 
these foreign markets (i.e. when there are available shares to be purchased), (2) they feel that 
their investment is well protected, and (3) they are able to engage in a fair trading with local 
investors. In short, they will enter foreign markets if the governance and information problems 
                                               
26
 See, e.g., Brennan and Cao (1997) and Kang and Stulz (1997). 
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of these markets are not so severe as to cancel out the potential diversification benefits. 
Conditional conservatism can reduce the adverse effect of governance and information 
problems. Therefore, we expect that: 
H1: The effect of accounting conservatism on the sensitivity of investor allocations to 
diversification opportunities is positive.  
 
3.2.1.2. The Choice of Foreign Investment Mode 
 
Foreign investors can enter foreign markets either as Foreign Portfolio Investors (FPI) or as 
Foreign Direct Investors (FDI) (Kho, Stulz, and Warnock 2008). While entering as an FPI has 
the advantage of greater potential diversification, the disadvantage is that FPIs are more 
exposed to information and governance problems.  
 
Foreign investors can overcome the deficiencies of FPI by alternatively entering as an FDI, i.e. 
owning a large block of shares for the purpose of participating in or influencing firm 
management, (Kho, Stulz, and Warnock 2008). By entering as FDI, investors can reduce the 
likelihood of being expropriated by the managers of a firm. FDI, however, does not provide 
investors with the same degree of diversification as FPI as they have to hold a substantial 
stake in the firm in order to have an effective role in decision making. We expect the tradeoff 
between both entry modes to be decided in favor of FPI in countries in which the accounting 
system reduces governance and information problems.  
 
Indeed, as conditional conservatism increases, there are fewer benefits to direct monitoring by 
blockholders and foreign investors are less at risk to be taken advantage of by locals with 
superior information. Thus, we hypothesize that: 
H2: There is a positive (negative) association between the fraction of FPI (FDI) in total 
foreign investment and conditional conservatism.  
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3.2.2. Conservative Accounting Systems and Domestic Diversification 
 
It is likely that investors are more diversified within their home markets when there are 
sufficient diversification opportunities (i.e. when the stocks within home markets do not move 
together (Morck, Yeung, and Yu 2000). However, even if domestic diversification 
opportunities are high, investors may still choose not to diversify if they reside in countries 
where there are severe governance problems. In fact, prior theoretical studies argue that 
investors tradeoff the costs of diversification (i.e. the benefits from ownership concentration) 
against the benefits (Admati, Pfleiderer, and Zechner 1994; DeMarzo and Urosevic 2006). 
Since higher conditional conservatism in home markets implies less severe governance 
problems and lower benefits from ownership concentration at home; we hypothesize that:  
H3: Higher levels of conditional conservatism combined with higher domestic diversification 
opportunities leads to higher levels of domestic diversification.  
 
3.3. Empirical Setting: Data, Models, and Results 
 
3.3.1. Tests of Hypothesis 1 
 
Our first prediction is that the effect of accounting conservatism on the sensitivity of investor 
allocations to diversification opportunities is positive. 
 
3.3.1.1. Data 
The data set used for examining this hypothesis consists of the average mutual fund equity 
allocations (in percent) of 26 countries across 48 countries for the period 1999 and 2000. The 
26 allocator countries are US, UK, Canada, Germany, Italy, Sweden, France, Switzerland, 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Finland, Greece, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
the Netherlands, Japan, Australia, Singapore, Hong Kong, New Zealand, Taiwan, and South 
Africa. The number of mutual funds in these 26 countries is 20,821 and 24,589 in 1999 and 
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2000, respectively. We obtain this data set from Chan, Covrig, and Ng (2005), who construct 
it based on the TFS database.27  
 
Although the data set provides data on mutual fund equity allocations of 26 countries across 
48 countries, only 25 out of the 26 and 36 out of the 48 countries have non-missing data on all 
variables included in our model. Thus, the actual data that we use for estimating our 
regressions is the allocations of 25 countries across 36 countries. So the number of allocations 
is 900 (25×36). In addition, since we model the choice among foreign markets and following 
Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005), we exclude observations where the allocator country is the same 
as the country to which investment is allocated. This leaves us with 875 observations (900-
25). 
 
3.3.1.2. Model 
 
In the data set, the allocator countries do not invest in all possible countries. Approximately 20% 
of the mutual fund allocations are zero. Accordingly, our dependent variable has a nontrivial 
fraction of zero observations and at the same time covers a wide range of positive values. 
Thus, our dependent variable is a continuous variable that is truncated at zero. Therefore, we 
use a Tobit model to estimate our models (Wooldridge 2002).28  
 
Our Tobit model is as follows, 
 
                     
εβ += '*)( xww jij            ε  ~ N (0, 2σ )                                                    (1) 
 
                      =jij ww    
*)( jij ww  , if  *)( jij ww  ≥ 0   
                                   or     0        , if  *)( jij ww  < 0  
                  
                      
ijw  is the weight of country j in the portfolio of the mutual funds from country i (i ≠ j). jw  is 
the weight of country j in the world float portfolio. The world float portfolio is the world 
                                               
27
 See Chan, Covrig, and Ng (2005) for both the full data set and a detailed explanation of how they constructed 
it. 
28
 Leuz, Lins, and Warnock (2009) also use Tobit model as their sample contains approximately 25% of foreign 
firms with zero U.S. holdings. 
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market portfolio adjusted to reflect that not all shares are available to be held by portfolio 
investors. jw  is the fraction of the available shares in country j in the total available shares in 
the world.  We compute jw  using the closely held shares figures constructed by Dahlquist, 
Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2003) for all countries.   
 
Our vector of explanatory variables, x , contains proxies for the quality of the accounting 
system, proxies for international diversification opportunities, and a set of controls. A 
description of each of these variables is provided below.  
 
a) Proxies for the Quality of Accounting Systems:  
We use two country level proxies for the quality of the accounting system, timely economic 
loss recognition (TLR_BP_BKR) and the incremental timeliness of economic losses 
(INCR_BP_BKR), as reported in Bushman and Piotroski (2006) who follow the methodology 
in Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000). Using ten annual cross-sectional estimations of the Basu 
(1997) model over the period 1992-2001, Bushman and Piotroski compute for each country 
(1) the average timeliness with which economic gains are recognized in earnings and (2) the 
average incremental timeliness of economic losses. The sum of these two averages is the 
average timely economic loss recognition measure. As a robustness test, we also use an 
alternative measure of timely loss recognition (TLR_BP_BS) over the same time period 
measured by Bushman and Piotroski (2006) based on the accruals-cash flow model of Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005).29 
 
Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2011) argue that although these cross-country conservatism 
proxies are computed using firm-level data, they capture the accounting system differences 
across countries rather than across firms. Their argument is summarized as follows. The 
conservatism practice of a firm is determined by three components; firm-specific 
characteristics, industry-specific characteristics and country-specific characteristics. If the 
firm- and industry- specific components are not perfectly correlated across firms and 
industries within the same country, they will cancel out by measuring conservatism using data 
                                               
29
 We obtain the TLR_BP_BS from the 2005 version of Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2011). 
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on all firms in all industries within the same country. This procedure, thus, yields an estimate 
of the country component of conditional conservatism only. 
 
b) Proxies for International Diversification Opportunities: 
We use three proxies for international diversification opportunities; Stock Market 
Segmentation, Emerging Market, and Stock Market Correlation. These three measures capture 
international diversification opportunities as they reflect the degree of correlation of a certain 
country with the rest of the world. A detailed explanation of each of these proxies is provided 
below.  
 
1. Stock Market Segmentation: 
When a stock market is highly integrated into the world capital market, the degree of its 
correlation with the rest of the world is also very high (Bekaert and Harvey 1997). 
Accordingly, international investors can obtain more diversification benefits in less integrated 
markets (Arshanapalli and Doukas 1993; Chan, Gup, and Pan 1992, 1997). Despite these 
diversification benefits, foreign investors underweight segmented markets (e.g. Chan, Covrig 
and Ng 2005; Edison and Warnock 2002). We argue that this underweighting of segmented 
markets can be attributed to two causes. First, local information determines the expected 
return in segmented markets but not in integrated markets (Harvey 1995; Bekaert and Harvey 
1997). Thus, the fact that local investors possess an information advantage over foreign 
investors about their local markets matters in segmented market but not in integrated markets 
(there are no incentives to invest in these markets). Second, segmented markets impose 
restrictions on their locals’ ability to invest abroad, which leads to increased domestic 
ownership concentration in these markets. Such domestic ownership concentration can be 
perceived as a possible mechanism to expropriate foreign investors, who will, in turn, be less 
likely to enter these markets. In short, segmented markets provide a setting with 
diversification opportunities; in addition, these markets suffer from information as well as 
governance problems. Thus, segmented markets provide an a priori promising testing ground 
for our first hypothesis. 
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We measure stock market segmentation using an index constructed by The Economic 
Freedom Network. This index captures the restrictions both on access by foreigners to local 
markets and on access by locals to foreign markets. It provides lower (higher) ratings to 
countries with more (less) restrictions on foreign capital transactions. We multiply the index 
score by minus one so that this variable becomes increasing in stock market segmentation. We 
predict that foreign investors are more likely to enter segmented markets if the governance and 
information problems of these markets are sufficiently mitigated by the accounting system to 
be not so severe that they cancel their potential diversification benefits. Therefore, under H1 
we expect the coefficient on the interaction of Stock Market Segmentation and conditional 
conservatism to be positive.  
 
2. Emerging Markets:  
Investors can also obtain diversification benefits from investing in emerging markets since (1) 
the correlations of their returns with those of developed countries’ returns are low, and (2) the 
cross correlations among emerging markets are small (Harvey 1995; Bekaert and Harvey 
1997). Indeed, Bekaert and Urias (1996) document diversification benefits accruing from 
investing in emerging markets. Despite these benefits, foreign investors under-weight 
emerging markets (Chan, Covrig and Ng 2005; Edison and Warnock 2002). Two possible 
explanations might explain this under-weighting of emerging markets. First, local information 
plays a more important role in predicting emerging market returns than in predicting 
developed market returns (Harvey 1995). Thus, one would expect foreigners to be worried that 
local investors in emerging markets possess more information than they do. Second, emerging 
markets provide poor investor protection and have special ownership structures that are 
vulnerable to agency problems (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 1998, 1999; 
Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis 2000; Lins 2003). As a result, investors might perceive a 
higher likelihood of being expropriated in emerging markets. Taken together, emerging 
markets, as segmented markets before, offer diversification opportunities but suffer from 
information as well as governance problems. 
 
We measure Emerging Markets as an indicator variable (1 for an emerging market and 0 
otherwise). Under H1, we predict that foreign investors are more likely to diversify in 
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emerging markets if the governance and information problems of these markets are alleviated 
by the accounting system to be not so severe that they outweigh their potential diversification 
benefits. Accordingly, we expect the coefficient on the interaction of Emerging Markets with 
conditional conservatism to be positive.  
 
3. Stock Market Correlations: 
Investors also obtain more international diversification benefits when there are lower stock 
market correlations (Chan, Covrig and Ng 2005; Karolyi and Stulz 1996). Our measure of 
stock market correlations is the average correlation coefficient for each country, j, with the 
rest of world. This measure is drawn from Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005) who compute it using 
country returns in U.S. dollars from Datastream over the period 1995 to 1999. We multiply 
stock market correlation by minus one so that a higher value of this variable means lower 
stock market correlation. Since a low correlation between country j and the rest of the world 
provides higher diversification benefits, investors are likely to invest more in country j. We 
predict that this effect is likely to be observed when information and governance problems are 
less severe. We therefore expect the coefficients on the interaction between Stock Market 
Correlations and measures of conditional conservatism to be positive.   
 
c) Control Variables: 
We also include a set of control variables that captures stock market development, economic 
development (GDP per Capita, Trading Volume), financial development (Stock Market 
Capitalization, Turnover), investor protection and legal system (Rule of Law, Minority 
Investor Protection, Legal Tradition, Efficiency of Judicial System, Expropriation Risk), 
information environment (CIFAR Disclosure Index, Analysts, Insider Trading), investor 
familiarity with foreign markets (Language, Distance), and other aspects that affect the flow 
of international investment (Tax, Lagged Returns). Details on each of these variables and their 
sources can be found in the appendix. 
 
We also include a full set of allocator country indicator variables to control for allocator 
countries-specific characteristics. 
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Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables of interest.  
 
3.3.1.3. Results 
Our first prediction that the effect of accounting conservatism on the sensitivity of investor 
allocations to diversification opportunities is positive is supported when the coefficients on 
interacting international diversification opportunities proxies (Stock Market Segmentation, 
Emerging Markets, and Stock Market Correlations) with conditional conservatism is positive. 
Tables 2, 3, and 4 provide the empirical results for each diversification opportunity proxy 
respectively using two-tailed t-test. The standard errors reported in these tables (and 
subsequent tables) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the allocator country 
level.  
 
Table 2 presents the full results for both the variables of interest and the set of controls. First, 
columns 1, 2 and 3 in Table 2 show that the coefficients on the interaction term of Stock 
Market Segmentation with each of the three measures of conditional conservatism 
(INCR_BP_BKR, TLR_BP_BKR, and TLR_BP_BS) are positive and statistically significant at 
the 1% level. Second, Columns 1 & 2 in Table 3 shows that the coefficients on the interaction 
of Emerging with INCR_BP_BKR, TLR_BP_BKR, or TLR_BP_BS are positive and 
statistically significant at the 1%, 1%, and 10% level, respectively.  Third, Table 4 shows the 
results of using Stock Market Correlation as the proxy for international diversification 
opportunities. Recall that Stock Market Correlation is multiplied by negative one so that a 
higher value of this variable means lower stock market correlation. Columns 1-3 in Table 4 
show that the coefficients on the interaction of Stock Market Correlation with 
INCR_BP_BKR, TLR_BP_BKR, or TLR_BP_BS is positive and statistically significant at the 
10%, 10%, and 5% level, respectively. 
 
 Taken together, these results support our first hypothesis that the effect of accounting 
conservatism on the sensitivity of investor allocations to diversification opportunities is 
positive. 
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3.3.1.4. Additional Tests: The Role of the Home Market’s Accounting Conservatism 
 
In the previous section we find that conservatism increases the willingness of international 
investors to diversify into foreign markets that have effective diversification opportunities. In 
this section, we test whether the willingness of international investors to diversify into foreign 
markets is a function of the conditional conservatism of these  investors’ home markets. There 
are two explanations for why one would expect this to be the case. First, holding the 
international diversification opportunities of foreign markets constant, one would expect 
investors who are used to a higher quality accounting systems at home to be more averse to 
poor accounting systems in foreign markets. In other words, investors are expected to invest 
more in a foreign country whose accounting system’s structure and language are familiar to 
them.  For example, investors who are used to have an accounting system at home that 
promotes more timely loss recognition are likely to prefer a foreign market accounting system 
that provides the same. 
 
Second, despite both the availability of foreign markets that offer diversification opportunities 
and higher quality accounting systems, international investors might still be constrained by the 
institutional features of their home markets when constructing their portfolios. Investors 
residing in home markets with severe governance problems might perceive benefits from 
concentrating their ownership at home in order to alleviate their home market’s governance 
problems. This in turn implies that they will forego diversification opportunities offered by 
foreign markets. In contrast, those residing in home markets with fewer governance problems 
do not perceive benefits from concentrating ownership at home and, consequently, they are 
more likely to diversify internationally. For the second explanation to hold, we assume that the 
investment decision process of international investors follows the following sequence. First, 
investors put more weight on distance (i.e. proximity) in allocating their investment as 
suggested by prior studies.30 Thus, investors will give more priority to investment at home due 
to its geographical proximity. Second, investors assess the severity of governance problem at 
home and, accordingly, decide whether to concentrate their ownership at home. Third, what 
                                               
30
 Prior studies suggest that geographical proximity is a main determinant of investment (Coval and Moskowitz 
1999; Chan, Covrig and Ng 2005; Grinblatt and Keloharju 2001; Sarkissian and Schill 2004). 
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remains will be diversified across foreign markets. Given that the amount of funds to be 
invested is limited, concentrating ownership in home markets implies underweighting foreign 
markets. Since higher conditional conservatism in home markets implies less severe 
governance problems and lower benefits from ownership concentration at home, one would 
expect international investors based in home markets with higher conditional conservatism to 
invest more abroad. 
 
To sum up, both of the two explanations above lead us to expect that the willingness of an 
international investor to diversify into foreign markets that have higher international 
diversification opportunities and higher conditional conservatism depends positively on the 
degree of conditional conservatism in the home market. To test this prediction we re-estimate 
model (1) after partitioning the allocator countries by the degree of their conditional 
conservatism. Specifically, an allocator is based in a high (low) conditional conservatism 
regime when its home market’s conditional conservatism is greater than or equal to (less than) 
the median of the conditional conservatism computed across the 25 home markets of mutual 
funds. We expect the interaction between diversification opportunities offered by foreign 
markets and the quality of their conditional conservatism to be stronger in the sub-sample of 
international investors coming from high conditional conservatism markets.  
 
Tables 5, 6 and 7 provide the results for this prediction. Columns 1 and 2 (Columns 3 and 4) in 
Table 5 show that the interaction between Stock Market Segmentation and INCR _BP_BKR 
(TLR _BP_BKR) is stronger for the sub-sample of investors coming from high conditional 
conservatism markets, as measured by the INCR_BP_BKR (TLR _BP_BKR) of the home 
markets, than the one for the sub-sample of investors coming from low conditional 
conservatism markets. We formally test this prediction by conducting cross-equations 
restriction tests which show that the difference between these two interactions is statistically 
significant as reported in Table 5. Table 6 and 7, using Emerging Market and Stock Market 
Correlation as proxies for international diversification opportunities, provide similar results. 
Thus, these findings support our prediction that the effect of conservatism on the willingness 
of international investors to diversify into foreign markets offering diversification 
opportunities depends positively on the degree of conditional conservatism in the home 
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markets. However, when we conduct the cross-equations restriction tests using the 
TLR_BP_BS [i.e. the timely loss recognition estimated based on the methodology of Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005)] as the proxy for conditional conservatism, we find that the difference 
among the two sub-samples is statistically insignificant. 
 
3.3.2. Tests of Hypothesis 2 
 
Our second prediction is that there is a positive (negative) association between the fraction of 
FPI (FDI) in total foreign investment and conditional conservatism.  
 
3.3.2.1. Data 
 
To test this prediction, we focus on U.S. investors due to data availability. We collect the U.S. 
FPI data from comprehensive benchmark surveys of foreign securities ownership by U.S. 
residents that are conducted by the U.S. Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.31 We use the U.S. FPI 
data for the years 1994 and 1997 since (1) the first survey is conducted in year 1994; (2) there 
were no surveys in years 1995, 1998, 1999, and 2000; and (3) the structure of the surveys 
changed for the years after 2000.32 More importantly, the years 1994 and 1997 are within the 
period “1992-2001” for which Bushman and Piotroski (2006) report country-level conditional 
conservatism proxies. 
 
We collect U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) data from the Department of Commerce- 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).33 U.S. FDI is defined as the “Ownership or control, 
directly or indirectly, by one U.S. person, or entity, of 10 percent or more of the voting 
securities of an incorporated foreign business enterprise or an equivalent interest in an 
unincorporated foreign business enterprise.”34 U.S. FDI investors intend to participate in firm 
                                               
31
 See Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock (2004) and Kho, Stulz, and Warnock (2008) for more information about 
these surveys. 
32
 The U.S. FPI data are as of March 31, 1994 and December 31, 1997, as reported in Table 18 of the Report on 
U.S. Portfolio Holdings of Foreign Securities as of December 31, 2006 (Department of the Treasury-November 
2007). 
33
  We collect the data from this website: http://www.bea.gov/ 
34
 This definition is from http://www.bea.gov/glossary/glossary.cfm 
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management (Kho, Stulz, and Warnock 2008). In order to match the time period for the U.S. 
FPI data we use the U.S. FDI data for years 1994 and 1997 also.  
 
3.3.2.2. Model 
 
We estimate the following country-level model using standard OLS: 
 
                        
iiii ControlssmConservatilConditionaFDIFPIFPI εβββ +++=+ 210))((log      (2) 
 
Where iFDIFPIFPI )( + is the arithmetic mean of the )( FDIFPIFPI + in 1994 and 1997 
for country i. This variable captures for country i the importance of U.S. investors’ FPI 
relative to their FDI. We take the natural log of iFDIFPIFPI )( + . Conditional conservatism 
for country i is either its timely loss recognition measure or its incremental timeliness of bad 
news measure as reported in Bushman and Piotroski (2006).  
 
The set of control variables comprises the following. Liberalization Intensity is a proxy for the 
degree of equity market liberalization. Rule of Law is a proxy variable for the quality of legal 
enforcement. Antidirector Rights captures the degree of minority investor protection. Common 
Law reflects legal origin and tradition and is measured by an indicator variable that takes the 
value of unity if the country is a common-law country and zero otherwise. Liquidity is a proxy 
for equity market liquidity as measured by the total value of stocks traded as a fraction of the 
shares outstanding. We also control for country’s Weight in World Market Portfolio and 
disclosure quality as proxied by its CIFAR Disclosure scores. In order to control for stock 
market performance we include a measure of stock returns over the period 1994-1998 
(Returns). We also control for the fraction of a country available in the U.S. by including a 
variable that captures the share of a country’s stock market that is listed on US exchanges in 
1997 or has issued public debt in the United States (Cross-Listing). Finally, we include a 
measure of Closely Held Shares as Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2003) and 
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Kho, Stulz, and Warnock (2008) argue that higher insider ownership reduces the number of 
shares that can be held by FPI investors.  
 
The descriptive statistics of the variables of interest are reported in Table 1. 
 
3.3.2.3. Results 
Table 8 presents the results for our prediction that conditional conservatism is positively 
(negatively) associated with the fraction of FPI (FDI) in total foreign investment. Column 1 
indicates that the coefficient on the first proxy for conditional conservatism, INCR_BP_BKR, 
is positive and significant at the 1% level. Even controlling for (1) Returns, the proxy for stock 
market performance (as shown in Column 2), (2) Cross-Listing (as shown in Column 3), and 
(3) Closely Held Shares (as shown in Column 4), the coefficient on INCR_BP_BKR is still 
significant. Columns 6-10 report similar results using TLR_BP_BKR as the proxy for 
conditional conservatism. Column 11 provides the results of the specification using 
TLR_BP_BS.35  
 
Overall, the results in Table 8 show that the proxies for conditional conservatism are positive 
and significant, suggesting that higher conditional conservatism is associated with higher FPI 
relative to FDI, whereas lower conditional conservatism is associated with higher FDI relative 
to FPI.  
 
3.3.3. Tests of Hypothesis 3 
 
Our final hypothesis is that ownership is more (less) dispersed in home markets that have 
higher domestic diversification opportunities and higher (lower) conditional conservatism 
 
 
 
 
                                               
35
 For brevity, we only report the results of the specification using the full set of controls. However, depending on 
the set of controls included the p-value for the coefficient on TLR_BP_BS varies from 0.00 to 0.16. 
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3.3.4.1. Data 
To test the final hypothesis we use the country-level data set constructed by La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998).36 This data set provides data on ownership 
concentration across countries and its main determinants. 
 
3.3.4.2. Model 
We estimate the following country-level OLS regression: 
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where, Ownership concentration for country i is the average ownership stake of the largest 
three shareholders in the ten largest privately owned non-financial firms in country i.37 This 
measure is constructed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). Higher 
ownership concentration in country i implies less dispersed ownership in this country. 
 
The Inverse of Stock Market Synchronicity is our proxy for domestic diversification 
opportunities. The rationale behind choosing this proxy is as follows. Portfolio diversification 
cannot play its predicted role (i.e., to diversify firm-specific risk) if stock prices move in the 
same direction. Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) show that stocks move together since their 
return variations are mainly explained by market wide movements rather than firm-specific 
variations. They refer to this phenomenon as Stock Market Synchronicity. We invert 
synchronicity so that it will be increasing in diversification opportunities.38 
 
Lower synchronicity implies higher diversification benefits, and consequently one would 
expect more dispersed ownership in markets with low synchronicity. Even if synchronicity is 
                                               
36
 We obtain the data from http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/publications.html  
37
 A firm is considered privately owned if the state is not a known shareholder in it. 
38
 Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) apply the logistic transformation to the synchronicity measure before estimating 
their regressions [(log (Synchronocity/1-synchronocity)]. Thus, we apply the same logistic transformation to the 
synchronicity before inversing it. As a robustness test, we estimate our regressions using the raw synchronicity 
measure without either transforming or inversing it. 
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low, investors, however, may still choose not to diversify if they perceive high governance and 
information problems.  Low synchronicity is a necessary condition for diversification benefits, 
but before such benefits can be obtained investors would need to be assured that they will not 
face information or governance problems. It is here that conditional conservatism can make a 
difference. We expect that higher levels of conditional conservatism combined with higher 
domestic diversification opportunities leads to higher levels of dispersed ownership. 
Accordingly, we expect the sign on the interaction term between Inverse of Stock Market 
Synchronicity and conditional conservatism to be negative.  
 
We include in our regressions the full set of ownership concentration determinants identified 
by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) as control variables. These 
variables are the log of GDP per capita, log of GDP, Gini Coefficient, Anti-director rights, 
Creditor Rights, Mandatory Dividends, Legal Reserve Required, One share-one vote, Code 
Law, Rule of Law, CIFAR.39 In additional tests, we also include a proxy for the benefits that 
can be extracted by being a large shareholder (Private Benefits of Control).40 Full details about 
these controls are provided in the Appendix. 
 
The descriptive statistics of the variables of interest are provided in Table 1. 
 
3.3.4.3. Results 
 
Column 1 in Table 9 shows that the inverse of stock market synchronicity is negatively 
associated with ownership concentration (as shown in Column 2).  This result suggests that 
ceteris paribus, investors diversify domestically when there are benefits to be gained from 
diversification in their home markets.  
 
Column 3 (column 4) shows that the coefficient on the interaction between the inverse of 
synchronicity and TLR_BP_BKR (INCR_BP_BKR) is negative and significant at the 1% level. 
                                               
39
 See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) for the rationale behind including each of these 
variables. The only two items that were not reported in their paper: Gini coefficient and the log of GDP. We 
obtain GDP for the year 1994 from the World Bank Indicators, while we obtain the Gini Coefficient for the year 
1990 from the Euro Monitor Database. 
40
 Since this measure reduces the number of observations we include it in additional tests. 
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Similar results, reported in column 7, obtain when using TLR_BP_BS as a proxy for 
conditional conservatism. These results support our third hypothesis that higher levels of 
conditional conservatism combined with higher domestic diversification opportunities leads to 
higher levels of domestic diversification. 
 
3.4. Conclusion 
 
Investors are more willing to diversify their portfolios when the benefits of diversification 
outweigh its costs. Investors are more likely to diversify if the governance and information 
problems are not so severe that they cancel the potential diversification benefits. Thus, we 
examine whether a ‘conservative’ accounting system, as a mechanism to alleviate governance 
and information problems, is positively associated with investors’ decision to diversify 
internationally as well as domestically. Such a positive association could indicate either that 
the degree of accounting conservatism directly affects diversification choices, or that 
increased conservatism is one of the consequences of the unmodeled factors that influence 
diversification choice. Either way it would appear that investors, especially foreign investors, 
exhibit an implicit demand for conditional conservatism.   
 
With regard to international diversification, we report two strong and mutually supportive 
pieces of evidence. First, international investors are more likely to diversify into foreign 
countries that have both higher international diversification opportunities and higher 
accounting conservatism, and this effect is more pronounced when these investors come from 
home markets with higher accounting conservatism. Second, international investors enter as 
portfolio investors in foreign markets with higher accounting conservatism, and as 
blockholders in foreign markets with lower accounting conservatism. Concerning domestic 
diversification, we find that that higher levels of conditional conservatism combined with 
higher domestic diversification opportunities leads to higher levels of domestic diversification. 
 
Taken together our results strongly indicate that the degree of domestic and international 
portfolio diversification and the forms of international diversification are strongly linked to the 
degree of conditional accounting conservatism.  
 79 
 
References  
 
Admati, A., P. Pfleiderer, and J. Zechner. 1994. Large shareholder activism, risk sharing, and 
financial market equilibrium. Journal of Political Economy 102 (December): 1097-1130. 
 
Aggarwal, R., L. Klapper, and P. Wysocki, 2005. Portfolio Preferences of Foreign 
Institutional Investors, Journal of Banking and Finance 29: 2919-2946. 
 
Ahearne, A., W. Griever, and F. Warnock. 2004. Information costs and home bias: An 
analysis of U.S. holdings of foreign equities. Journal of International Economics 62: 313-336. 
 
Arshanapalli, B. and J. Doukas. 1993. `International stock market linkages: Evidence from the 
pre- and post-October 1987 period. Journal of Banking and Finance 17: 193-208. 
 
Ball, R. 2001. Infrastructure requirements for an economically efficient system of public 
financial reporting and disclosure. Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services: 127-
182. 
 
Ball, R., Kothari, S.P., and A. Robin, 2000. The effect of international institutional factors on 
properties of accounting earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 29 (1): 1-51. 
 
Ball, R. and L. Shivakumar, 2005. Earnings quality in U.K. private firms. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 39: 83-128. 
 
Ball, R. and L. Shivakumar, 2008. How much new information is there in Earnings? Journal 
of Accounting Research 46 (5): 975-1016. 
 
Basu, S., 1997. The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. Journal 
of Accounting and Economics 24 (December): 3-37. 
 
Bebchuk, L., R. Kraakman, and G. Triantis. 2000. Stock pyramids, cross-ownership, and dual 
class equity: The creation and agency costs of separating control from cash flow rights. In 
Concentrated Corporate Ownership, edited by R. K. Morck. Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
Bekaert, G. and C. R. Harvey. 1997. Emerging equity market volatility. Journal of Financial 
Economics 43(1): 29-77  
 
Bekaert, G. and C. R. Harvey. 2000. Foreign speculators and emerging equity markets. 
Journal of Finance 55: 565–614. 
 
Bekaert, G., C. R. Harvey and C. T. Lundblad. 2005. Does Financial Liberalization Spur 
Growth? Journal of Financial Economics 77: 3-56. 
 
 80 
Bekaert, G., M. S. Urias. 1996. Diversification, integration, and emerging market closed-end 
funds. Journal of Finance 51: 835– 870. 
 
Black, B. 2001. The legal and institutional preconditions for strong securities markets. UCLA 
Law Review 48 (April): 781-858. 
 
Bradshaw, M., B. Bushee, and G. Miller. 2004. Accounting choices, home bias, and U.S. 
investment in non-U.S. firms. Journal of Accounting Research 42: 795-841. 
 
Brennan, M. , and H. Cao. 1997. International portfolio investments flows. Journal of Finance 
(December): 1851-1880 
 
Bushman, R., Q. Chen, E. Engel, and A. Smith. 2004. Financial accounting information, 
organizational complexity and corporate governance systems. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 37 (2): 167-201 
 
Bushman, R., and J. Piotroski, 2006. Financial reporting incentives for conservative 
accounting: The influence of legal and political institutions. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 42: 107-148. 
 
Bushman, R., J. Piotroski, and A. Smith 2004. What determines corporate transparency? 
Journal of Accounting Research 42(2): 207-252. 
 
Bushman, R., J. Piotroski, and A. Smith 2011. Capital allocation and timely accounting 
recognition of economic losses. Journal of Business, Finance and Accounting, forthcoming. 
 
Bushman, R., and A. Smith. 2001. Financial accounting information and corporate 
governance. Journal of Accounting Economics 31: 237-333. 
 
Bushman, R., and A. Smith. 2003. Transparency, financial accounting information, and 
corporate governance. FRBNY Economic Policy Review.  
 
Chan, K., V. M. Covrig, and L. K. Ng. 2005. What determines the domestic bias and foreign 
bias? Evidence from mutual fund equity allocations worldwide. Journal of Finance 60: 1495-
1534. 
 
Chan, K.C., B.E. Gup and M. Pan. 1992. An empirical analysis of stock prices in major Asian 
markets and the United States. Financial Review 27: 289-307.  
 
Chan, K.C., B.E. Gup and M. Pan. 1997. International stock market efficiency and integration: 
A study of eighteen nations. Journal of Business, Finance and Accounting 24(6): 803-813.  
 
Coval, J., and T. Moskowitz. 1999. Home bias at home: Local equity preference in domestic 
portfolios. The Journal of Finance 54 (6): 2045-2073. 
 
 81 
Covrig , V ., M. Defond , and M. Hung. 2007. Home bias, foreign mutual fund holdings, and 
the voluntary adoption of international accounting standards. The Journal of accounting 
Research 45(1): 41-70. 
 
Dahlquist, M., L. Pinkowitz, R. Stulz, and R. Williamson. 2003. Corporate governance and the 
home bias, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38: 87–110. 
 
DeMarzo, P., and B. Urosevic. 2006. Ownership Dynamics and Asset Pricing with a Large 
Shareholder. Journal of Political Economy 114 (4): 774-815. 
 
Diamond, D., and R. Verrecchia. 1991. Disclosure, liquidity and the cost of equity capital. The 
Journal of Finance (September): 1325-1360. 
 
Doidge, C., A. Karolyi, and R. Stulz. 2007. Why do countries matter so much for corporate 
governance? Journal of Financial Economics 86 (1): 1-39. 
 
Dyck, A., and L. Zingales, 2004. Private benefits of control: An international comparison. 
Journal of Finance 2 (April): 537-600. 
 
Edison, H., and F. Warnock. 2004. U.S. investors’ emerging market equity portfolios: A 
security-level analysis. Review of Economics and Statistics 84(3): 691-704. 
 
Frankel, J., and S. Wei. 1998. Open regionalism in a world of continental trade blocs, IMF 
Staff Papers 45, No.3. 
 
French, K., and J. Poterba. 1991. Investor diversification and international equity markets. 
American Economic Review 81: 222–226. 
 
García Lara, J.M., B. García Osma, and F. Penalva. 2010. Conditional Conservatism and Cost 
of Capital. Review of Accounting Studies, forthcoming. 
 
Giannetti, M., and A. Simonov. 2006. Which investors fear expropriation? Evidence from 
investors’ portfolio choices Journal of Finance 61: 1507-1547. 
 
Grinblatt, M., and M. Keloharju, 2001, How distance, language, and culture influence 
stockholdings and trades. Journal of Finance (56): 1053–1073. 
 
Harvey, C. R. 1995. Predictable risk and returns in emerging markets. Review of Financial 
Studies 8: 773-816. 
 
Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency 
costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3: 305-360. 
 
Kang, Jun-koo, and R. Stulz, 1997, Why is there a home bias? An analysis of foreign portfolio 
equity ownership in Japan. Journal of Financial Economics 46: 3–28. 
 
 82 
Karolyi, G. A., and R. Stulz.1996 Why do markets move together? An investigation of U.S.-
Japan stock return comovements. Journal of Finance 51(3): 951-986 
 
Kho, Bong-Chan; René M. Stulz, and Francis E. Warnock. 2008. Financial globalization, 
governance, and the evolution of the home bias. 2008 Journal of Accounting Research 
Conference.  
 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. 1999. Corporate ownership around the 
world. Journal of Finance 54: 471-517. 
 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 2006. What works in securities laws? 
Journal of Finance 61: 1-32. 
 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-De-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 1997. Legal determinants of 
external finance. Journal of Finance 52: 1131–1150. 
 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-De-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 1998. Law and finance. 
Journal of Political Economy 106: 1113-1155. 
 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-De-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 2000. Investor protection and 
corporate governance.  Journal of Financial Economics 58: 3–28. 
 
Lafond, R., and R. Watts. 2008. The information role of conservatism. The Accounting Review 
83(2): 447-478. 
 
Lafond, R., and S. Roychowdhury. 2008. Managerial ownership and accounting conservatism. 
The Journal of Accounting Research 46 (1): 101-135. 
 
Leuz, C. 2001. Comment and discussion: Infrastructure requirements for an economically 
efficient system of public financial reporting and disclosure. Brookings-Wharton Papers on 
Financial Services: 170-177. 
 
Leuz, C., K. V. Lins, and F. E. Warnock. 2009. Do foreigners invest less in poorly governed 
firms? Review of Financial Studies 22 (8): 3245-3285. 
 
Lins, K., 2003. Equity ownership and firm value in emerging markets. Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis 38: 159-184. 
 
Lintner, J. 1965. The valuation of risky assets and the selection of risky investment in stock 
portfolio and capital budgets. Review of Economics and Statistics 47: 103–124. 
 
Morck, R., B. Yeung, W. Yu. 2000. The information content of stock markets: Why do 
emerging markets have synchronous stock price movements? Journal of Financial Economics 
58: 215–260. 
 
 83 
O’Hara, M. 2003. Presidential address: Liquidity and price discovery. The Journal of Finance 
58 (4): 1335-1354. 
 
Sarkissian, S., and M. Schill. 2004. The overseas listing decision: New evidence of proximity 
preference. Review of Financial Studies (17): 769–809. 
 
Sharpe, W. 1964. Capital asset prices: A theory of market equilibrium under the condition of 
risk. Journal of Finance 19: 425–442. 
 
Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny. 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance 52 
(June): 737–783. 
 
Stulz, R. 1981. On the effects of barriers to international investment. Journal of Finance 36: 
923–934. 
 
Watts, R. 2003. Conservatism in accounting part I: Explanations and implications. Accounting 
Horizons 17(3): 207–221. 
 
Wooldridge, J. 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
 84 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the variables of interest used for testing Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 
 
 
Number  
of Observations 
 
Mean Median Standard Deviation Min. Max 
jij ww  875 1.147 0.385 3.44 0 56.51 
 
INCR _BP_BKR 36 .250 .265 .178 -.145 .618 
 
TLR _BP_BKR 36 .276 .288 .182 -.042 .687 
 
TLR_BP_BS 36 -.314 -.317 .391 -1.214 .5 
 
Stock Market Segmentation 36 -7.11 -8 3.08 -10 0 
 
Emerging Market 36 .417 0 .5 0 1 
 
Stock Market Correlation 36 -.427 -.435 .086 -.55 -.17 
 
)( FDIFPIFPI +  
 
33 .894 .904 .074 .70 1 
 
Ownership Concentration 
 
34 .446 .48 .142 .18 .67 
 
Stock Market Synchronicity 
 
34 .173 .163 .101 .021 .429 
ijw is the weight of country j in the portfolio of the mutual funds from country i (i ≠ j)). jw  is the weight of 
country j in the world float portfolio. INCR_BP_BKR and TLR_BP_BKR are the incremental timeliness of 
economic losses and the timely economic loss recognition, respectively, as reported in Bushman and Piotroski 
(2006) who follow the methodology in Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000). TLR_BP_BS is the timely loss 
recognition as measured by Bushman and Piotroski (2006) based on the methodology of Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005). Stock Market segmentation is an index that captures the restrictions on access by foreigners to local 
markets and on access by locals to foreign markets. Stock Market Segmentation is multiplied with -1 so that this 
variable becomes increasing in stock market segmentation. Emerging is an indicator variable (1 for an emerging 
market and 0 otherwise). Stock Market Correlation is the average correlation coefficient for each country’s stock 
market with the rest of the world. Stock Market Correlation is multiplied with -1 so that a higher value of this 
variable means lower stock market correlation. )( FDIFPIFPI + is the arithmetic mean of the fraction of 
foreign portfolio investment (FPI) in total foreign investment (FPI + FDI) in 1994 and 1997 for each country. 
Ownership Concentration is the average ownership stake of the largest three shareholders in the ten largest 
privately owned non-financial firms in each country. Stock Market Synchronicity is the average R² of firm-level 
regressions of bi-weekly stock returns on local and U.S. market indexes in each country in year 1995. The 
synchronicity measure summarized in this table is the raw measure without being transformed or inverted.  
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Table 2: Tests of Hypothesis 1 using Stock Market Segmentation as a proxy for International 
Diversification Opportunities 
 
Dependent Variable: jij ww  
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Test Variables:    
INCR_BP_BKR 11.764***   
 [2.973]   
TLR_BP_BKR  9.569***  
  [2.526]  
TLR_BP_BS   6.720*** 
   [1.870] 
Stock Market Segmentation -0.310*** -0.2587*** 0.1217** 
 [0.102] [0.087] [.0517] 
Stock Market Segmentation*INCR_BP_BKR 1.459***   
 
[0.408]   
Stock Market Segmentation*TLR_BP_BKR  1.121***  
 
 [0.330]  
Stock Market Segmentation*TLR_BP_BS   0.685*** 
 
  [0.214] 
Controls:    
Log Distance -1.209*** -1.199*** -1.268*** 
 [0.442] [0.441] [0.450] 
Language 0.730** 0.719** 0.776** 
 [0.328] [0.327] [0.317] 
Rule of Law 0.501** 0.517** 0.679** 
 [0.242] [0.247] [0.271] 
Minority Investor Protection 0.207** 0.201** -0.029 
 [0.083] [0.084] [0.090] 
Common Law 1.076 1.002 1.214 
 [0.770] [0.742] [0.806] 
Efficiency -0.314** -0.342** -0.554*** 
 [0.157] [0.167] [0.210] 
Expropriation Risk 0.198 0.19 -0.13 
 [0.161] [0.151] [0.211] 
Insider Trading -0.359 -0.292 0.063 
 [0.259] [0.238] [0.162] 
CIFAR 0.008 0.007 -0.005 
 [0.013] [0.013] [0.014] 
Analyst -0.009 -0.011 -0.01 
 [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] 
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Log GDP Per Capita -0.867*** -0.774*** -0.564*** 
 [0.287] [0.271] [0.218] 
Trade 0.009 0.011 0.009 
 [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] 
Stock Market Capitalization -0.099 -0.119 -0.337* 
 [0.119] [0.129] [0.185] 
Log Turnover -0.035 0.071 0.405** 
 [0.117] [0.123] [0.177] 
Tax -0.144* -0.137* -0.128 
 [0.079] [0.080] [0.079] 
Lagged Return 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.039*** 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.012] 
Constant 16.6757** 15.257** 18.5318*** 
 [6.595] [6.222] [6.9929] 
Allocator Countries Dummies? Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 875 875 875 
Pseudo R-squared 0.068 0.0674 0.0694 
The table presents Tobit regression estimates of ijw  (i.e., the weight of country j in the portfolio of the mutual 
funds from country i (i ≠ j)) scaled by jw  (i.e., the weight of country j in the world float portfolio). 
INCR_BP_BKR and TLR_BP_BKR are the incremental timeliness of economic losses and the timely economic 
loss recognition, respectively, as reported in Bushman and Piotroski (2006) who follow the methodology in Ball, 
Kothari and Robin (2000). TLR_BP_BS is the timely loss recognition as measured by Bushman and Piotroski 
(2006) based on the methodology of Ball and Shivakumar (2005). The rest of the variables are described in the 
Appendix. The standard errors reported in brackets are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the 
allocator countries level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-
tailed t-test. 
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Table 3: Tests of Hypothesis 1 using Emerging Market as a proxy for International Diversification 
Opportunities 
 
Dependent Variable: jij ww  
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
    
INCR_BP_BKR -1.690*   
 [0.93]   
TLR_BP_BKR  -1.223  
  [0.86]  
TLR_BP_BS   0.431 
   [0.58] 
Emerging Markets -1.922*** -1.604*** -0.220 
 [0.57] [0.46] [0.45] 
Emerging Markets *INCR_BP_BKR 7.421***   
 
[2.01]   
Emerging Markets *TLR_BP_BKR  5.743***  
 
 [1.82]  
Emerging Markets *TLR_BP_BS   1.420* 
 
  [0.86] 
Constant 13.929** 15.944*** 15.785*** 
 [5.50] [6.01] [5.76] 
Controls Included Yes Yes Yes 
Allocator Countries Dummies? Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 875 875 875 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0668 0.0667 0.0659 
The table presents Tobit regression estimates of ijw  (i.e., the weight of country j in the portfolio of the mutual 
funds from country i (i ≠ j)) scaled by jw  (i.e., the weight of country j in the world float portfolio). 
INCR_BP_BKR and TLR_BP_BKR are the incremental timeliness of economic losses and the timely economic 
loss recognition, respectively, as reported in Bushman and Piotroski (2006) who follow the methodology in Ball, 
Kothari and Robin (2000). TLR_BP_BS is the timely loss recognition as measured by Bushman and Piotroski 
(2006) based on the methodology of Ball and Shivakumar (2005). The controls in this table are the full set of 
controls reported in Table 2. The rest of the variables are described in the Appendix. The standard errors reported 
in brackets are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the allocator countries level. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed t-test.  
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Table 4: Tests of Hypothesis 1 using Stock Market Correlation as a proxy for International Diversification 
Opportunities 
 
Dependent Variable: jij ww  
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
    
INCR_BP_BKR 7.2766**   
 [3.274]   
TLR_BP_BKR  9.724**  
  [4.35]  
TLR_BP_BS   5.141*** 
   [1.727] 
Stock Market Correlation 1.226 0.9206 8.6777*** 
 [3.107] [2.31] [3.37] 
Stock Market Correlation *INCR_BP_BKR 15.231*   
 
[7.836]   
Stock Market Correlation *TLR_BP_BKR  18.562*  
 
 [9.646]  
Stock Market Correlation *TLR_BP_BS   9.674** 
 
  [4.419] 
Constant   14.227** 14.6067**   20.561*** 
 [6.750] [5.941] [7.773] 
Controls Included Yes Yes Yes 
Allocator Countries Dummies? Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 875 875 875 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0662 0.0668 0.0677 
The table presents Tobit regression estimates of ijw  (i.e., the weight of country j in the portfolio of the mutual 
funds from country i (i ≠ j)) scaled by jw  (i.e., the weight of country j in the world float portfolio). 
INCR_BP_BKR and TLR_BP_BKR are the incremental timeliness of economic losses and the timely economic 
loss recognition, respectively, as reported in Bushman and Piotroski (2006) who follow the methodology in Ball, 
Kothari and Robin (2000). TLR_BP_BS is the timely loss recognition as measured by Bushman and Piotroski 
(2006) based on the methodology of Ball and Shivakumar (2005). Stock Market Correlation is multiplied with -1. 
The controls in this table are the full set of controls reported in Table 2. The rest of the variables are described in 
the Appendix. The standard errors reported in brackets are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the 
allocator countries level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-
tailed t-test. 
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Table 5: Extending Hypothesis 1 using Stock Market Segmentation as the proxy for International 
Diversification Opportunities 
 
 
Dependent Variable: jij ww  
 
 
Partitioning Allocator Countries 
by their INCR_BP_BKR  
 
Partitioning Allocator Countries by  
their TLR_BP_BKR 
 
Independent Variables 
(1) 
 
Allocator 
Countries with 
High 
Conservatism 
 
(2) 
 
Allocator 
Countries with 
Low 
Conservatism 
 
(3) 
 
Allocator 
Countries with 
High 
Conservatism 
 
(4) 
 
Allocator 
Countries with 
Low 
Conservatism 
 
 
 
   
INCR_BP_BKR 13.326*** 7.541***   
 [3.522] [1.514]   
TLR_BP_BKR .  12.061*** 5.175*** 
   [3.08] [1.38] 
Stock Market Segmentation -.415*** -.165*** -.329*** -.136*** 
 [.1429] [.0511] [.125] [.047] 
 
Stock Market Segmentation 
*INCR_BP_BKR 
 
 
1.797*** 
[.491] 
 
.85469*** 
[.185] 
  
Stock Market Segmentation 
*TLR_BP_BKR 
 
 
1.441*** 
[.409] 
.582*** 
[.163] 
 
(cross-equations restriction tests to 
test whether the interaction of Stock 
Market Segmentation with 
conditional conservatism is the 
same across groups) 
 
 
(0.067) 
 
(0.051) 
Constant 24.1267** 4.845*** 21.56864** 4.05385** 
 [9.9436] [1.861] [9.254] [1.911] 
Controls Included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Allocator Countries Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 455 420 455 420 
No of Allocator Countries 13 12 13 12 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0769 0.1306 0.0700 0.1713 
The table presents Tobit regression estimates of ijw  (i.e., the weight of country j in the portfolio of the mutual 
funds from country i (i ≠ j)) scaled by jw  (i.e., the weight of country j in the world float portfolio). 
INCR_BP_BKR and TLR_BP_BKR are the incremental timeliness of economic losses and the timely economic 
loss recognition, respectively, as reported in Bushman and Piotroski (2006) who follow the methodology in Ball, 
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Kothari and Robin (2000). TLR_BP_BS is the timely loss recognition as measured by Bushman and Piotroski 
(2006) based on the methodology of Ball and Shivakumar (2005). The rest of the variables are described in the 
Appendix. The standard errors reported in brackets are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the 
allocator countries level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-
tailed t-test. The p-value of the difference in coefficients on the interaction of Stock Market Segmentation with 
conditional conservatism in the low and high conservatism allocator countries subsamples is reported in 
parentheses.
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Table 6: Extending Hypothesis 1 using Emerging Market as the proxy for International Diversification 
Opportunities 
 
 
Dependent Variable: jij ww  
 
 
Partitioning Allocator Countries 
by their INCR_BP_BKR  
 
Partitioning Allocator Countries by  
their TLR_BP_BKR 
 
Independent Variables 
(1) 
 
Allocator 
Countries with 
High 
Conservatism 
 
(2) 
 
Allocator 
Countries with 
Low 
Conservatism 
 
(1) 
 
Allocator 
Countries with 
High 
Conservatism 
 
(2) 
 
Allocator 
Countries with 
Low 
Conservatism 
 
 
 
   
INCR_BP_BKR -3.2606*** -.271   
 [1.171] [.4687]   
TLR_BP_BKR   -1.678 -.249 
   [1.224] [.482] 
Emerging Market -2.5405*** -1.2888*** -2.225*** -.739*** 
 [.857] [.333] [.691] [.256] 
 
Emerging Market 
*INCR_BP_BKR 
 
9.537*** 
[1.9738] 
4.172*** 
[1.0057]   
 
 
   
Emerging Market *TLR_BP_BKR 
 
 
7.130*** 
[2.159] 
2.496*** 
[.917] 
 
(cross-equations restriction tests to 
test whether the interaction of 
Emerging Market with conditional 
conservatism is the same across 
groups) 
 
 
 
(0.0154) 
 
 
(0.0439) 
Constant 20.911** 3.596** 26.5766*** 4.3828** 
 8.6185 1.487 10.154 1.9385 
Controls Included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Allocator Countries Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 455 420 455 420 
No of Allocator Countries 13 12 13 12 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0760 0.1257 0.0693 0.1653 
The table presents Tobit regression estimates of ijw  (i.e., the weight of country j in the portfolio of the mutual 
funds from country i (i ≠ j)) scaled by jw  (i.e., the weight of country j in the world float portfolio). 
INCR_BP_BKR and TLR_BP_BKR are the incremental timeliness of economic losses and the timely economic 
loss recognition, respectively, as reported in Bushman and Piotroski (2006) who follow the methodology in Ball, 
 92 
Kothari and Robin (2000). TLR_BP_BS is the timely loss recognition as measured by Bushman and Piotroski 
(2006) based on the methodology of Ball and Shivakumar (2005). The rest of the variables are described in the 
Appendix. The standard errors reported in brackets are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the 
allocator countries level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-
tailed t-test. The p-value of the difference in coefficients on the interaction of Emerging Market with conditional 
conservatism in the low and high conservatism allocator countries subsamples is reported in parentheses.
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Table 7: Extending Hypothesis 1 using Stock Market Correlation as the proxy for International 
Diversification Opportunities 
 
 
Dependent Variable: jij ww  
 
 
Partitioning Allocator Countries 
by their INCR_BP_BKR  
 
Partitioning Allocator Countries by  
their TLR_BP_BKR 
 
Independent Variables 
(1) 
 
Allocator 
Countries with 
High 
Conservatism 
 
(2) 
 
Allocator 
Countries with 
Low 
Conservatism 
 
(1) 
 
Allocator 
Countries with 
High 
Conservatism 
 
(2) 
 
Allocator 
Countries with 
Low 
Conservatism 
 
 
 
   
INCR_BP_BKR 
 
12.577** 3.8102**   
 
[4.919] [1.881] 
  
TLR_BP_BKR   18.17831** .235188 
 
 
 [7.093] [1.875] 
Stock Market Correlation -.30946 .422039 -1.260 2.209* 
 
[4.466] [1.709] [4.354] [1.248] 
 
Stock Market Correlation 
*INCR_BP_BKR 
 
29.622*** 
[11.335] 
6.536 
[4.556]   
 
 
   
Stock Market Correlation 
*TLR_BP_BKR 
 
 
37.0279** 
[16.467] 
-1.4269 
[4.229] 
 
(cross-equations restriction tests to 
test whether the interaction of Stock 
Market Correlation with conditional 
conservatism is the same across 
groups) 
 
 
 
(0.0539) 
 
 
(0.0210) 
Constant 19.977* 3.4378* 23.4105** 4.7405** 
 [10.510] [1.804] [9.776] [2.006] 
Controls Included Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Allocator Countries Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 455 420 455 420 
No of Allocator Countries 13 12 13 12 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0759 0.1205 0.0702 0.1620 
The table presents Tobit regression estimates of ijw  (i.e., the weight of country j in the portfolio of the mutual 
funds from country i (i ≠ j)) scaled by jw  (i.e., the weight of country j in the world float portfolio). 
INCR_BP_BKR and TLR_BP_BKR are the incremental timeliness of economic losses and the timely economic 
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loss recognition, respectively, as reported in Bushman and Piotroski (2006) who follow the methodology in Ball, 
Kothari and Robin (2000). TLR_BP_BS is the timely loss recognition as measured by Bushman and Piotroski 
(2006) based on the methodology of Ball and Shivakumar (2005). The rest of the variables are described in the 
Appendix. The standard errors reported in brackets are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the 
allocator countries level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-
tailed t-test. The p-value of the difference in coefficients on the interaction of Stock Market Correlation with 
conditional conservatism in the low and high conservatism allocator countries subsamples is reported in 
parentheses. 
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Table 8: Tests of Hypothesis 2 
 
Dependent Variable: ))((log FDIFPIFPI +  
 
            
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
            
INCR_BP_BKR 0.200*** 0.151** 0.207*** 0.163*** 0.149**       
 [0.051] [0.057] [0.057] [0.057] [0.055]       
TLR_BP_BKR      0.204*** 0.168** 0.209*** 0.140* 0.129*  
      [0.065] [0.067] [0.071] [0.070] [0.073]  
TLR_BP_BS           0.110*** 
           [0.036] 
Weight in World Market Portfolio 0.672*** 0.722*** 0.666*** 0.581*** 0.579*** 0.667*** 0.750*** 0.661*** 0.557** 0.597** 0.651*** 
 [0.171] [0.187] [0.179] [0.194] [0.204] [0.188] [0.202] [0.196] [0.200] [0.214] [0.211] 
Liquidity 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Liberalization Intensity  0.164** 0.108 0.167** 0.123 0.093 0.180** 0.111 0.184** 0.138 0.093 0.058 
 [0.071] [0.082] [0.077] [0.082] [0.090] [0.071] [0.081] [0.077] [0.084] [0.091] [0.082] 
Common Law 0.07 0.078* 0.069 0.069* 0.070* 0.066 0.079* 0.065 0.063 0.070* 0.064* 
 [0.041] [0.040] [0.042] [0.036] [0.036] [0.042] [0.039] [0.042] [0.039] [0.038] [0.031] 
CIFAR -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002* -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Rule of Law -0.019** -0.017* -0.019** -0.018* -0.014 -0.022** -0.020** -0.022** -0.019* -0.016 -0.014* 
 [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.010] [0.010] [0.008] 
Antidirector Rights -0.008 -0.014 -0.006 -0.009 -0.007 -0.006 -0.013 -0.004 -0.007 -0.008 -0.026* 
 [0.008] [0.009] [0.010] [0.009] [0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.009] [0.011] [0.013] 
Returns  0.001   0.001  0.002*   0.001 0.002** 
  [0.001]   [0.001]  [0.001]   [0.001] [0.001] 
Cross-Listing   -0.028  -0.091*   -0.023  -0.079 -0.126** 
   [0.072]  [0.052]   [0.074]  [0.055] [0.046] 
Closely Held Shares    -0.181* -0.204**    -0.168 -0.173* -0.152* 
    [0.097] [0.090]    [0.106] [0.098] [0.082] 
Constant -0.106 -0.108 -0.1 0.034 0.069 -0.084 -0.082 -0.078 0.03 0.053 0.099 
 96 
 [0.067] [0.064] [0.067] [0.095] [0.100] [0.078] [0.075] [0.079] [0.100] [0.106] [0.107] 
Observations 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Adjusted R-squared 0.329 0.358 0.305 0.426 0.446 0.315 0.375 0.289 0.384 0.419 0.507 
            
The table presents OLS regression estimates of the natural log of the fraction of foreign portfolio investment (FPI) in total foreign investment (FPI + FDI). 
INCR_BP_BKR and TLR_BP_BKR are the incremental timeliness of economic losses and the timely economic loss recognition, respectively, as reported in 
Bushman and Piotroski (2006) who follow the methodology in Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000). TLR_BP_BS is the timely loss recognition as measured by 
Bushman and Piotroski (2006) based on the methodology of Ball and Shivakumar (2005). The rest of the variables are described in the Appendix. The standard 
errors reported in brackets are corrected for heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed t-
test. 
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Table 9: Tests of Hypothesis 3 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Ownership Concentration 
 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
         
Inverse of Synchronicity  -0.061*** -0.066** -0.007 -0.015 -0.008 -0.016 -0.116*** -0.134*** 
 [0.021] [0.028] [0.018] [0.024] [0.017] [0.023] [0.035] [0.030] 
 
Inverse of  
Synchronicity 
*INCR_BP_BKR 
-0.529*** 
[0.135] 
-0.495*** 
[0.140] 
    
 
        
Inverse of Synchronicity 
*TLR_BP_BKR      
-0.465*** 
[0.111] 
-0.433*** 
[0.135]   
 
    
    
Inverse of Synchronicity 
*TLR_BP_BS       
-0.083* 
[0.047] 
-0.094* 
[0.048] 
         
INCR_BP_BKR   -0.373*** -0.326**     
   [0.124] [0.142]     
TLR_BP_BKR     -0.304** -0.269*   
     [0.133] [0.142]   
TLR_BP_BS       -0.034 -0.009 
       [0.085] [0.092] 
Log of GNP per Capita 0.075** 0.124*** 0.132*** 0.170*** 0.133*** 0.170*** 0.132*** 0.204*** 
 [0.030] [0.034] [0.027] [0.051] [0.027] [0.050] [0.031] [0.050] 
Log of GNP -0.042*** -0.056*** -0.050*** -0.062*** -0.050*** -0.062*** -0.049*** -0.066*** 
 [0.009] [0.015] [0.011] [0.020] [0.010] [0.020] [0.010] [0.017] 
Legal reserve Required  -0.445*** -0.392*** -0.574*** -0.531*** -0.560*** -0.515*** -0.485*** -0.456*** 
 [0.077] [0.076] [0.083] [0.095] [0.081] [0.095] [0.073] [0.065] 
CIFAR -0.005*** -0.003** -0.007*** -0.005** -0.008*** -0.006** -0.007*** -0.006* 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] 
Gini Coefficient 0.000 0.004 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.003 
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 [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] 
Rule of Law -0.036** -0.041*** -0.066*** -0.063*** -0.066*** -0.062*** -0.069*** -0.075*** 
 [0.015] [0.010] [0.014] [0.020] [0.015] [0.019] [0.017] [0.018] 
Antidirector Rights -0.039** -0.025 -0.030** -0.025 -0.029** -0.023 -0.037** -0.035 
 [0.015] [0.023] [0.013] [0.027] [0.013] [0.027] [0.015] [0.029] 
One Share One Vote -0.083* -0.091** -0.127** -0.106** -0.130** -0.107** -0.133* -0.110** 
 [0.042] [0.040] [0.051] [0.040] [0.053] [0.043] [0.063] [0.046] 
Mandatory Dividends 0.445*** 0.165 0.668*** 0.386 0.675*** 0.373 0.669*** 0.368 
 [0.146] [0.108] [0.161] [0.324] [0.168] [0.319] [0.204] [0.262] 
Creditor Rights 0.007 -0.003 -0.004 -0.013 0 -0.01 0 -0.014 
 [0.016] [0.021] [0.020] [0.031] [0.017] [0.029] [0.017] [0.025] 
Civil Law -0.019 0.009 -0.051 -0.02 -0.047 -0.015 -0.059 -0.025 
 [0.055] [0.062] [0.054] [0.086] [0.048] [0.082] [0.049] [0.086] 
Private Benefits of Control  0.305**  0.203  0.215  0.248 
  [0.126]  [0.210]  [0.203]  [0.160] 
Constant 1.019*** 0.42 1.142*** 0.579 1.130*** 0.552 1.083*** 0.34 
 [0.246] [0.295] [0.278] [0.344] [0.274] [0.347] [0.303] [0.395] 
         
Observations 34 31 32 29 32 29 32 29 
R-squared 0.6933 0.7323 0.7505 0.7378 0.7472 0.7379 0.7115 0.7371 
         
The table presents OLS regression estimates of Ownership Concentration (i.e., the average ownership stake of the largest three shareholders in the ten largest 
privately owned non-financial firms in each country). INCR_BP_BKR and TLR_BP_BKR are the incremental timeliness of economic losses and the timely 
economic loss recognition, respectively, as reported in Bushman and Piotroski (2006) who follow the methodology in Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000). TLR_BP_BS 
is the timely loss recognition as measured by Bushman and Piotroski (2006) based on the methodology of Ball and Shivakumar (2005). The rest of the variables are 
described in the Appendix. The standard errors reported in brackets are corrected for heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% 
levels, respectively, using two-tailed t-test. 
  
Appendix 
Variables  Description 
 
Variables used for testing 
Hypothesis 1  
 
 
Stock Market Segmentation 
 
An index constructed by The Economic Freedom Network. This index captures 
the restrictions both on access by foreigners to local markets and on access by 
locals to foreign markets. It provides lower (higher) ratings to countries with 
more (less) restrictions on foreign capital transactions. We multiply the index 
score with negative one so that this variable becomes increasing in stock market 
segmentation. Source: Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005). 
 
Emerging Market  An indicator variable that takes the value unity for an emerging market and zero 
otherwise. Source: Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005). 
 
Stock Market Correlation The average correlation coefficient for each country’s stock market with the rest 
of world. It is computed using country returns in U.S. dollars from Datastream 
over the period 1995 to 1999. We multiply stock market correlation with 
negative one so that a higher value of this variable means lower stock market 
correlation. Source: Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005). 
 
Distance The bilateral distance between mutual funds’ home country i and foreign 
country j. This variable is used in Frankel and Wei (1998). Source: 
http://www.nber.org/~wei/  
 
Language An indicator variable that takes the value unity if mutual funds’ home country i 
and the foreign country j share a major language and zero otherwise. We 
construct this variable using data on the languages reported in the World 
Factbook 1999. 
 
Rule of Law An index that assesses the law and order tradition in the country. The index has 
a scale of 0–10, with lower scores for countries without tradition for law and 
order. It is produced by the risk-rating agency, International Country Risk. 
Source: Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005). 
 
Minority Investor Protection A measure indicating the degree of minority investor protection. The value 
varies from 0 to 5, with 0 indicating the lowest degree of protection and 5 the 
highest. Source: Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005). 
 
Common Law An indicator variable that takes the value unity if the country is a common-law 
country and zero otherwise. Source: Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005). 
 
Efficiency A measure of the efficiency of the judicial system. It provides an assessment of 
the “efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, 
particularly foreign firms.” It is constructed by Business International 
Corporation. Source: Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005). 
 
Expropriation Risk An assessment of the risk of “outright confiscation” or “forced nationalization.” 
The index has a scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores for greater risks. It is 
constructed by the International Country Risk agency. Source: Chan, Covrig 
and Ng (2005). 
 
Insider Trading The prevalence of insider trading in the country. A low value means it is 
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pervasive, while a high value means it is extremely rare. Source: La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006). 
 
CIFAR A disclosure index that measures the inclusion or omission of 90 items in the 
1990 annual reports. Source: Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005). 
 
Analyst The number of analysts following the largest 30 firms in each country in year 
1996. Source: Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2004). 
 
GDP Per Capita Gross domestic product per capita in U.S. dollars that is obtained from the 
World Competitiveness Report 2000. Source: Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005) 
 
Trade The average of exports and imports scaled by GDP. Source: Chan, Covrig and 
Ng (2005) 
 
Stock Market Capitalization The relative size of the stock market of each country, measured by the stock 
market capitalization as a percentage of the country’s GDP. Source: Chan, 
Covrig and Ng (2005) 
 
Turnover The ratio of the total value of stocks traded to the average market capitalization 
in a given country. Source: Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005) 
 
Tax The average withholding tax percentage per country obtained it from Corporate 
Taxes: Price Waterhouse, 1996. Source: Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005)  
 
Lagged Return A one-year lagged stock return for each country. Source: Chan, Covrig and Ng 
(2005). 
 
Variables used for testing 
Hypothesis 2 
 
 
Weight in World Market 
Portfolio 
 
The weight of each country in the world market capitalization in Year 1994. 
Source: Kho, Stulz and Warnock (2008).  
 
Liquidity The total value of stocks traded as a fraction of the shares outstanding. Source: 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2004). 
 
Liberalization Intensity The degree of equity market liberalization. It takes values between zero and 
one. A fully liberalized country has an intensity measure of one, while a fully 
segmented country has an intensity measure of zero. Source: Bekaert, Harvey, 
and Lundblad (2005). 
 
Common Law An indicator variable that takes the value unity if the country is a common-law 
country and zero otherwise. Source: Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005). 
 
CIFAR An index that measure the inclusion or omission of 90 items in the 1990 annual 
reports. Source: Chan, Covrig, and Ng (2005). 
 
Rule of Law 
 
Assessment of the law and order tradition in the country. Scale from 0 to 6, 
with lower scores for less tradition for law and order. Source: La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). 
 
Antidirector Rights An index aggregating shareholder rights. It ranges from 0 to 6. Source: La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). 
 
Returns Stock returns for each country over the period 1994-1998. Source: Chan, 
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Covrig, and Ng (2005). 
 
Cross-Listing The share of a country’s stock market that is listed on US exchanges in Year 
1997 (either directly or as a Level II or III ADR) or has issued public debt in the 
United States. Source: Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock (2004). 
 
Closely Held Shares The percentage of shares in a country that is unavailable for purchase by the 
portfolio investors. Source: Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson 
(2003). 
  
Variables used for testing 
Hypothesis 3 
 
 
Stock Market Synchronicity 
 
The systematic market-wide stock return variation as a percent of the total 
variation (i.e., the sum of market-wide stock return variation and firm-specific 
stock return variation). It is measured as the average R² of firm-level 
regressions of bi-weekly stock returns on local and U.S. market indexes in each 
country in year 1995. Source: Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) 
 
GNP per Capita Gross National Product per capita in constant dollars of year 1994. Source: La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). 
 
GNP Gross National Product for each county for the year 1994. Source: World Bank 
Indicators. 
 
Legal reserve Required  It is the minimum percentage of total share capital mandated by Corporate Law 
to avoid the dissolution of an existing firm. It takes a value of zero for countries 
without such restriction. Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1998). 
 
CIFAR An index that measure the inclusion or omission of 90 items in the 1990 annual 
reports. Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). 
 
Gini Coefficient Gini coefficient for income inequality in each country for the year 1990. 
Source: the Euro Monitor Database. 
 
Rule of Law Assessment of the law and order tradition in the country. Scale from 0 to 6, 
with lower scores for less tradition for law and order. Source: La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). 
 
Antidirector Rights An index aggregating shareholder rights. It ranges from 0 to 6.  
Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). 
 
One Share One Vote Equals one if the Company Law or Commercial Code of the country requires 
that ordinary shares carry one vote per share, and zero otherwise. Equivalently, 
this variable equals one when the law prohibits the existence of both multiple-
voting and non-voting ordinary shares and does not allow firms to set a 
maximum number of votes per shareholder irrespective of the number of shares 
she owns, and zero otherwise. Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1998). 
 
Mandatory Dividends Equals the percentage of net income that the Company Law or Commercial 
Code requires firms to distribute as dividends among ordinary stockholders. It 
takes a value of zero for countries without such restriction. Source: La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). 
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Creditor Rights An index aggregating different creditor rights. It ranges from 0 to 4. Source: La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). 
 
Civil Law An indicator variable that takes the value unity if the country is a civil-law 
country and zero otherwise. Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1998). 
 
Private Benefits of Control The country’s average block premium based on transfers of controlling blocks 
of shares. Source: Dyck and Zingales (2004). 
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Chapter 4 
The role of stock ownership by US members of Congress on the market for 
political favors∗ 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
A growing empirical literature suggests that politicians and firms exchange benefits with each 
other.41 This literature, however, is virtually silent on the mechanism for establishing a 
“politician-firm exchange market”. I examine whether a politician’s stock ownership in a firm 
can be a possible mechanism to establish mutual relations with this firm. I define a “mutual 
relation” as an agreement in which firms support politicians during the election and 
politicians, in turn, provide private benefits to these firms. Specifically, I investigate whether 
the stock ownership of politicians is a mechanism to establish mutual relations with 
contributing firms. In the United States, the mandated disclosure requirements of the Ethics in 
Government Act of 1978 as well as the Federal Election Committee Act enable me to obtain 
the data required for investigating this question. My question is motivated in part by anecdotal 
evidence which cites ‘ownership by politicians’ as a main element in cases where there are 
allusions toward politicians exchanging benefits with firms.42 Procon.org, for example, 
reports: “Less than two months after ascending to the United States Senate, Barack Obama 
bought more than $50,000 worth of stock in two speculative companies whose major investors 
included some of his biggest political donors. One of the companies was a biotech concern 
that was starting to develop a drug to treat avian flu. In March 2005, two weeks after buying 
about $5,000 of its shares, Mr. Obama took the lead in a legislative push for more federal 
                                               
∗
 This chapter is accepted for presentation at the American Finance Association 2011. I undertook part of this 
research while I was a visiting scholar at the Wharton School. I am indebted to Laurence van Lent and Martin 
Walker for their continuous support, guidance, and valuable discussions. I thank Jennifer Blouin, John Core, 
Henry Friedman, Christian Leuz, Baiman Stanley, Norman Strong, the doctoral students at the Wharton School 
for their feedback and comments. I thank Tilburg University for providing the financial support I needed to 
compile the dataset. I gratefully acknowledge the financial contribution of the European Commission Research 
Training Network INTACCT (MRTN-CT-2006-035850). I thank the Center for Responsive Politics, Eagle Eye 
Publishers, Inc., and Charles Stewart III (MIT) for making their data publicly available. 
41
 See Section 2 for a review of this literature. 
42
 See http://insidertrading.procon.org/viewresource.asp?resourceID=1580   
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spending to battle the disease. The most recent financial disclosure form for Mr. Obama . . . 
also shows that he bought more than $50,000 in stock in a satellite communications business 
whose principal backers include four friends and donors who had raised more than $150,000 
for his political committees.”43  
 
Politicians seek re-election and campaign contributions and support by firms are helpful to 
enhance the likelihood of their winning (Snyder 191). Firms need politicians’ help in getting 
benefits, such as securing favorable legislation, special tax exemptions, contracts to provide 
goods or services to government, help in dealing with regulatory agencies, or to avoid being 
investigated by governing bodies for fraud detection (e.g., the SEC). Writing direct fee-for-
service contracts, however, between these two parties in order to exchange benefits are 
considered bribery (Krozner and Stratmann 1998). In addition, either party to this contract 
might renege on its promise and the other party cannot resort to the courts to enforce the 
contract. If the uncertainty about how the other party is going to behave becomes too high, the 
politician-firm exchange market will break down. Krozner and Stratmann (1998) argue that 
certain institutional features of the US Congress are conducive to politicians and firms 
engaging in repeated interaction, credible reputation building, and establishing long term 
relations. These institutional features allow for a better enforcement of the relationship 
between politicians and firms not by enforcement by court but by the threat of stopping all 
future exchanges. These authors suggest that the formation of specialized standing committees 
is one important example of such an institutional feature that fosters reputation building and 
enable long-term relations specifically between firms belonging to industries influenced by the 
relevant committee and members of the relevant committee. 44 
                                               
43
 See http://insidertrading.procon.org/viewresource.asp?resourceID=1580#obamaa. I cite two more examples 
from the Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) report (2009) in Appendix II. The first 
concerns Representative Jerry Lewis (R-CA). He allegedly misused his position on the Appropriations 
Committee to steer hundreds of millions of dollars in earmarks to family, friends, former employees, and 
corporations—all of which were linked to Security Bank of California in which he owns shares—in exchange for 
contributions to his campaign committee. The second concerns the case of Representative Maxine Waters (D-
CA), a senior member of the House Financial Services Committee, who arranged a meeting between the 
Department of Treasury and OneUnited Bank, a company with which she has mutually supportive financial ties. 
Thus, it seems from these anecdotes, that the ownership of politicians is likely to be a mechanism that facilitate 
their interactions with firms. 
44
 This is because these committees have three main features: a) they are specialized, b) politicians have the 
choice to continue in the same committees as long as they want, and c) there is a limit on the number of those 
committees that politicians can join, thereby limiting politicians’ relation to a subset of firms. 
 105 
 
I argue that in the absence of strong mechanisms such as these specialized committee 
assignments the ownership of these politicians could be the alternative mechanism that can 
avoid the breakdown of their relationships with these firms. As investors in firms, politicians 
tie their own interests to those of the firm. In other words, by owning a firm's stock, politicians 
commit their personal wealth to the firm. This will, in turn, enhance the firm's incentive to 
support these politicians during elections and prolong their incumbency period for as long as 
possible. In addition, investment can be a long term relationship that allows repeated 
interaction between firms and politicians. Politicians have the choice not to divest their share, 
and accordingly, can be in a relationship with firms for as long as they want. By not divesting, 
a politician reduces a firm’s uncertainty with regard to his/her action toward the firm. Taken 
together, ownership of stocks by politicians acts as an alternative mechanism that fosters 
repeated interactions, reputation building, and long-term relationships of politicians that invest 
with firms in which they invest.  
 
I examine the main prediction that the ownership of politicians is a mechanism to establish 
mutual relations with firms in five closely related tests. In the first test I investigate whether 
the ownership of politicians is negatively associated with the availability of other mechanisms 
for firm-politician exchanges of benefits. In particular, I consider the investments of 
politicians seated in committees that regulate industries and the investments of those who do 
not hold such an assignment. I link the share ownership that members of Congress held in 642 
firms between 2004–2007 to both the industry membership of these firms and the committee 
assignments of politicians. I find that politicians invest higher amounts in firms not belonging 
to industries under the influence of the committee in which they are seated than in those under 
their influence.45  
 
In a second set of tests, I examine whether the ownership of politicians in firms is positively 
associated with the contribution they receive from these firms. A primary objective of 
politicians from forging a relation with firms is to obtain these firms’ contributions and 
                                               
45
 This result could also suggest that politicians are not investing in these firms in order to avoid being in conflict 
of interest situations. However, I am not relying only on this result to support my arguments. All the results in the 
paper taken together support the use of ownership as a mechanism to establish a relation with firms.  
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support. Thus, if politicians indeed use their ownership as a mechanism to establish a relation 
with contributing firms, this should be manifested in a positive association between the 
ownership of these politicians and contributions. I find a positive association between the 
share ownership that members of Congress held in firms between 2004–2007 and the Political 
Action Committee (PAC) contributions they received from these firms. Not only that, but also 
I find that Republican politicians invest less (more) in a firm that favors (i.e., contribute more 
to) the Democratic (Republican) Party over the Republican (Democratic) Party, while 
Democratic politicians own fewer (more) shares in a firm that favors the Republican 
(Democratic) Party over the Democratic (Republican) Party. Because these results suggest a 
partisan component to politicians’ investment decisions, it seems that ownership of politicians 
is a mechanism to establish relations with the contributing firms. 
 
In the third set of tests, I examine whether the strength of the mutual relation established 
through the ownership mechanism is stronger in situations where it is expected, a priori, that 
either or both firms and politicians benefit more from having a relation. I use the magnitude of 
the documented positive association between ownership and contribution as a proxy for the 
strength of the mutual relation between firms and politicians. I find that the positive 
association between ownership and contributions is ‘stronger’ when firms are ‘not’ linked to 
politicians via their committee assignments. These results suggest that the mutual relation 
between politicians and firms via ownership is established to overcome the absence of a 
mechanism linking politicians and firms. More importantly, consistent with my prediction, I 
find that the positive association between ownership and contributions is increasing in 
politicians’ power (as defined by having membership in a powerful Congressional committee, 
seats in several powerful committees, or seniority). In addition, I find politicians who are 
under investigation for ethics issues (and accordingly their ability to help firms is constrained) 
invest more in contributing firms than in non-contributing firms in the time periods before, but 
not in the time periods after, the investigation took place. 
 
In the fourth test I examine whether there are actual private benefits to firms out of a mutual 
relation established based on the ownership mechanism. Here I shift my analysis to the firm 
level. I predict that as the strength of the association between ownership and contributions 
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estimated at the firm level increases so too will the provision of benefits from politicians to 
firms. Specifically, I compute for each firm a measure of the association between politicians’ 
share ownership in this firm and the contributions the firm makes to their election campaigns 
(i.e., Ownership-Contribution Association). To measure the benefits provided to firms, I 
obtain data on both the size and number of government contracts awarded to these firms over 
the same period. I document a positive association between firm-level Ownership-
Contribution Association and both the size and number of government contracts awarded to 
these firms.  
 
I conduct a final test to investigate whether the relation between firms and politicians is 
terminated when the latter divest their stocks in the firm.  As I argue that ownership is the 
mechanism that underlies the relation between politicians and firms, divesting the stock should 
immediately terminate the relation. Of course, for this to happen, firms should be able to know 
that politicians divested their stocks. This is indeed the case in the United States as politicians 
are required to disclose their investments to the public. I find that politicians who divest their 
ownership in firms are less likely to receive contributions from these firms in the future 
conditional upon having received contributions in the past. I find, however, this termination of 
the relation does not happen when politicians are, at the time of the liquidation of their stock 
holding, serving in a committee assignment affecting the firm. These results suggest that 
divesting the stocks is less likely to terminate the relation if there is a mechanism in place that 
is already protecting the relation.  
 
My results contribute both to the stream of research that examines whether politically 
connected firms receive benefits as a result of their connections (e.g., Roberts 1990; Fisman 
2001; Johnson and Mitton 2003; Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Ueda 2004; Faccio 2006, 2009; 
Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell 2006; Jayachandran 2006; Claessens, Feijen, Laeven 2008; 
Goldman, Rocholl, and So 2008, 2009; Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov 2009) and to the 
stream of research that examines whether politicians benefit from politically connected firms 
(e.g., Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar, and Thesmar 2006; Dinç 2005). None of these studies 
investigate how the stock ownership of politicians can be a mechanism to avoid the 
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breakdown of politicians-firm exchange markets.46 My study shows that in the absence of 
formal mechanisms avoiding the break down of politicians-firms exchange market, such as the 
committee assignments as suggested by Krozner and Stratmann (1998), market forces provide 
an alternative solution. My results are consistent with ownership of politicians acting as the 
alternative mechanism to mitigate the consequences of a lack of such formal mechanisms, 
enabling firms and politicians to continue providing each other with support.  
 
My results also contribute to the stream of research examining determinants of investor 
decisions to hold firms’ stocks apart from risk-return portfolio considerations. This literature 
shows that investors have preferences to invest more in some stocks; for example, because 
they are more familiar with these stocks (Merton 1987), prefer to invest in firms that are 
located in the same geographical area (Coval and Moskowitz 1999), or have emotional ties or 
feelings of loyalty to a firm (Cohen 2009). In addition to familiarity, geographical proximity, 
and loyalty, I show that investor preferences for stocks are determined by “personal ties” with 
the firm. To what extent this evidence that I document using a sample of politicians can be 
generalized to other regular investors is an empirical question for future research. 
 
4.2. Prior Literature and Hypothesis Development 
In Section 2.1 I first review the prior literature documenting benefits being exchanged 
between firms and politicians. In Sections 2.2 I develop the hypotheses to test my main 
prediction that ownership of politicians is a mechanism for establishing relationships with 
firms to exchange benefits. Each sub-section of Section 2.2 develops different hypothesis to 
test this same prediction.  
 
4.2.1. Prior literature 
Prior studies argue that politicians make decisions in response to the interests of their voters 
and pressure groups in an effort to win (re)election (Barro 1973; Levitt 1996; Mian, Sufi and 
                                               
46
 It is important to note that Ziobrowski, Cheng, Boyd, and Ziobrowski (2004) is the only study that examines 
the investments of politicians; by examining whether the investments of U.S. senators outperform the market, 
they test the hypothesis that, relative to other investors, senators have an informational advantage. My objective, 
however, is different from theirs, as I am not interested in examining whether politicians are informed traders. 
That said, my results could partially explain why these senators' investments outperform the market: the senators 
may simply have access to firm-specific information via the ties they established with the firms themselves. 
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Trebbi 2010). The premise in this line of work is that politicians are motivated by the desire to 
increase their net wealth and that obtaining, or remaining in, political office allows them to do 
so. Thus, politicians want to win the (re)election and enhance the likelihood of being re-
elected in the future. The literature suggests that firms’ support and contributions can help in 
achieving this objective. For example, Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar, and Thesmar (2006) show 
that politically connected firms will both vary the number of people they employ and 
coordinate the opening and closing of plants in order to help incumbent politicians get re-
elected. Dinç (2005) finds that government-owned banks increase their lending activity in 
election years. Firms benefit politicians by offering political campaign contributions as well as 
the votes of their employees. Contributions indeed help in winning elections (Snyder, 1990). 
Thus, supporting firms can enhance the welfare of politicians.  
 
Politicians, in turn, can augment the performance of their business sponsors. The evidence 
provided by Fisman (2001), Johnson and Mitton (2003), Sapienza (2004), Faccio, Masulis and 
McConnell (2006), Benmelech and Moskowitz (2010) and others suggests that politically 
connected firms can obtain economic favors. For example, Fisman (2001) finds that, relative 
to less-connected firms, firms connected to the Indonesian President Suharto lost value in 
response to adverse rumors about his health. Roberts (1990) finds that the death of Senator 
Jackson negatively affected the value of firms connected to him and positively affected the 
value of firms connected to his successor. Jayachandran (2006) examines the announcement 
effects of Senator Jim Jefford's decision to leave the Republican Party in 2001—an event that 
transferred control of the U.S. Senate from Republicans to Democrats—and finds that this 
event produced a decrease in the value of firms contributing to Republicans and an increase in 
the value of firms contributing to Democrats. Firms benefit from supporting politicians by 
enjoying more frequent and better-quality access to them (i.e., Kroszner and Stratmann 1998; 
Langbein and Lotwis 1990; Durden et al 1991; Stratmann 1991, 1995, and 1998). Firms 
whose board members are connected to the winning (losing) party are more likely to 
experience an increase (decrease) in procurement contracts (Goldman, Rocholl, and So 2008). 
Faccio and Parsley (2009) demonstrate that the sudden deaths of politicians in several 
countries reduced the value of companies geographically connected to these politicians (by, 
for example, being headquartered in the politician’s hometown). Goldman, Rocholl, and So 
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(2009) examine stock-price reactions to the Republican win of the 2000 U.S. election and 
show that firms whose board members were connected to the Republican (Democratic) Party 
experienced an increase (decrease) in value. Ramanna (2008) shows that congressmen who 
opposed the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB) original proposal to abolish 
pooling accounting are linked, via political contributions, to firms similarly opposed. 
Politically connected firms also undergo less scrutiny by regulatory bodies and can thereby 
delay the detection of accounting fraud (Correia 2009; Yu and Yu 2008). Such firms gain a 
competitive advantage over other less well-connected firms in the industry. In general, 
politically connected firms enjoy easier access to domestic finance, debt financing, lower 
taxation, and stronger market power (Faccio 2009; Claessens, Feijen, Laeven 2008; Leuz and 
Oberholzer-Gee 2006). Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov (2009) suggest that making 
contributions to U.S. political campaigns is likely to increase the contributor's value.  
 
4.2.2. Hypothesis development   
The literature review in the previous section suggests that supporting firms can enhance the 
welfare of politicians in various ways. Likewise, politicians, in turn, can augment the 
performance of their business sponsors. Fee-for-service contracts, however, between 
politicians and firms in order to accomplish these exchanged-benefits are considered bribery 
(Krozner and Stratmann 1998). In addition, if one party to this contract were to renege on its 
promise, the other party could not resort to the courts to enforce it. For example, politicians 
might not provide the promised benefits to the firm after they receive the contribution. 
Similarly, firms might not continue to support the politician in the future after they receive the 
benefit. If the uncertainty about how the other party is going to behave becomes too high, the 
politician-firm exchange market will break down. Krozner and Stratmann (1998) suggest that 
the formation of specialized standing committees is a strong mechanism that can avoid such 
breakdown for three reasons. We discuss these reasons in some detail because they enable us 
to understand the conditions needed for an efficient mechanism to underpin politician-firm 
relations. First, standing committees allow repeated interaction and a long term relationship 
between firms and politicians who are members of these committees. This will, accordingly, 
provide politicians in those committees more opportunities to reduce uncertainty about where 
they stand by producing more observations of their actions for the firms. Similarly, the firms 
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can more easily develop their reputations for reliability by having frequent interactions with a 
subset of politicians. Second, politicians have the ability to stay on the same committee for as 
long as they are re-elected. Third, the committees have specialized jurisdictions and politicians 
can join a limited number of committees. These constraints preclude politicians from 
opportunistically joining committees handling hotly contested issues and, accordingly, 
compete with other politicians for firms’ contributions. These three features of the committee 
system allows for repeated interaction, credible reputation building, and a long term 
relationship which benefit both firms and politicians relative to a situation without standing 
committees. Compliance in implicit agreements between firms and politicians will, 
accordingly, be achieved through the threat of stopping all future exchanges between the two 
parties but not through the courts (Krozner and Stratmann 1998). 
 
Politicians, however, are not always in committee assignments that have jurisdictions over all 
firms. Stock ownership can provide politicians with an alternative mechanism that can avoid 
the breakdown of the relationship between firms and politicians who do not have access to 
committees that influence those firms. By owning firms’ stocks, politicians tie their own 
interests to those of the firm. This will, in turn, enhance the firm's incentive to support these 
politicians during elections and prolong their incumbency period for as long as possible. In 
addition, investing in the stock market possesses features that are to some extent similar to 
those of the committee assignments mentioned above. First, investment can be a long term 
relationship that allows repeated interaction between firms and politicians. Second, politicians 
have the choice not to divest their shares, and accordingly, can be in a relationship with firms 
for as long as they want. By not divesting, a politician reduces the firm’s uncertainty with 
regard to his/her action toward the firm. Third, as with standing committees, firm-politician 
relations need to be to some extent exclusive. In committees, this is achieved by specialization 
(i.e., a committee’s work pertains to a limited number of industries). Typically, political 
activity involves a redistribution of wealth from one party to the other. If a politician forges 
relations with too many firms, it is unclear whether this redistribution remains feasible. 
Similarly, if a firm supports not only one politician, but also his opponent, then it is unclear 
how either of the two politicians benefits from the support. By restricting the set of firms in 
which a politician invests, such exclusivity in the relation is achieved. 
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Thus, I predict that share ownership by politicians is a mechanism for establishing a 
relationship with firms. I examine this prediction in the following sub-sections using five tests. 
An outline of each of these tests is as follows. First, if ownership is a mechanism being used to 
overcome the absence of stronger mechanism linking politicians and firms, it should be 
negatively associated with the availability of other mechanisms. Second, for ownership to be a 
mechanism for establishing relation with firms to obtain their contributions, it should be 
positively associated with contributions. Third, for the ownership to be a mechanism for 
establishing ‘mutual’ relations with contributing firms, the strength of these relations should 
be stronger in situations where it is expected, a priori, that having these relations is more 
valuable. Fourth, if ownership is a mechanism for establishing mutual relations so that firms 
contribute to politicians, and so that politicians provide benefits to firms, we should indeed 
observe the provision of private benefits to these firms. Fifth, for stock ownership to be a 
mechanism for establishing relations with contributing firms, divesting these stocks should 
terminate the relation. 
 
4.2.2.1. Is ownership by politicians negatively associated with their committee assignments? 
Since I argue that stock ownership of politicians is an alternative mechanism to avoid the 
breakdown of the relationship between firms and politicians, the demand on this mechanism 
should be, accordingly, lower when there is another stronger mechanism already in place, such 
as the committee assignments as suggested by Krozner and Stratmann (1998). Stated 
differently, we should observe politicians investing less in firms belonging to industries under 
the influence of their committee assignments, and more in other firms. If there is a component 
of politicians’ investment that is primarily for establishing a relationship with firms rather than 
for regular portfolio considerations, this should be manifested in differences in the amount of 
investment between committee and non-committee members. Therefore, I test my prediction 
that ownership of politicians is a mechanism for establishing a relationship with firms with the 
following hypothesis, 
H1: Politicians invest lower amounts in firms belonging to industries under the influence of 
their committee assignments than in firms that do not belong to industries under their 
influence. 
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4.2.2.2. Is the stock ownership of politicians positively associated with firm contributions? 
The main objective of politicians in establishing a relation with firms is to obtain these firms’ 
contributions and support. Thus, if politicians indeed use their ownership as a mechanism to 
establish a relation with contributing firms, one would expect a positive association between 
the ownership of these politicians and contributions (i.e., a mutually supportive relation). 
Therefore, I test my prediction that ownership is a mechanism for establishing a relationship 
with firms with the following hypothesis, 
H2: There is a positive association between the ownership of politicians in firms and 
contributions they receive from these firms. 
 
It should be noted that a positive association between politicians’ ownership and firms’ 
campaign donations can be explained by other factors than the cementing of mutually 
supportive relations. I outline those explanations in some detail because not only do they 
suggest important controls for the empirical design, but they also motivate a different test of 
the same hypothesis. 
 
Familiarity and geographical proximity, is supported by several prior studies on investment 
allocation decisions, which demonstrate that both variables serve as significant determinants 
of investment behavior (see, e.g., Coval and Moskowitz 1999). Investors prefer to include in 
their portfolios firms they are familiar with, either because the firm is geographically 
proximate or the investor has personally consumed the firm’s products. If firms tend to 
support politicians who represent the district in which they are headquartered and if politicians 
tend to invest in firms close to home, then a positive correlation between ownership and 
contributions would follow. The second theory is Merton’s (1987) investor recognition 
hypothesis. Merton argues that investors focus on stocks they recognize to construct their 
portfolios.  Politicians, like other investors, are likely to invest in large firms because investors 
tend to know more about large firms. These large firms, in turn, are more likely to be 
politically active and to establish a political action committee that makes campaign 
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contributions.47 Taken together, failure to control for firm size can drive a positive association 
between investment and contribution.  
 
Politicians' committee assignments may also make them more aware of a particular firm. 
Much of the Congress’s legislative process is prepared via sub-committees. Politicians are 
more likely to be aware of firms belonging to industries under the aegis of committees on 
which they serve, particularly the largest of these firms. Furthermore, the familiarity and 
investor recognition hypotheses would predict that politicians will not only recognize but 
invest in these firms. At the same time, firms are likely to curry favor with politicians who 
stand on committees able to affect their competitive position by contributing to these 
politicians' election campaigns.48 Again, the positive association between ownership and 
contribution might stem from the effect Committee membership has on both ownership and 
contribution. Bear in mind that that the familiarity and investor recognition effect due to 
committee membership (which would predict that politicians invest more in firms belonging 
to industries under the influence of their committee assignments) biases against me finding 
results supporting H1 above. In short, it is imperative to account for familiarity, geographical 
proximity, and investor recognition before concluding that the positive association between 
ownership and contribution is an evidence of mutual relation between firms and politicians. 
 
An alternative way to rule out the familiarity and investor recognition hypotheses is by 
examining party-level contributions. Politicians scan the market for firms and other sponsors 
to support their election campaigns. Through this scanning process, politicians are likely to 
become aware of most of the firms participating in the political process. Some of these firms 
will support the party to which the politician belongs while others will support the opposing 
party; either way, politicians are likely to be aware of all politically active firms. Thus, if 
investor recognition alone caused politicians to invest in firms, we should find that politicians 
                                               
47
 Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov (2009) demonstrate that firms that participate in the contribution process 
tend to be very large. They find that approximately 7.2% of publicly traded firms participate in the contribution 
process. They also find that these firms tend to be the largest firms on the market. Specifically, the average 
market capitalization of these firms places them in the top 8% of NYSE market capitalization. 
48
 There is evidence that influential legislators, such as party leaders, committee chairs, and members of 
powerful committees, raise substantially more funds than other legislators (Grier and Munger 1991, Romer and 
Snyder 1994, and Ansolabehere and Snyder 1999). 
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invest in any firm participating in the political process, regardless of the firm's political 
leanings. However, should we find instead that politicians invest more in firms that favor their 
party and less in firms that oppose their party, we can conclude that investor recognition is not 
the full story. Indeed, we would not then observe partisan behavior driving investment 
decisions. Conversely, should partisan behavior inform politicians’ investment decisions, I can 
conclude that the association between ownership and contribution captures a mutually 
supportive relation. Therefore, I alternatively test whether there is a partisan component in 
politicians’ investment decisions. 
 
4.2.2.3. Is the association between ownership and contribution a function of the size of 
potential benefit to the firm? 
For the association between ownership and contribution to capture the relationship between 
politicians and firms, the strength of that association should reflect the degree of its 
usefulness. In other words, if we observe this association to be a function of measures 
capturing the value of the relation, one would confidently believe that there is a relation 
established by politicians with contributing firms using their ownership. Therefore, I 
hypothesize that, 
H3: The association between ownership and contribution is a function of how valuable it is to 
establish a mutual relation between politicians and firms. 
 
Specifically, I examine H3 in three situations where a priori it is expected that the value of the 
relation varies. The first situation focuses on the absence/availability of other mechanisms 
linking politicians and firms, and the other two address situations involving politicians who 
have varying degrees of ability to provide benefits to firms. 
 
 First, since the relationship is more valuable with politicians who do not have a mechanism 
enabling them to establish a relation with firms, and is less valuable for politicians who 
already possess such a mechanism, I predict that the association between ownership and 
contribution is higher for the former than the latter. Since Krozner and Stratmann (1998) show 
that the committee assignment is a strong mechanism, I predict that the association between 
ownership and contribution is higher for politicians who are not seated in committee 
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assignments affecting the firm than for those who are seated in committee assignments 
affecting the firm. 
 
Second, the mutual relations between politicians and firms are established with the 
understanding that politicians will grant benefits to the firms and that, in turn, the firms will 
increase their contributions to and support for the politicians. Then, it stands to reason that 
these mutual relations will be more valuable when they involve powerful politicians. This is 
because a powerful politician can award more benefits to firms than a non-powerful one. For 
example, from his or her seat on an appropriate Congressional committee, a politician can 
influence government policy in a desired direction. The literature demonstrates that not all 
committee assignments are capable of generating maximum benefits to firms (Edwards and 
Stewart 2006). The literature also suggests that a politician's seniority affects the distribution 
of government benefits (Roberts 1990). Because powerful politicians can provide firms with 
more benefits than non-powerful ones, firms have greater incentives to contribute to powerful 
politicians than non-powerful ones (Grier and Munger 1991; Romer and Snyder 1994; and 
Ansolabehere and Snyder 1999). These incentives will be even greater if the powerful 
politicians own shares in the firms because, being owners, the politicians will align their 
interests with those of the firms. Thus, the value of the mutual relation increases with the 
powerfulness of the politician. Therefore, I predict that the positive association between 
ownership of politicians and the contributions is increasing in politicians’ power. 
 
Third, official authorities (such as the Office of Congressional Ethics), nonpartisan public 
interest organizations (such as Judicial Watch), and public watchdogs (such as the Citizens for 
Responsibility and Ethics in Washington) that monitor politicians’ behavior question some 
politicians about providing benefits to firms with which they have personal ties. The 
investigations and monitoring of these institutions put these politicians under heavy scrutiny 
and exposes them to the risk of being forced to leave office. This will, accordingly, constrain 
the ability of these politicians to help firms, and increase firms’ uncertainty with regard to 
what these politicians can still provide them. Since the relationships with the politicians when 
they are ‘under investigation’ are no longer valuable, there will be a lower demand for 
creating a relationship with these politicians during these periods compared to the time periods 
 117 
where they were not yet under investigation. Such differences in the value of creating the 
relation in the two periods should be reflected in how politicians invest in the contributing 
firms in these two periods relative to how they generally invest in the non-contributors. 
Therefore, I predict that politicians invest more in the contributing firms during the time 
periods where they are ‘not’ yet under investigation than in the non-contributing firms, but not 
during the time periods where they are under investigation.49  
 
4.2.2.4. Do firms obtain actual private benefits from a mutual relation with politicians? 
To the extent the association between politicians’ share ownership and firms’ contributions 
captures the relation between firms and politicians, I predict that as the strength of this 
association increases so too will the provision of benefits from politicians to firms. In other 
words, the association between politicians’ share ownership and firms' contributions should 
explain a given firm's likelihood of receiving government benefits. To test this prediction, I 
focus on the one clear benefit that can accrue to firms at the behest of a politician, that is, the 
awarding of government contracts. To capture the mutually supportive relation between a firm 
and group of politicians, I compute for each firm a measure of the association between 
politicians’ share ownership in this firm and the contributions the firm makes to their election 
campaigns (i.e., Ownership-Contribution Association). I then use this firm-specific measure to 
test my prediction that mutually supportive financial ties between politicians and firms 
increase the likelihood that the government will provide benefits to these firms, as the 
following hypotheses reflects: 
H4: There is a positive association between government contracts awarded to firms and the 
Ownership-Contribution Association. 
 
4.2.2.5. Does divesting the stock terminate the mutual relation between politician and firm? 
Krozner and Stratmann (1998) argue that since the committee assignment is the mechanism 
that avoids the breakdown of the contributor-politician relationship, we should indeed observe 
the breakdown of this relation if the politicians switch their committees. Consistent with their 
theory, they find that contributions to those politicians who switch their committee 
                                               
49
 In the empirical analyses, I use two benchmarks for ownership in non-contributing firms. The first is the 
ownership by only those politicians who are under investigations, and the second is the ownership by all 
politicians whether they are under investigations or are not under investigation. 
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assignments fall. Romer and Snyder (1994) also find that politicians who switch committees 
initially tend to lose more in total contributions than they gain. If the ownership of politicians, 
as I argue in the paper, is indeed a mechanism for avoiding the breakdown of the relation, we 
should observe politicians who choose to terminate the relations by divesting their stocks in 
firms to receive ‘no’ contributions from these firms in the future conditional upon receiving 
contributions in the past. However, this breakdown in the relation should not occur if there is 
already a mechanism in place that is protecting the relationship from such breakdown (such as 
the committee assignments).  Therefore, I hypothesize that,  
H5a: Divesting the stocks by politicians who do not serve in a committee assignment affecting 
the firm reduces the likelihood of receiving future contribution from the firm conditional upon 
receiving contributions in the past. 
H5b: Divesting the stocks by politicians who serve in a committee assignment affecting the 
firm does not affect the likelihood of receiving future contribution. 
 
4.3. Empirical Setting 
 
4.3.1. Data 
 
4.3.1.1. Stock Ownership data 
Members of Congress, candidates for federal office, senior congressional staff, nominees for 
executive branch positions, Cabinet members, the President and Vice President, and Supreme 
Court justices are required by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 to file annual reports 
disclosing their income, assets, liabilities, and other relevant details about their personal 
finances. Personal financial disclosure forms are filed annually by May 15 and cover the 
preceding calendar year. The Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) collected the 2004–2007 
reports both for Congress members from the Senate Office of Public Records and the Office of 
the Clerk of the House and for the executive branch members (i.e., the President, Vice 
President, presidential Cabinet, and other select officials) from the U.S. Office of Government 
Ethics. The Center then scanned the reports as digital images, classified the politicians’ 
investments into categories including stocks, bonds, and mutual funds, and built a database 
accessible via a web query.  
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Using CRP's website, I collect the shares in S&P 500 firms held by members of Congress 
between 2004 and 2007. I collect the stock ownership data for every firm that joined the S&P 
500 Index any time between 2004 and 2008; regardless of when it joined the index, I obtained 
all the available stock ownership data for that firm between 2004 and 2007. Likewise, if a firm 
dropped out of the index at any time during 2004–2008, I nevertheless retain the firm in my 
sample for the target period. As such, my sample includes stocks in 642 unique firms owned 
by politicians between 2004 and 2007. 
Politicians are required to report only those stocks whose value exceeds $1,000 at the end of 
the calendar year or that produce more than $200 in income. They are not required to report 
the exact value of the holding, but instead must simply check a box corresponding to the value 
range into which the asset falls. The CRP then undertakes additional research to determine the 
exact values of these stocks. When the Center makes these determinations, it reports them 
instead of the ranges and I use these values in my study. When only the range is available, I 
use its midpoint as the holding's value. I have data on the stock holdings of 709 politicians.  
4.3.1.2 Political Action Committee (PAC) Contributions 
 
The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) sets limits on the amount PACs can contribute to 
candidates. Specifically, PACs are allowed to contribute up to $10,000 to a candidate per two-
year election cycle (i.e., $5,000 during a primary election and $5,000 during a general 
election). Using the CRP's website, I searched for all Political Action Committees (PACs) 
associated with my sample firms. I then collected data on each contribution these PACs made 
to candidates (both the winners and losers) running for the Senate and House elections. Some 
firms establish several PACs, each in a different location, and each of these PACs can 
contribute to the same candidate.50 In such cases, I total for each candidate every contribution 
he or she received from PACs affiliated with the same firm. To parallel the investment data 
sample period, I collect every contribution made from the 2003–2004 cycle up to and 
                                               
50
 According to the FECA, “Two or more affiliated committees are treated as a single committee for the purposes 
of the contribution limits. This means that all contributions made or received by several affiliated committees 
count against the same limits.” 
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including the 2007–2008 cycle. Nevertheless, despite the fact that my sample contains the 
largest firms on the market, approximately 37% of my sample firms did not make 
contributions to politicians during my sample period.  
 
4.3.1.3. Government Contracts 
I collected my government contract data from Eagle Eye Publishers, Inc., one of the leading 
commercial providers of Federal procurement and grant business intelligence.51 Eagle Eye 
collects its contract data from Federal Procurement Data System–Next Generation (FPDS-
NG), the contract data collection and dissemination system administered by the U.S. General 
Services Administration (GSA). FPDS-NG provides data on procurement contracts awarded 
by the U.S. Government. If these contracts are awarded to company subsidiaries, Eagle Eye 
searches for the names of their parent companies and assigns each subsidiary to its appropriate 
parent. To facilitate the use of its contract data for academic research, Eagle Eye aggregates 
the procurement contracts for subsidiaries of companies at the parent-company level. Eagle 
Eye enables searching for contract data by subsidiary as well as by parent company.52 If a 
subsidiary's ownership changes during the fiscal year, then Eagle Eye adjusts the parent 
company to reflect the change in subsidiary ownership as close as possible to the date the 
merger or acquisition was finalized. Eagle Eye continuously updates the parent companies to 
reflect the majority owners of each company in the current fiscal year.  
 
I collected both the number and aggregate value of government contracts that were awarded to 
my sample firms between 2004 and 2007.53 Approximately 22% of my sample firms did not 
                                               
51
 I collect the data from this website: http://www.usaspending.org  
52
 The Parent Company Name is the unique name of the parent organization that owns at least 51% of the 
recipient of a contract (e.g., a subsidiary or a division) at any point during the fiscal period. 
53
 For the federal government, a fiscal year is the 12-month period beginning on October 1 and ending on 
September 30. A fiscal year is defined by the last two digits of the calendar year in which the bulk of the fiscal 
year falls. For example, the period spanning October 1, 2007 through September 30, 2008 is called FY 2008. 
Each individual contract obligation is assigned a fiscal year in USASpending.org based on the sign date of the 
obligation, that is, the date a government agency committed to making the contract obligation. Fiscal year dollar 
totals—of agency spending, of company revenue, etc.—are aggregations of every obligation amount reported as 
being made during the indicated fiscal year.  
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receive contracts during my sample period. Table 1, Panel B presents the descriptive statistics 
for the number and size of the contracts.54 
 
4.3.2. Empirical Models 
I estimate three empirical models. Several specifications of the first model are for examining 
hypotheses one, two, and three, while the second and third models are for testing hypotheses 
four and five, respectively. 
 
4.3.2.1. The Empirical model and results for Hypotheses One, Two, and Three:  
Not every politician invests in my sample firms. Even when they do invest, politicians do not 
invest every year or in all firms.55 Of a total number of 1,309,727 politician-firm year 
observations, only 17,872 correspond to positive investments. In other words, politicians' 
share ownership, our dependent variable, is continuous and truncated at zero. Therefore, 
consistent with prior studies on household finance, I use a Tobit model to explain a given 
politician’s decision to invest or not to invest in a firm, as well as the amount invested 
(Wooldridge 2002).56 The ownership, ijty , of politician i in firm j at time t is explained by the 
following model, 
 
ijtijitjtijtijt vzxy εγαδλκ +++++= '''*            (1), 
 
                                  ijty =   
*
ijty  , if  *ijty   ≥ 0   
                                   or          0  , if  *ijty  < 0  
 
wherein *ijty  is the desired amount of ownership in the firm, while ijty  is the actual amount of 
ownership. If the desired amount of ownership is positive, then the actual ownership equals 
                                               
54
 My sample includes 16 firm-year observations that are de-obligations, which "means the government has either 
reduced the authorized value of the contract, or has cancelled the contract outright." (See the definition of de-
obligations at http://www.usaspending.org). These de-obligations have negative dollar amounts. In my empirical 
analyses, I replace the negative values of these cases with zero. 
55
 If we observe no investment by a politician in a firm at time t, it is nevertheless incorrect to automatically 
assign a zero to this observation. It might, for example be the case that: 1) the firm did not exist at time t, 2) the 
firm was not a publicly traded firm in year t, or 3) the firm was once publicly traded but went private in year t. In 
all of these cases, the investment variable at time t should have missing values rather than zeros. To ensure that I 
do not mistakenly assign zeros to these firm-year observations, I record zeros only when at least one trading day 
is reported that year in CRSP.  
56
 For example, van Soest and Kapetyn (2006). 
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the desired ownership. If the desired amount of ownership is negative, then the actual 
ownership is zero. I measure the actual ownership as the natural logarithm of the dollar 
amount of shares owned if the politician invests, and zero if he or she does not invest 
( ijtOwnership ).   
 
The desired amount of ownership is modelled as a function of the following explanatory 
variables. Please note that complete definitions of the variables and their data sources are 
provided in Appendix 1 and their descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. First, the 
vector ijtx  includes politician-firm–specific characteristics, specifically, three measures. The 
first, jitPAC  , is an indicator variable that equals 1 if politician i receives a campaign 
contribution from firm j in year t, and zero otherwise. The second, ijtMatchFirmCom __ , is an 
indicator variable that takes a value of 1 when the industry to which firm j belongs is under the 
influence of politician i's Congressional committee at time t, and zero otherwise. I obtain my 
data on Congressional committee assignments from the website of Charles Stewart III 
(MIT).57 The third is ijMatchFirmState __ . I measure this variable for Representatives as an 
indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if both the headquarter of firm j and the 
Congressional district of politicians i belong to the same state, and zero otherwise, I measure 
ijMatchFirmState __  for Senators as an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the 
headquarter of firm j are in the same state as politician i, and zero otherwise. 
ijMatchFirmState __
 
captures geographical proximity between politician i and firm j. In 
addition, this indicator variable can capture a politician's degree of familiarity with and 
recognition of a certain firm. It can also capture politicians' political motivations for 
establishing ownership in a particular firm as politicians may invest in firms located in their 
congressional districts in order to attract these firms' contributions and support during 
elections.58 I obtain my data on the location of firm headquarters from Compustat and on the 
                                               
57
 Charles Stewart III and Jonathan Woon.  Congressional Committee Assignments, 103rd to 110th Congresses, 
1993--2007:  [House and Senate], [updated to 01/03/2009]. These databases are available at 
http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data_page.html  
58
 The following quote from one of the media’s reports in 2006 highlights this point: “only one member of 
Michigan's congressional delegation owned stock in troubled Ford Motor Co. last year: Republican Rep. Dave 
Camp. Is it just a coincidence he's headed for an easy victory on Tuesday?” (See 
http://www.slate.com/id/2152887 ). 
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location of both Congressional districts of Representatives and States of Senators from the 
Center for Responsive Politics.  
 
Second, the vector jtz includes the following firm-specific characteristics: 1−jtSize , which is 
the log of the market capitalization for firm j at the end of year t-1 (i.e., at the beginning of 
year t); 1−jtBM , which is the book-to-market ratio for firm j at the beginning of year t; 
jtMomentum , which is the twelve-month buy-and-hold stock return; jtVolatilityturnRe , which 
is measured as the standard deviation of daily returns; jtDividends , which is the dividends per 
share divided by the year-end share price; jtLeverage , which is the ratio of total debt to total 
assets for firm j at time t; and jtROA , which is the income before extraordinary items available 
to common divided by total assets. I choose these firm-specific characteristics to maintain 
consistency with prior studies' determinants of investors’ investment decisions (e.g., Leuz, 
Lins, and Warnock 2009). I delete all firm-year observations that have a negative book-to-
market ratio ( 1−jtBM ). To mitigate the influence of outliers, I winsorize the firm-specific 
characteristics at the 1% and 99% levels. 
 
Third, the vector itv  includes the following politician-specific characteristics: itWealthNet _ , 
which is the difference between itAssets  (i.e., the amount of assets owned by politician i at 
time t) and itsLiabilitie (i.e., the amount of liabilities owed by politician i at time t); itAge , 
which is defined as the age of politician i at time t; and iGender , which is an indicator variable 
taking a value of 1 if politician i is male, and zero otherwise.  
 
The panel structure of my data allows me to control for the unobserved time-invariant 
politician-specific characteristics as well as unobserved time-invariant firm-specific 
characteristics that might be correlated with the variables of interest. Specifically, I 
include jα  and iγ  to capture the unobserved time-invariant characteristics of firms and 
politicians, respectively. Following Chamberlain (1984), I model the firm effects jα  as a sum 
 124 
of the linear combination of the means of the time-varying regressors jtz  and an error term 
that is independent of the regressors:  
 
jk
k
jkj z ηλα +=∑                                       (2) 
Similarly, I model the politician effects iγ  as a sum of the linear combination of the means of 
the time-varying regressors itv  and an error term that is independent of the regressors: 
il
l
ili v ξδγ +=∑                                         (3) 
 
4.3.2.1.1. Hypothesis One: Ownership of politicians and Committee Assignments 
Table 2 provides the results of my first hypothesis. ijtMatchFirmCom __  is my variable of 
interest for testing H1. If the ownership of politicians is an alternative mechanism to establish 
mutual relation with firms to substitute the absence of formal mechanisms linking firms and 
politicians, H1 predicts the coefficient on ijtMatchFirmCom __  to be negative. If the latter 
captures, instead, a politician's degree of familiarity with and recognition of a certain firm, one 
would expect the coefficient to be positive.   
 
As Table 2 shows, the coefficients on ijtMatchFirmCom __  is negative and significant, which 
suggests that politicians own smaller amounts in firms belonging to industries controlled by 
their committee assignment. While the latter finding is inconsistent with the familiarity and 
investor recognition hypotheses, it is consistent with my prediction that the ownership of 
politicians act as the alternative mechanism to mitigate the lack of formal mechanisms (such 
as the committee assignments), thereby avoiding the breakdown of politicians-firms exchange 
market.  
 
4.3.2.1.2. Hypothesis Two: Ownership of politicians and firms’ contributions 
My second hypothesis is that there is a positive association between the ownership of 
politicians in firms and contributions they receive from these firms. To test this hypothesis I 
conduct two tests below, the first focuses on the contribution that a firm pays directly to the 
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politician and the second focuses on the contribution a firm pays to the political party of the 
politician. 
 
4.3.2.1.2.1. Ownership of politicians and contributions of firms to the politician 
Table 2 provides the results of my second hypothesis. jitPAC  is my variable of interest for 
testing H2. H2 predicts a positive coefficient on jitPAC . As Table 2 shows, the coefficient on 
jitPAC  is positive and significant controlling for politician-firm–specific characteristics, 
politician-specific characteristics, and firm-specific characteristics. These results suggest that 
the association between ownership and contributions is less likely to be driven by either 
intervening politician-firm–specific characteristics or firm-specific characteristics driving both 
ownership and contribution in the same direction. That said, I cannot confidently conclude that 
the association supports H2 until I take into consideration the results of the second test 
discussed below.  
 
4.3.2.1.2.2. Ownership of politicians and firms’ contributions to political parties  
I further test H2 by examining whether the contributions firm  j pays to the party of politician i 
also affect said politician's investment decision. I focus here on the two main political parties 
in the United States, namely the Republican Party and Democratic Party. I replace jitPAC  
with the variable jtjt PACrepPACdem − , which is the difference between the sum of all 
contributions paid to Democratic candidates by firm j in year t and the sum of all contributions 
paid to Republican candidates by firm j in year t. The higher (lower) the value of the 
variable jtjt PACrepPACdem − , the greater is a company's connection to the Democratic 
(Republican) Party relative to the Republican (Democratic) Party. When the variable 
jtjt PACrepPACdem −
 
equals zero, this means that a firm either supports both parties equally 
or it does not support either of them. I interact the variable jtjt PACrepPACdem −  with the 
indicator variable republican, which takes a value of 1 if the politician is Republican, and zero 
if the politician is Democratic.  
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As Table 3 shows, the coefficient on the variable jtjt PACrepPACdem −  is positive and 
significant, which suggests that Democratic politicians own larger amounts in firms that favor 
Democratic candidates relative to Republicans. In addition, it shows that (1) the coefficient on 
the interaction of jtjt PACrepPACdem −  with Republican is negative and (2) the sum of the 
coefficients on jtjt PACrepPACdem −  and its interaction with Republican is negative and 
significant. These results suggest that Republican politicians own less shares in a firm that 
favors the Democratic Party over the Republican Party. In other words, Republicans 
(Democrats) invest more (less) in a firm that favors Republicans over Democrats. These 
results suggest that some degree of partisanship drives politicians’ investment decisions. 
 
In addition, the results in table 3 show a significant positive coefficient on the variable 
Republican. Since the latter is interacted with jtjt PACrepPACdem − , the positive coefficient 
on Republican suggests that Republicans invest more than Democrats in firms that are either 
connected to both parties equally or connected to neither (i.e., firms whose  
jtjt PACrepPACdem −  equals zero). Further, the results show that this incremental difference 
in the amounts allocated by Republicans relative to those by Democrats decreases (increases) 
when the firm is connected more to Democrats (republicans). 
 
Collectively, the results of the two tests presented in Tables 2 and 3 suggest that the 
association between ownership and contributions captures motivations other than familiarity, 
geographic proximity, and investor recognition. I can therefore conclude that this association 
suggests the use of ownership by politicians as a mechanism to establish relations with 
contributing firms. 
 
4.3.2.1.3. Hypothesis Three: The association between ownership and contribution and 
potential benefits to firms 
 
In this section, I examine my prediction that share ownership by politicians is a mechanism to 
establish relations with contributing firms by examining whether the association between 
ownership and contribution is stronger in situations where it is expected, a priori, that 
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establishing a relation between firms and politicians is valuable for either or both firms and 
politicians. Specifically, I examine three situations below.  
 
4.3.2.1.3.1. Committee Assignments of Politicians 
This test focuses on the availability of other mechanisms linking politicians and firms. I 
predict that the use of ownership to establish a relation with contributing firms is more 
valuable when politicians do not have an alternative mechanism that enables them to do so. 
Specifically, I test the prediction that the association between ownership and contribution is 
higher for politicians who are not seated in committee assignments affecting the firm than for 
those who are seated in committee assignments affecting the firm. Consistent with this 
prediction, Table 4, column 1 shows that the coefficient on jitPAC
 
is positive and significant, 
while the coefficient on the interaction term jitPAC  * ijtMatchFirmCom __
 
is negative and 
significant.  
 
4.3.2.1.3.2. Powerful Politicians 
Since establishing a relation will be more valuable when they involve powerful politicians, I 
predict that the association between ownership and contribution is increasing in politicians’ 
power. I use three measures of politicians’ power. The first, itCommitteePowerful _ , is an 
indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if politician i is a member of an influential and 
powerful committee at time t, and zero otherwise. To compute my first measure of power, I 
follow Cohen, Coval, and Malloy (2009) and use the ten most powerful committees, as 
determined by Edwards and Stewart (2006), on both the U.S. Senate and the House: the 
Finance, Veterans Affairs, Appropriations, Rules, Armed Services, Foreign Relations, 
Intelligence, Judiciary, Budget, and Commerce committees on the U.S. Senate and the Ways 
and Means, Appropriations, Energy and Commerce, Rules, International Relations, Armed 
Services, Intelligence, Judiciary, Homeland Security, and Transportation and Infrastructure 
committees on the House. Because a politician can serve on more than one committee, my 
second measure of power counts the number of influential committee seats politician i holds at 
time t (i.e., itCommitteesPowerfulNo __ ). Similarly, because seniority has been proven to be 
an important measure of power (Roberts 1990), my third measure captures the seniority level 
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of politician i at time t (i.e., itSeniority ). I measure seniority as the log of 1 plus the number of 
years since the date a politician was first elected to Congress. I collect from CRP the first year 
a politician is elected and then subtract this year from year t.  
 
I include these three measures of power independently in equation 1, along with their 
interaction terms with jitPAC . H3 predicts a positive coefficient on each of the coefficients on 
the interaction terms. Table 4 presents the results for H3. Columns 2, 3, and 4 report the 
respective results of using itCommitteePowerful _ , itCommitteesPowerfulNo __ , and 
itSeniority as my measure of power. As shown in Columns 2–4, the coefficients on the 
interaction terms are all positive as well as significant. Thus, my results support my prediction 
that the association between ownership and contribution is increasing in politicians’ power.  
 
4.3.2.1.3.3. Monitored Politicians 
The final test focuses on those politicians who are under investigation for ethics issues. I 
predict that politicians invest more in contributing firms during the time periods when they are 
‘not’ yet under investigation than in the non-contributing firms, but not during the time 
periods when they are under investigation. To test this prediction I replace jitPAC  with two 
indicator variables. The first is jitonInvesigatiNonPAC −_ , which is defined as an indicator 
variable that equals unity if politician i receives a campaign contribution from firm j and is 
‘not’ under investigation in year t, and zero otherwise. The second is jitonInvesigatiPAC _ , 
which is defined as an indicator variable that equals unity if politician i receives a campaign 
contribution from firm j and is under investigation in year t, and zero otherwise. Table 5 
reports the results of these predictions. Column 1 reports the results of restricting the sample 
to only those politicians who are under-investigation, while column 2 reports the results of 
estimating the model with the full sample of politicians. Consistent with my prediction, the 
results in Column 1 shows a significant positive coefficient on jitionInvestigatNonPAC −_ , 
and an insignificant negative coefficient on jitionInvestigatPAC _ . The results of Column 2 
are consistent with those in Column 1 with the exception that the negative coefficient 
on jitionInvestigatPAC _
 
is significant. The latter result suggests that when politicians are 
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being more closely monitored, they shy away from firms that contribute to their election 
campaigns. 
 
4.3.2.2. Hypothesis Four: Ownership-contribution association and actual benefits to firms 
 
If the association between ownership of politicians and firms’ contributions to those 
politicians captures the relation between them, I hypothesize that the strength of this 
association explains the provision of private benefits from politicians to firms. I focus on the 
award of government contracts as the measure of private benefits to firms. To test this 
hypothesis, I first estimate the following Tobit model annually for each firm,  
 
iii PACy εβ +=*            (4), 
 
                                  iy =   
*
iy  , if  
*
iy   ≥ 0   
                                   or          0  , if  *iy  < 0  
 
where *iy  is politician i's desired amount of ownership in the firm, while iy  is the actual 
amount of ownership. If the desired amount of ownership is positive, then the actual 
ownership equals the desired ownership. If the desired amount of ownership is negative, then 
the actual ownership ( iOwnership ) is zero. I measure the actual ownership as the natural 
logarithm of the dollar amount of shares owned if politician i invests, and zero if he or she 
does not invest. iPAC  is an indicator variable that equals unity if politician i receives a 
campaign contribution from the firm, and zero otherwise. β , which I refer to as Ownership-
Contribution Association, in equation (4) is my measure of the mutual relation between a firm 
and the politicians who invest in this firm.  
 
When there is a positive association between politicians' share ownership in these firms and 
the firms' election contributions (i.e., when β  in equation 4 is positive), a mutual relation 
between politicians and firms is likely to exist. In contrast, when there is a zero (or a negative) 
association between politicians' share ownership and firms' election contributions (i.e., 
when β  is zero or negative), it is less likely that a mutual tie between politicians and firms 
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exists. This is because not every politician invests for the purpose of establishing a close 
relationship with the firm, and firms may contribute to politicians during elections solely to 
support their government of choice, rather than to establish mutual connections with 
politicians. In addition, some politicians may even shy away from firms that contribute to their 
election campaigns in order to avoid conflicts of interest. Therefore, my measure of a mutual 
relation, i.e., Ownership-Contribution Association, takes the value of β  when it is positive, 
and zero when β  is either zero or negative. After estimating equation 4, I find that β  is 
positive for 490 firm-year observations (belonging to 222 firms). Table 1, Panel B presents the 
descriptive statistics for β . I include my measure Ownership-Contribution Association in 
equation (5) below to test my hypothesis that there is a positive association between 
government contracts awarded to firms and the Ownership-Contribution Association: 
 
jtjtjtjt ControlsnAssociatioonContributiOwnershipContractsGovernment ξβββ +++= 210 ___                                                                                                                                            
(5) 
 
I use two measures of government contracts. The first, jtAmountsContract_ , is defined as the 
log of 1 plus the aggregate values of procurement contracts awarded to firm j at time t. The 
second measure is jtnumbersContract _ , which is defined as the log of 1 plus the aggregate 
number of contracts. Because 757 of the 2,398 firm-year observations in my sample (i.e., 
approximately 32%) have no contracts, I estimate equation (5) using a Tobit model. 
 
There is a concern that variations in Ownership-Contribution Association across firms actually 
capture differences in firm-specific characteristics that also drive government contracts. To 
mitigate this concern, I control for determinants of contracts, such as firm size, that can also 
drive ownership-contribution association. I also control for other determinants of government 
contracts following Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2008). Specifically, my controls 
include: jtSize , which is the log of the market capitalization for firm j at the end of year t; 
jtBM , which is the book-to-market ratio for firm j at the end of year t; jtIndexHerfindahl_ , 
which is the Herfindahl sales concentration index that controls for the intensity of competition 
for government contracts between firm j and its competitors and is based on the total sales of 
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all firms with the same two-digit SIC code; jtSalesCAPX / , which is defined as the ratio of 
capital expenditure to sales for firm j in year t and controls for the possibility that a company 
expanded its facilities to increase future production; jtROA , which is the income before 
extraordinary items available to common divided by total assets and captures firms' long-term 
profitability and viability; and jtSalesCOGS / , which is defined as the ratio of the cost of 
goods sold to sales of firm j at time t and captures the firm's cost-efficiency and attendant 
likelihood of being awarded government contracts. I delete all firm-year observations that 
have a negative book-to-market ratio ( jtBM ). To mitigate the influence of outliers, I winsorize 
these determinants at the 1% and 99% levels. Using the two-digit SIC Industry Classifications, 
I include a full set of industry dummies. I also include a full set of year dummies. 
 
Table 6 presents the results of my fourth hypothesis. Columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) present the 
results of using the aggregate size (number) of the procurement contracts as the measure of 
government benefits. Specifically, Column 1 presents a significant positive association 
between the aggregate size of the contracts awarded to firms and the firm-level Ownership-
Contribution Sensitivity and Column 2 shows that this positive association remains significant 
at the 5% level, even after controlling for other contract determinants. Columns 3 and 4 report 
similar results using the aggregate number of contracts as the measure of government benefits. 
Overall, my findings support my fourth hypothesis that there is a positive association between 
government contracts awarded to firms and the Ownership-Contribution Association. 
 
4.3.2.3. Hypothesis Five: Divesting the stocks and the termination of politician-firm relation 
In this section I examine my final predictions that divesting the stocks by politicians who do 
not serve in a committee assignment affecting the firm reduces the likelihood of receiving 
future contribution from the firm conditional upon receiving contributions in the past; while 
divesting the stocks by politicians who serve in a committee assignment affecting the firm 
does not affect the likelihood of receiving future contributions. To test these predictions, I 
estimate the following logit model: 
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where jitationDiscontinuPAC _  is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if politician i 
does ‘not’ receive a contribution from firm j at time t conditional upon receiving a 
contribution at time t-1, and zero when  politician i receives a contribution from firm j at time t 
conditional upon receiving a contribution at time t-1.59 Every politician i in my sample is 
running for (re)election at time t.60 1−ijtDivest  is defined as an indicator variable that takes a 
value of 1 when politician i is ‘not’ an investor in firm j at time t conditional upon being an 
investor at time t-1, and zero when politician i is an investor in firm j at time t conditional 
upon being an investor at time t-1. The variable  1−ijtDivest  has a one year lag because 
politicians disclose their investments of year t-1 at year t. Thus, firms know about the 
divestment decisions of politicians, that occurred in year t-1, at year t. 1__ −ijtMatchFirmCom , 
is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 when the industry to which firm j belongs is 
under the influence of politician i's Congressional committee at time t-1, and zero otherwise. 
The set of controls includes the following. ijMatchFirmState __ , which is defined, for 
Representatives, as an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if both the headquarter of firm 
j and the Congressional district of politicians i belong to the same state, and zero otherwise., 
while defined, for Senators, as an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the headquarter 
of firm j are in the same state of politicians i, and zero otherwise. This variable is to account 
for the possibility that firms are less likely to terminate a relation with politician representing 
the state or district in which they are headquartered. itSeniority , is defined as the log of 1 plus 
the number of years since the date a politician was first elected to Congress. itAge  is defined 
as the age of politician i at time t. I include itSeniority and itAge  to account for the possibility 
that firms are more likely 1) to continue the relation with senior politicians holding their age 
                                               
59
 There is the concern that the non-payment of contribution at time t is due to paying the allowable maximum 
amount of contributions at time t-1, and not due to firms stopped supporting politicians. This situation can only 
happen when both years t and t-1 belong to the same election cycle since the limit on contributions is per election 
cycle. In order to mitigate this concern, if politicians indeed received the maximum contribution in year t-1, I do 
consider that they also received contribution at time t.  
60
 I exclude from my analysis the politicians that retired, resigned or died at time t. 
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constant, and 2) to terminate the relation with politicians that are about to retire holding their 
seniority constant. In order to account for party affiliations of politicians, I include the variable 
Republican, defined as an indicator that takes a value of 1 if the politician is Republican, and 
zero if the politician is Democratic.  
 
There is a possibility that some changes in firm characteristics drive both the divestment 
decision of politicians and the discontinuation of firms’ contributions. Failure to account for 
these changes might lead to an omitted variable bias. For example, a reduction in firm size 
might lead to divesting the stocks, and at the same time reduces firms’ ability to continue 
supporting the candidates in the future. To account for this possibility, I include the variable 
1−∆ jtSize  which measures the change in firm size during the divest year. Higher (lower) values 
of 1−∆ jtSize
 
means size increased (decreased) during the divest year.  
 
Table 7 report the results of estimating equation (5). Column 1 reports the logit model 
estimates when I only include the variable of interest 1−ijtDivest . The sign is positive and 
significant at the 5% level, suggesting that if politicians divested their stocks, they are less 
likely to receive future contributions from the firm conditional upon being supported by the 
same firm in the past.  Column 1 reports the logit model estimates when I interact 1−ijtDivest  
with 1__ −ijtMatchFirmCom . The coefficient on the interaction term is negative and significant. 
The sum of the coefficients on 1−ijtDivest  and the coefficient on 
1−ijtDivest * 1__ −ijtMatchFirmCom  is insignificant. The latter results suggest the termination of 
the relation due to divesting the stocks does not happen when politicians are, at the time of the 
liquidation of their stock holding, serving in a committee assignment affecting the firm. 
Columns 3-6 report the results of estimating equation (5) with a conditional fixed effect logit 
model. Columns 3 and 4 (Columns 5 and 6) fix the effect at the politician (firm) level. 
Regardless of the specification, the results in Table 7 support my prediction that divesting 
stocks by politicians terminate their relation with contributing firms in the absence of other 
mechanism protecting the relation from termination. 
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4.4. Concluding Remarks 
 
Writing a fee-for-service contract, in which firms support politicians during the election and 
politicians, in turn, provide private benefits to these firms, is considered bribery and cannot be 
enforced by courts. Politicians can renege on their promises and firms have no recourse. 
Higher uncertainty with regard to how these politicians will act towards firms will lead to a 
breakdown in the firm-politician exchange market. If politicians, however, tie their own 
interests to those of firms by owning their stocks, politicians commit not to renege on their 
promises. In addition, by not divesting politicians reduce firms’ uncertainty with regard to 
their actions toward the firms, and prolong their relationship with these firms. Taken together, 
share ownership by politicians acts as a mechanism that fosters repeated interactions, 
reputation building, and long-term relationships of politicians that invest with firms in which 
they invest.  
 
Politicians in the United States are required to disclose their financial dealings, as are U.S. 
firms that contribute to these politicians during elections. Collectively, these requirements 
allow me to examine whether the stock ownership of politicians is indeed an effective 
mechanism to establish mutual relations with contributing firms. I provide pieces of evidence 
suggesting that in the absence of institutional features of US Congress avoiding the break 
down of politicians-firms exchange market, such as the committee assignments (Krozner and 
Stratmann 1998), ownership of politicians provide an alternative solution.  
 
Without the mandated disclosure requirements to which firms and politicians in the United 
States are subject, I would not have been able to examine the mutual relation between firms 
and politicians, and, accordingly, understand the consequences of such relationships. In other 
words, these mandated disclosures might be generally useful for monitoring the actions of 
politicians and making them accountable for their actions. The same mandated disclosure, 
however, is what makes the use of ownership an ‘effective’ mechanism to establish relation 
with firms. By these mandated disclosure politicians can signal to firms their intentions to 
establish a relation with them, and, similarly, can signal their intention of terminating such 
relation. Through these disclosures firms can also know whether politicians are indeed holding 
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their stocks, and are still tying their own interests to those of the firms. In addition, to be 
elected, politicians must garner support for their policy platforms across broad-based 
constituencies. A priori it is, therefore, plausible that politicians make investment decisions 
mindful, at least in part, of the potential effects these investments might have on their election 
outcomes. For example, investing in firms that use child labor in developing countries might 
alienate supporters of a progressive candidate. On the other hand, investing in a major 
employer in the politician’s district might convince voters that their representative cares about 
their community. Taken together, politicians could be benefiting personally from these 
mandated disclosures by enabling them to convey signals to their constituencies via their buy 
and sell decisions of firms’ stocks. Thus, the results of my study raises the need to re-ask the 
question raised by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2009), that is, should 
politicians be required to disclose their personal finance and business connections to the 
public?  
 
Politicians' investment decisions reflect the subtle interplay between political and financial 
motives, and understanding these motives enables us to better understand the relations 
between firms and politicians. My study also contributes to a broader literature that seeks to 
improve understanding of the interplays between decision making in markets and decision 
making in the political domain (the market for votes). This literature is still a long way away 
from being able to simultaneously model market equilibria and political equilibria. The 
ultimate prize, however, would be the creation of a model of general economic and political 
equilibrium that included the “market” for votes as well markets for goods, services, 
employment, and capital. 
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Table 1 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for all variables. See Appendix 1 for variable definitions. 
Panel A: Variables used for testing hypotheses one, two and three 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max. N 
Politician-firm–specific characteristics       
ijtOwnership   ($) 1706.87 284182.06 0 0 167875004 1309727 
ijtOwnership
 
 [If  > 0]   ($) 125036.75 2429185.4 1 8000.50 167875004 17879 
jitPAC   0.052 0.222 0 0 1 1309727 
ijMatchFirmState __  0.043 0.203 0 0 1 1309727 
ijtMatchFirmCom __  0.15 0.355 0 0 1 1309727 
jitionInvestigatNonPAC −_
    
[when restricted to monitored politicians] 0.039 0.193 0 0 1 107314 
jitionInvestigatPAC _
 
[when restricted to monitored politicians] 0.0303 0.1715 0 0 1 107314 
jitionInvestigatNonPAC −_
   
0.0496 0.2171 0 0 1 1309727 
jitionInvestigatPAC _
 
0.0025 0.0498 0 0 1 1309727 
       
Politician-specific characteristics
 
      
itWealthNet_
 
(Millions) 6.586 28.572 –9.500 0.773 406.546 2307 
itAge  56.855 10.070 26 57 90 2307 
iGender  0.839 0.368 0 1 1 709 
irepublican
 
0.488 0.5 0 0 1 709 
itCommitteePowerful _  0.821 0.383 0 1 1 2307 
itCommitteePowerfulNo __   1.164 0.83 0 1 5 2307 
itSeniority    (Years) 10.759 8.835 0 9 52 2307 
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Firm-specific characteristics
 
      
1−jtSize  23.013 1.091 20.712 22.905 26.007 2273 
1−jtBM  0.399 0.221 0.032 0.361 1.230 2273 
jtVolatilityturnRe  0.017 0.006 0.007 0.015 0.077 2273 
jtMomentum  0.143 0.304 –0.789 0.117 1.194 2273 
jtDividends  9.078 22.396 0 2.217 161.816 2273 
jtLeverage  0.591 0.210 0.118 0.590 0.981 2273 
jtROA  0.061 0.061 –0.161 0.054 0.243 2273 
jtdemPAC   (Millions) 0.026 0.056 0 0.002 0.510 2273 
jtrepPAC     (Millions) 0.045 0.090 0 0.005 0.904 2273 
jtjt repPACdemPAC −
 
(Millions)
 
-0.019 0.051 -0.575 0 0.169 2273 
 
Panel B: Variables used for testing hypothesis four       
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max. N 
       
jtAmountsContracts   249860042 1854358235 0 241242 34965437979 2398 
jtNumbersContracts  188.5 835 0 4 17625 2398 
jtnAssociatioonContributiOwnership __
 
2.35 6.54 0 0 62.85 2398 
jtnAssociatioonContributiOwnership __  [If  > 0 ]                  11.208 10.056 0.008 7.679 62.85 490 
jtSize  23.117 1.068 20.921 23.022 25.997 2315 
jtBM  0.397 0.229 0.029 0.354 1.215 2315 
jtROA  0.062 0.067 –0.566 0.054 0.503 2315 
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jtIndexHerfindahl_  0.061 0.061 0.01 0.037 0.343 2315 
jtSalesCAPX /  0.068 0.098 0 0.037 0.629 2315 
jtSalesCOGS /  0.577 0.217 0.094 0.613 0.945 2315 
       
 
Panel C: Variables used for testing hypothesis five  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max. N 
Politician-firm–specific characteristics       
ijtationDiscontinuPAC _
 
0.411 0.492 0 0 1 1939 
1−itDivest
 
0.215 0.411 0 0 1 1939 
1__ −ijtMatchFirmCom
 
0.171 0.377 0 0 1 1939 
ijMatchFirmState __
 
0.165 0.371 0 0 1 1939 
Politician-specific characteristics
 
      
itSeniority    (Years)
 
12.827 8.239 1 12 53 450 
itAge  59.66 8.949 36 60 84 450 
irepublican
 
0.584 0.494 0 1 1 214 
       
Firm-specific characteristics
 
      
1−∆ jtSize  0.127 0.243 –0.723 0.110 1.186 444 
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Table 2 
Table 2 presents Tobit model estimates of ijtOwnership , which is defined as the natural 
logarithm of the dollar amount of shares owned if politician i invests in firm j at time t, and 
zero if he or she does not invest. jitPAC is an indicator variable that equals unity if politician i 
receives a campaign contribution from firm j in year t, and zero otherwise. 
ijtMatchFirmCom __ , is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 when the industry to 
which firm j belongs is under the influence of politician i's Congressional committee at time t, 
and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix 1. The sample includes 
politicians from every party (i.e., Democratic, Republican, Independent, and Third-party). 
Standard errors corrected for clustering at the politician-firm level are reported in parentheses. 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-tailed test). 
 (1) 
 ijtOwnership  
  
jitPAC  2.906*** 
 (0.290) 
  
ijtMatchFirmCom __  -0.509* 
 (0.295) 
  
ijMatchFirmState __  4.514*** 
 (0.458) 
  
itWealthNet _  0.010*** 
 (0.004) 
 
 
itAge  1.997*** 
 (0.224) 
 
 
iGender  -1.876*** 
 (0.270) 
  
1−jtSize  4.327*** 
 (0.374) 
 
 
1−jtBM  1.729* 
 (1.003) 
 
 
jtMomentum  2.665*** 
 (0.309) 
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jtVolatilityturnRe  182.274*** 
 (22.207) 
 
 
jtDividends  -0.014** 
 (0.006) 
 
 
jtLeverage  -6.564*** 
 (1.271) 
 
 
jtROA  1.077 
 (2.185) 
  
Year Indicators? Yes 
Politician Effect? Yes 
Firm Effect? Yes 
Intercept -243.060*** 
 (3.224) 
 
 
Ln_sigma 21.630*** 
 (0.075) 
N 1309727 
pseudo R2 0.088 
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Table 3 
Table 3 presents the Tobit model estimates of ijtOwnership , which is defined as the natural 
logarithm of the dollar amount of shares owned if politician i invests in firm j at time t, and 
zero if he or she does not invest. jtjt repPACdemPAC −  is the difference between the sum of 
contributions paid to all Democratic candidates (regardless of whether the candidate is 
elected) by firm j in year t and the sum of contributions paid to all Republican candidates 
(regardless of whether the candidate is elected) by firm j in year t. republican  is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if a politician i is republican at time t, and zero otherwise. All other 
variables are defined in Appendix 1. The sample includes only those politicians belonging to 
either the Democratic or Republican Party. Standard errors corrected for clustering at the 
politician-firm level are reported in parentheses. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-tailed 
test). 
 (1) 
 ijtOwnership  
  
jtjt repPACdemPAC −
                             (1) 6.908*** 
 (2.206) 
  
( jtjt repPACdemPAC − )* irepublican
      (2) -10.601*** 
 (2.569) 
Test 1 + 2 = 0         [p-value  0.0354]                  
irepublican  4.687*** 
 (0.239) 
  
ijtMatchFirmCom __  -0.389 
 (0.293) 
  
ijMatchFirmState __  5.173*** 
 (0.458) 
  
itWealthNet _  0.010*** 
 (0.004) 
 
 
itAge  1.197*** 
 (0.228) 
 
 
iGender  -2.757*** 
 (0.273) 
  
1−jtSize  4.334*** 
 (0.375) 
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1−jtBM  1.765* 
 (1.002) 
 
 
jtMomentum  2.697*** 
 (0.309) 
  
jtVolatilityturnRe  187.904*** 
 (22.122) 
  
jtDividends  -0.015** 
 (0.006) 
 
 
jtLeverage  -6.675*** 
 (1.270) 
 
 
jtROA  1.298 
 (2.176) 
  
Year Indicators? Yes 
Politician Effect? Yes 
Firm Effect? Yes 
Intercept -247.081*** 
 (3.217) 
  
Ln_sigma 21.487*** 
 (0.075) 
N 1304008 
pseudo R2 0.092 
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Table 4 
Table 4 presents Tobit model estimates of ijtOwnership , which is defined as the natural logarithm of the dollar amount of shares 
owned if politician i invests in firm j at time t, and zero if he or she does not invest. jitPAC is an indicator variable that equals unity if 
politician i receives a campaign contribution from firm j in year t, and zero otherwise. ijtMatchFirmCom __ , is an indicator variable 
that takes a value of 1 when the industry to which firm j belongs is under the influence of politician i's Congressional committee at 
time t, and zero otherwise. itCommitteePowerful _
 
is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if politician i is a member of an 
influential and powerful committee at time t, and zero otherwise. itCommitteesPowerfulNo __ is the number of seats on influential 
committees politician i occupies in year t. itSeniority  is the log of 1 plus the number of years since the date a politician was first 
elected to Congress. All other variables are defined in Appendix 1. The sample includes politicians from every party (Democratic, 
Republican, Independent, and Third-party). Standard errors corrected for clustering at the politician-firm level are reported in 
parentheses. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-tailed test). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ijtOwnership  ijtOwnership  ijtOwnership  ijtOwnership  
     
jitPAC  3.363*** -0.115 1.619*** 1.221 
 (0.318) (0.784) (0.489) (0.789) 
     
jitPAC * ijtMatchFirmCom __  -2.462***    
 (0.724)    
     
ijtMatchFirmCom __  -0.150 -0.513* -0.478 -0.522* 
 (0.304) (0.297) (0.297) (0.295) 
     
jitPAC * itCommitteePowerful _   3.479***   
  (0.830)   
     
itCommitteePowerful _   -0.495*   
  (0.276)   
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jitPAC * itCommitteesPowerfulNo __    1.027***  
   (0.293)  
     
itCommitteesPowerfulNo __    -0.285**  
   (0.133)  
     
jitPAC * itSeniority     0.766** 
    (0.320) 
     
itSeniority     -0.677*** 
    (0.152) 
     
ijMatchFirmState __  4.497*** 4.532*** 4.514*** 4.528*** 
 (0.458) (0.458) (0.458) (0.458) 
     
itWealthNet _  0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
 
    
itAge  1.975*** 2.099*** 2.098*** 2.595*** 
 (0.225) (0.233) (0.227) (0.268) 
 
    
iGender  -1.879*** -1.872*** -1.859*** -1.709*** 
 (0.270) (0.266) (0.270) (0.274) 
     
1−jtSize  4.330*** 4.327*** 4.328*** 4.335*** 
 (0.374) (0.374) (0.374) (0.374) 
     
1−jtBM  1.729* 1.724* 1.731* 1.725* 
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 (1.003) (1.002) (1.002) (1.002) 
 
    
jtMomentum  2.663*** 2.656*** 2.661*** 2.663*** 
 (0.309) (0.309) (0.309) (0.309) 
     
jtVolatilityturnRe  182.528*** 181.184*** 181.954*** 182.477*** 
 (22.206) (22.197) (22.204) (22.191) 
     
jtDividends  -0.014** -0.015** -0.015** -0.014** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 
    
jtLeverage  -6.560*** -6.560*** -6.568*** -6.568*** 
 (1.272) (1.271) (1.271) (1.271) 
 
    
jtROA  1.086 1.037 1.039 1.042 
 (2.185) (2.184) (2.185) (2.184) 
     
Year Indicators? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Politician Effect? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Effect? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept -243.109*** -242.891*** -242.964*** -243.910*** 
 (3.223) (3.225) (3.224) (3.235) 
     
Ln_sigma 21.628*** 21.627*** 21.628*** 21.626*** 
 (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) 
N 1309727 1309727 1309727 1309727 
pseudo R2 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088 
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Table 5 
 
Table 5 presents Tobit model estimates of ijtOwnership , which is defined as the natural 
logarithm of the dollar amount of shares owned if politician i invests in firm j at time t, and 
zero if he or she does not invest. jitionInvestigatNonPAC −_
 
is an indicator variable that 
equals unity if politician i receives a campaign contribution from firm j and is ‘not’ under 
investigation in year t, and zero otherwise. jitionInvestigatPAC _
 
is an indicator variable that 
equals unity if politician i receives a campaign contribution from firm j and is under 
investigation in year t, and zero otherwise.   All other variables are defined in Appendix 1. The 
sample includes politicians from every party (i.e., Democratic, Republican, Independent, and 
Third-party). Standard errors corrected for clustering at the politician-firm level are reported in 
parentheses. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-tailed test). 
 (1) (2) 
 ijtOwnership  ijtOwnership  
   
jitionInvestigatNonPAC −_  4.803*** 3.212*** 
 (1.182) (0.292) 
   
jitionInvestigatPAC _  -0.675 -6.087*** 
 (1.685) (1.651) 
   
ijtMatchFirmCom __  -2.040* -0.515* 
 (1.238) (0.295) 
   
ijMatchFirmState __  5.691*** 4.495*** 
 (1.502) (0.458) 
   
itWealthNet _  0.148* 0.009*** 
 (0.089) (0.004) 
 
  
itAge  -8.423*** 2.043*** 
 (2.125) (0.225) 
 
  
iGender  -4.112*** -1.867*** 
 (1.166) (0.270) 
   
1−jtSize  5.646*** 4.323*** 
 (1.573) (0.374) 
   
1−jtBM  6.313 1.755* 
 (4.007) (1.003) 
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jtMomentum  3.057*** 2.675*** 
 (1.168) (0.309) 
   
jtVolatilityturnRe  338.272*** 182.810*** 
 (98.420) (22.203) 
   
jtDividends  -0.015 -0.014** 
 (0.026) (0.006) 
 
  
jtLeverage  -3.108 -6.539*** 
 (4.914) (1.271) 
 
  
jtROA  6.758 1.158 
 (8.287) (2.184) 
   
Intercept -222.174*** -243.048*** 
 (12.536) (3.223) 
   
Ln_sigma 21.080*** 21.622*** 
 (0.271) (0.075) 
N 107314 1309727 
pseudo R2 0.089 0.088 
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Table 6  
Table 6, Columns 1 and 2 present Tobit model estimates of jtAmountsContract _ , while 
Columns 3 and 4 present Tobit model estimates of jtnumbersContract _ . jtAmountsContract _  
is defined as the log of 1 plus contract amounts. jtnumbersContract _ is defined as the log of 1 
plus the aggregate number of contracts. jtnAssociatioonContributiOwnership __ is defined as the 
estimated coefficient on iPAC  obtained from the firm j-year t specific Tobit model that 
regresses ijtOwnership  onto iPAC ; herein, ijtOwnership  is defined as the natural logarithm of 
the dollar amount of shares owned if politician i invests in the firm, and zero if he or she does 
not invest, and iPAC  is defined as an indicator variable that equals unity if politician i receives 
a contribution from the firm, and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix 
1. Standard errors corrected for clustering at the firm level are reported in parentheses. * p < 
.10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-tailed test). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
jtAmounts
Contracts
 
jtAmounts
Contracts
 
jtNumbers
Contracts
 
jtNumbers
Contracts
 
     
jtnAssociatioonContributiOwnership __  0.115*** 0.079** 0.028*** 0.016* 
 
(0.035) (0.034) (0.010) (0.009) 
     
jtSize   2.300***  0.850*** 
  (0.310)  (0.094) 
     
jtBM   0.600  0.256 
  (1.769)  (0.450) 
     
jtIndexHerfindahl_   -11.803  0.150 
  (12.032)  (2.952) 
     
jtSalesCAPX /   -2.558  0.105 
  (6.127)  (1.718) 
     
jtROA   -2.412  -2.036 
  (5.411)  (1.485) 
     
jtSalesCOGS /   4.806**  1.462** 
  (2.267)  (0.644) 
     
Year Indicators? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Indicators? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept 12.481* -43.927*** 5.293** -16.40*** 
 (6.920) (10.409) (2.477) (3.346) 
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Ln_sigma 8.514*** 8.122*** 2.390*** 2.238*** 
 (0.304) (0.304) (0.082) (0.080) 
N 2398 2315 2398 2315 
pseudo R2 0.065 0.078 0.114 0.141 
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Table 7 
Table 7, Columns 1 and 2 present logit model estimates of ijtationDiscontinuPAC _ , Columns 3 and 4 present conditional fixed effect 
logit model estimates by fixing the effect at the politician level, and Columns 5 and 6  present conditional fixed effect logit model 
estimates by fixing the effect at the firm level. jitationDiscontinuPAC _  is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if politician i 
does ‘not’ receive a contribution from firm j at time t conditional upon receiving a contribution at time t-1, and zero when  politician i 
receives a contribution from firm j at time t conditional upon receiving a contribution at time t-1. 1−ijtDivest  is defined as an indicator 
variable that takes a value of 1 when politician i is ‘not’ an investor in firm j at time t conditional upon being an investor at time t-1, 
and zero when politician i is an investor in firm j at time t conditional upon being an investor at time t-1. 1__ −ijtMatchFirmCom , is an 
indicator variable that takes a value of 1 when the industry to which firm j belongs is under the influence of politician i's 
Congressional committee at time t-1, and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix 1. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. The standard errors reported in Columns 1 and 2 are corrected for clustering at the politician-firm level.* p < .10, ** p < 
.05, *** p < .01 (two-tailed test). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
  
ijtationDiscontinuPAC _
                
ijtationDiscontinuPAC _
               
ijtationDiscontinuPAC _  
       
1−itDivest
 (1) 0.263** 0.361*** 0.385** 0.396** 0.299** 0.260* 
 (0.111) (0.122) (0.165) (0.166) (0.142) (0.143) 
       
1−itDivest * 1__ −ijtMatchFirmCom (2)                             -0.560* -0.738** -0.729** -0.672* -0.647* 
  (0.301) (0.366) (0.370) (0.346) (0.348) 
       
Test 1 + 2 = 0      [p-value]                 [0.4711] [0.2943] [0.3284 ] [0.2458] [0.2322] 
       
1__ −ijtMatchFirmCom   -0.021 0.043 0.043 -0.157 -0.140 
  (0.144) (0.203) (0.205) (0.161) (0.162) 
       
ijMatchFirmState __    -0.219 -0.233 -0.601*** -0.615*** 
   (0.161) (0.163) (0.165) (0.167) 
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itSeniority    -2.388** -2.530** 0.087 0.032 
   (1.142) (1.179) (0.098) (0.100) 
       
itAge    0.439***  0.015** 0.015** 
   (0.137)  (0.007) (0.007) 
       
irepublican      0.040 0.027 
     (0.119) (0.121) 
       
1−∆ jtSize    -0.422* -0.210 -0.776** -0.318 
   (0.238) (0.243) (0.316) (0.329) 
       
Year Indicator? No No No Yes No Yes 
Intercept -0.417*** -0.413***     
 (0.054) (0.059)     
N 1939 1939 1810 1810 1775 1775 
pseudo R2 0.002 0.004 0.014 0.029 0.021 0.037 
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Appendix I 
Note: the source in each description indicates the origin of the data I use to compute the 
variables. 
Variables  Description 
Politician-firm-specific characteristics  
ijtOwnership  
 
 
The natural logarithm of the dollar amount of 
shares owned if politician i invests in firm j at 
time t, and zero if he or she does not invest. 
Source: The Center for Responsive Politics  
jitPAC  An indicator variable that equals unity if politician 
i receives a campaign contribution from firm j in 
year t, and zero otherwise. Source: The Center for 
Responsive Politics 
ijMatchFirmState __  It is defined, for Representatives, as an indicator 
variable that takes a value of 1 if both the 
headquarter of firm j and the Congressional 
district of politicians i belong to the same state, 
and zero otherwise., while defined, for Senators, 
as an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if 
the headquarter of firm j are in the same state of 
politicians i, and zero otherwise. Source: The 
Center for Politics Response and Compustat 
 
ijtMatchFirmCom __  An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 when 
the industry membership of firm j is under the 
jurisdiction of the Congressional committee 
assignment of politician i at time t, and zero 
otherwise. Source: Compustat and the website of 
Charles Stewart III (MIT) 
http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data_page.html 
 
jitionInvestigatNonPAC −_
 
An indicator variable that equals unity if politician 
i receives a campaign contribution from firm j and 
is ‘not’ under investigation in year t, and zero 
otherwise. Source: The Center for Responsive 
Politics 
 
jitionInvestigatPAC _
 
An indicator variable that equals unity if politician 
i receives a campaign contribution from firm j and 
is under investigation in year t, and zero 
otherwise. Source: The Center for Responsive 
Politics    
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ijtationDiscontinuPAC _
 
An indicator variable that takes the value 1 if 
politician i does ‘not’ receive a contribution from 
firm j at time t conditional upon receiving a 
contribution at time t-1, and zero when  politician 
i receives a contribution from firm j at time t 
conditional upon receiving a contribution at time 
t-1. Source: The Center for Responsive Politics 
 
1−itDivest
 
An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 when 
politician i is ‘not’ an investor in firm j at time t 
conditional upon being an investor at time t-1, and 
zero when politician i is an investor in firm j at 
time t conditional upon being an investor at time 
t-1. Source: The Center for Responsive Politics 
 
Politician-specific characteristics  
itWealthNet  The difference between itAssets and itsLiabilitie . 
Assets are the total number of all legal ownerships 
a politician has in a company or property, 
including brokerage accounts, corporate bonds, 
and stocks. Politicians should report only assets 
worth more than $1,000 at the end of the calendar 
year or producing more than $200 in income. 
Politicians report the value of each of their assets 
within one of several ranges. The Center for 
Politics Response compute a minimum 
(maximum) value of total assets by summing the 
minimum (maximum) values of individual assets 
owned by each politician. I use the average of the 
minimum and maximum values of total assets as 
the value of total assets owned by a politician. 
Liabilities include loans, credit card debt, and 
mortgages on properties that produce income. 
Congress members and top officials in the 
executive branch must report liabilities that total 
more than $10,000 at any time during the calendar 
year. Politicians report the amount of each of their 
liabilities within one of several ranges. The Center 
for Politics Response compute a minimum 
(maximum) value of total liabilities by summing 
the minimum (maximum) values of individual 
liabilities owed by each politician. I use the 
average of the minimum and maximum values of 
total liabilities as the value of total liabilities owed 
by a politician. Source: The Center for Responsive 
Politics 
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itAge  
 
The age of politician i at time t.  Source: 
Wikipedia   
iGender  An indicator variable takes a value of 1 if 
politician i is male, and zero otherwise. Source: 
Wikipedia 
 
irepublican
 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if a politician i is 
republican at time t, and zero otherwise. Source: 
The Center for Responsive Politics 
 
itCommitteePowerful _  An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if 
politician i is a member of an influential and 
powerful committee at time t, and zero otherwise. 
Source: The website of Charles Stewart III (MIT) 
http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data_page.html 
 
itCommitteesPowerfulNo __  The number of seats on influential committees a 
politician i holds in year t. Source: The website of 
Charles Stewart III (MIT) 
http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data_page.html 
 
itSeniority  The log of 1 plus the number of years since the 
date a politician was first elected to Congress. 
Source: The Center for Responsive Politics 
 
Firm-specific characteristics  
jtrepPAC _  The sum of all contributions paid to all 
Republican candidates (regardless of whether the 
candidate is elected) by firm j in year t. Source: 
The Center for Responsive Politics 
 
jtdemPAC _  The sum of all contributions paid to all 
Democratic candidates (regardless of whether the 
candidate is elected) by firm j in year t. Source: 
The Center for Responsive Politics 
 
jtjt repPACdemPAC −
 
The difference between jtdemPAC _
 
and 
jtrepPAC _ . Source: The Center for Responsive 
Politics 
 
jtAmountsContract_  The log of 1 plus contract amounts 
Source: Eagle Eye Publishers, Inc. 
http://www.usaspending.org 
 
jtNumbersContract _  The log of 1 plus the aggregate number of 
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contracts. Source: Eagle Eye Publishers, Inc. 
http://www.usaspending.org 
 
jtnAssociatioonContributiOwnership __  The estimated coefficient on iPAC  obtained from 
the firm j-year t specific Tobit model that 
regresses iOwnership  onto iPAC . Source: 
Estimated by the author using data from the 
Center for Responsive Politics 
 
jtSize  The log of the market capitalization for firm j at 
the end of year t. Source: Compustat 
 
1−jtSize  The log of the market capitalization for firm j at 
the beginning of year t. Source: Compustat 
 
jtBM  The book-to-market ratio for firm j at the end of 
year t. Source: Compustat 
 
1−jtBM  The book-to-market ratio for firm j at the 
beginning of year t. Source: Compustat 
 
jtMomentum  The twelve-month buy-and-hold stock return. 
Source: CRSP 
 
jtVolatilityturnRe  The standard deviation of daily returns. Source: 
CRSP 
 
jtDividends  Dividends per share divided by the year-end share 
price. Source: Compustat and CRSP 
 
jtLeverage  The ratio of total debt to total assets for firm j at 
time t. Source: Compustat 
 
jtROA  The income before extraordinary items available 
to common divided by total assets. Source: 
Compustat 
 
jtIndexHerfindahl_  The Herfindahl sales concentration index based on 
the total sales of all firms that have the same two-
digit SIC code. Source: Compustat 
 
jtSalesCAPX /  The ratio of capital expenditure to sales for firm j 
in year t. Source: Compustat 
 
jtSalesCOGS /  The ratio of cost of goods sold to sales for firm j 
at time t. Source: Compustat 
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1−∆ jtSize
 
The change in firm size during year t-1. 
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Appendix II 
 
The Case of Representative Jerry Lewis (R-CA) 
 
Representative Jerry Lewis (R-CA) is a sixteen-term member of Congress and has been a 
member of the House Appropriations Committee since 1980. From 2005 to 2006, he served as 
chairman of the full committee, and he currently serves as a ranking member. Rep. Lewis’ 
ethical issues arise from his misusing of his position on the Appropriations Committee to steer 
hundreds of millions of dollars in earmarks to family, friends, former employees, and 
corporations in exchange for contributions to his campaign committee: 
 
“In 2005, shortly after becoming chairman of the Appropriations Committee, Rep. Lewis was 
asked to buy into an initial public offering of a fledgling bank, Security Bank of California, 
headed by his close friend James Robinson. Rep. Lewis’ initial investment of $22,000 for 
2,200 stocks in Security Bank was worth nearly $60,000 in 2006, an increase of almost 300%. 
The stock was recommended to Rep. Lewis by Mr. Robinson’s wife, a former chair and board 
member of the Loma Linda University Children’s Hospital Foundation, a branch of Loma 
Linda University Medical Center. Rep. Lewis has helped direct more than $200 million in 
federal dollars to the medical center, which has facilities named in his honor. In June 2006, 
Rep. Lewis acknowledged that the medical center benefitted from $40 million in earmarks. 
Many of Security Bank’s board members have also contributed to Rep. Lewis’ campaign and 
are linked to businesses that received federal earmarks. They include Zareh Sarrafian, an 
executive with Loma Linda Medical Center and president of the Hospital Foundation’s board, 
and Bruce Varner, a friend of Rep. Lewis’ who served on the board of the National Orange 
Show Events Center in San Bernardino. The center has received more than $800,000 in 
federal funds.” (Crew report 2009, pp. 37–38) 
 
The Case of Representative Maxine Waters (D-CA) 
 
Representative Maxine Waters (D-CA) is a ten-term member of Congress and a senior 
member of the House Financial Services Committee. She arranged a meeting between the 
Department of Treasury and OneUnited Bank, a company with close financial ties to Ms. 
Waters, involving both investments and contributions. 
 
“In September 2008, Rep. Waters asked then-Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson to hold 
a meeting for minority-owned banks that had suffered from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
losses. The Treasury Department complied and held a session with approximately a dozen 
senior banking regulators, representatives from minority-owned banks, and their trade 
association. Officials of OneUnited Bank, one of the largest black-owned banks in the country 
that has close ties to Rep. Waters, attended the meeting along with Rep. Waters’ chief of staff. 
Kevin Cohee, chief executive officer of OneUnited, used the meeting as an opportunity to ask 
for bailout funds. . . . Former Bush White House officials stated they were surprised when 
OneUnited Officials asked for bailout funds. . . . In December 2008, Rep. Waters intervened 
again, asking Treasury to host another meeting to ensure minority-owned banks received part 
of the $700 billion allocated under the Troubled Asset Relief Program. . . . Within two weeks, 
on December 19, 2008, OneUnited secured $12.1 million in bailout funds. . . . This was not 
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the first time Rep. Waters used her position to advance the interests of the bank. Rep. Waters’ 
spouse, Sidney Williams, became a shareholder in OneUnited in 2001, when it was known as 
the Boston Bank of Commerce. In 2002, Boston Bank of Commerce tried to purchase Family 
Savings, a minority-owned bank in Los Angeles. Instead, Family Savings turned to a bank in 
Illinois. Rep. Waters tried to block the merger by contacting regulators at the FDIC. She 
publicly stated she did not want a major white bank to acquire a minority-owned bank. When 
her efforts with the FDIC proved fruitless, Rep. Waters began a public pressure campaign with 
other community leaders. Ultimately, when Family Savings changed direction and allowed 
Boston Bank of Commerce to submit a winning bid, Rep. Waters received credit for the 
merger. The combined banks were renamed OneUnited. . . . In March 2004, she acquired 
OneUnited stock worth between $250,001 and $500,000, and Mr. Williams purchased two 
sets of stock, each worth between $250,001 and $500,000. In September 2004, Rep. Waters 
sold her stock in OneUnited and her husband sold a portion of his. That same year, Mr. 
Williams joined the bank’s board. . . . OneUnited Chief Executive Kevin Cohee and President 
Teri Williams Cohee have donated a total of $8,000 to Rep. Waters’ campaign committee 
since 2002. . . . On October 27, 2009, less than two months before OneUnited received a $12 
million bailout, the bank received a cease-and-desist order from the FDIC and bank regulatory 
officials in Massachusetts for poor lending practices and excessive executive compensation . . 
. the bank provided excessive perks to its executives, including paying for Mr. Cohee’s use of 
a $6.4 million mansion . . .” (Crew report 2009, pp. 123–125) 
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Chapter 5 
Summary and Suggestions for Future Research 
 
In this thesis, I examine why there are distortions in investor portfolio selection, and show the 
consequence of these distortions on firms’ investment decisions. These distortions in portfolio 
selections could be either due to market frictions or investor preferences. I introduce an 
example for each of these two reasons. Specifically, I introduce the quality of accounting 
system as an example for market frictions, and the personal relation of investors with firms as 
an example for investor preferences. I show that these two examples indeed explain the 
distortions in investors’ portfolio allocations. I also show that firms, as a consequence of these 
distortions, do not invest efficiently. The overall conclusion is that improving the quality of 
the accounting system, as part of country-level institutions, mitigates the distortions in 
investors’ investment decision, and consequently improves those of firms. Good institutions, 
however, will not always guarantee that there are no distortions in investor portfolio 
selections. Investors could also choose to misallocate their funds due to personal motives. I 
provide below a summary of each of the three essays constituting my thesis, and possible 
directions for future research. 
 
In Chapter two, I examine the economic consequences of the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 
EU countries by showing which types of economies have the largest reduction in investment-
cash flow sensitivity post-IFRS. I also examine whether the reduction in investment-cash flow 
sensitivity depends on firm size as well as economy type. I find that the investment-cash flow 
sensitivity of insider economies is higher than that of outsider economies pre-IFRS and that 
IFRS reduces the investment-cash flow sensitivity of insider economies more than that of 
outsider economies. Also, I find that small firms in insider economies have the highest 
sensitivity of investment to lagged cash flow pre-IFRS, and that they are no longer sensitive to 
lagged cash flow post-IFRS. Overall, my results suggest that IFRS adoption might have 
improved the functioning of capital markets in relation to small firms in insider economies. 
Bear in mind that my documented results might not be a direct outcome of IFRS but rather an 
indirect outcome. For example, IFRS adoption might have changed the proportion of firms 
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being audited by the Big 4 auditors. Observing big auditing firms in the market might have 
subsequently affected the trust of both current and potential investors in the stock market. Any 
increase in investors’ trust in the stock market is likely to imply a higher flow of external 
capital to firms, and, accordingly, lower investment-cash flow sensitivity. Examining this line 
of argument empirically is an important topic for future research. In addition, my results might 
not be attributed solely to IFRS adoption as there were simultaneous institutional and 
enforcement improvements in the EU suggesting that the documented results might be the 
outcome of IFRS or these improvements or the joint effects of both sets of changes working 
together. Disentangling these two effects is a challenge for future empirical research. In 
addition, the documented increase in investment efficiency could be either due to more public 
information released by managers to investors or due to changes in investors’ perception about 
how much private information mangers do possess. In other words, it is interesting to 
investigate whether the documented benefits of IFRS adoption are due to actual changes in 
firms’ information environment or whether they are due to changes in market’s assessment of 
how good the information environment is likely to be. 
 
In Chapter three, I show that the level of conditional accounting conservatism of foreign 
markets significantly influences decisions to diversify portfolios internationally. This could be 
either because conditional conservatism per se is attractive to international investors, or 
because the unmodelled factors that attract foreign investors to a country also cause these 
countries to adopt conditionally conservative accounting practices. We also find that the 
positive association between investor diversification decision and conditional conservatism is 
sensitive to the level of conditional conservatism of investors’ home markets. Two reasons 
explain this finding: (1) investors are expected to invest more in foreign countries whose 
accounting systems are similar to their own; or (2) investors based in poor quality home 
markets choose to hold concentrated portfolios of their home equities, thereby sacrificing 
diversification in foreign markets. If conditional conservatism serves to alleviate foreign 
investors’ concerns related to insiders have asymmetric access to information then one would 
expect the chosen mode of entry into a foreign market (as foreign portfolio or direct investor) 
to be sensitive to the level of conditional conservatism. I find evidence supportive of this 
expectation. My results indicate that conditionally conservative accounting systems improve 
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risk sharing. Overall, my results suggest an important role for the quality of accounting 
systems on the degree of investor diversification. If this is indeed true, one would predict an 
exogenous change in the quality of accounting system (for example, by adopting IFRS) to be 
accompanied by changes in the degree of investor diversification. For example, do we observe 
a reduction (an increase) in the propensity to enter as a block holder (portfolio investors) in a 
foreign market that adopted IFRS? and is the effect more pronounced in markets that enforced 
the adoption of IFRS and used to have a prior poor accounting system? In addition, since there 
will be lower demand on monitoring via ownership concentration in the post-IFRS adoption 
period due to transparency improvement, one might ask: do we indeed observe large 
shareholders who used to monitor the firm in the pre-IFRS adoption to divest all (or at least a 
significant portion) of their holdings in the post-IFRS period? In other words, can IFRS 
adoption reduce the cost borne by dedicated monitors due to being under-diversified? Testing 
these empirical predictions is an interesting topic for future research.  
 
In Chapter four, I examine the role of stock ownership by politicians on the market for 
political favors. Specifically, I predict that the stock ownership of a politician in a firm can be 
a possible mechanism to establish a mutual relation with this firm. I define a ‘mutual relation’ 
as an agreement in which firms support politicians during the election and politicians, in turn, 
provide private benefits to these firms. I document pieces of evidence supporting my 
prediction as follows. There is a positive association between the ownership of politicians and 
the contribution they receive from firms during the elections. This association is a function of 
how valuable is establishing a mutual relation between politicians and firms. Politicians invest 
more in firms that favor their party and less in firms that oppose their party. The strength of 
the ownership-based relation with contributing firms is positively associated with the amount 
as well as the number of government contracts awarded to firms. When politicians divest the 
stock, the established relation with contributing firms breaks down. Such break-down, 
however, only exists when there are no other mechanisms enforcing politician-firm relations. 
As I explain in chapter four, the ownership of stocks by politicians acts as a mechanism that 
fosters repeated interactions, reputation building, and long-term relationships of politicians 
that invest with firms in which they invest. This implies that politicians will not trade their 
stocks, which might, accordingly, lead to losses due to their inability to readjust their portfolio 
 166 
holdings. Some politicians, however, might be seeking relations with firms not as a 
‘politician’ seeking political gains (via firms’ support and contributions) but as an ‘investor’ 
seeking access to insider information. Thus, another possible definition of a mutual relation 
between firms and politicians could be an agreement in which firms provides politicians with 
private insider information (thereby enabling them to trade on firm-specific information) and 
politicians, in turn, provide private benefits to these firms. Thus, one might ask: is a political 
network (i.e., the connection between firms and politicians) a channel via which private 
information can be impounded into stock prices? Examining this line of argument empirically 
is an interesting avenue for future research.  
 
 
 
